Investor sentiment as a factor in an APT model: an international perspective using the FEARS index by Solanki, Kamini Narenda
  
 
 
Investor Sentiment as a Factor in an 
APT Model: An International 
Perspective Using the FEARS Index 
Kamini Solanki 
 
School of Economic and Business Sciences 
University of the Witwatersrand 
Johannesburg 
South Africa 
 
 
 
 
  
i 
 
Investor Sentiment as a Factor in an APT Model: An International Perspective Using the 
FEARS Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kamini Solanki 
361490 
Supervisor: Dr. Y. Seetharam 
School of Economic and Business Sciences 
 
A thesis submitted to the School of Economic and Business Sciences, Faculty of Commerce, 
Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand in fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Commerce (M.Com) in Finance. 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
June 2017
ii 
 
DECLARATION 
I, Kamini Solanki, declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is submitted in fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Commerce (M.Com) in Finance at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree 
or examination at this or any other university. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
Kamini Solanki 
June 2017
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
“No one who achieves success does so without acknowledging the help of others. The wise and 
confident acknowledge this help with gratitude.” 
~ Alfred North Whitehead 
I would like to express my gratitude to: 
- My supervisor, Yudhvir Seetharam – Thank you for your insight and guidance 
throughout this journey; without you I would not have been able to accomplish this 
- My parents, Anita and Narendra – Thank you for supporting and encouraging me 
throughout this journey. You were the light that guided me through the dark and this 
would not have been possible without you 
- My family and friends – Thank you for inspiring and encouraging me through this 
journey 
  
iv 
 
Definitions of Terms and Abbreviations 
Abreast of the Market (AOTM) – A column in the Wall Street Journal focusing purely on 
financial news. 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) – A theory of asset pricing that posits that the expected 
return of a financial asset can be modelled as a linear function of various factors, either macro- 
or micro-economic in nature. 
American Association of Independent Investors (AAII) – The AAII conducts a weekly 
survey of its member and their view of future market direction, specifically the survey asks 
members whether they have a bullish, bearish or neutral outlook on the stock market over the 
next six months. 
Animus X – The survey focuses on the prospects of the German stock market over the short-
term and medium-term, where short-term sentiment concerns expectations for the following 
week and medium term sentiment covers respondents’ expectation over the next three months. 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) – A model that describes the relationship between risk 
and expected return that is used to price risky assets.  
FNB/BER Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) – A survey-based sentiment index compiled 
by the Bureau of Economic Research in Stellenbosch, South Africa. The survey is constructed 
using three questions, each carrying a different weighting; the CCI is then computed as the 
average of the result of the three questions. The CCI is expressed as a net balance, therefore 
revealing changes in consumer expectations. The net balance is derived as the difference 
between the percentage of respondents expecting an improvement, and those expecting a 
decline. 
Global Mood Time Series (GMTS) – The Global Mood Time Series is provided by Wall 
Street Birds, a service that analyses Twitter posts to assess the global ‘mood’ of an economy. 
Wall Street Birds uses a mood assessment tool that assigns a weighting according to positive 
and negative tone. 
Google Search Volume Index (SVI) – Google Trends provides data on the frequency with 
which various search terms are searched for. The SVI is compiled using users’ searches and 
hence SVI data can be extracted for specific words, shares, events and so on. 
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Gross National Happiness Index (GNHI) – The Gross National Happiness index is compiled 
from Facebook by determining the textual analysis of content from status updates. GNHI is 
calculated using the word-count methodology in which Facebook measures a status update’s 
positivity (negativity) according to the relative frequency with which positive (negative) 
emotion words are used. 
Investor Intelligence (II) – The Investor Intelligence survey reflects the sentiment of financial 
newsletter writers, with the sentiment of the writers being classified as bullish, bearish or 
neutral. 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MSCI) – A survey-based sentiment index compiled 
by the University of Michigan; this index is a weighted average of responses to five survey 
questions about respondents’ views on current and future financial conditions. 
Raging Bull (RB) – An online financial community that allows users to post and read 
messages, own a private board, follow company data and participate in discussions. 
Seeking Alpha (SA) – A personal finance social media website that serves as a platform for 
investors to provide insight and analysis garnered from their own personal experiences. 
Yahoo! Finance (YF) – An online platform that offers the latest financial and business news 
with a focus on US markets. 
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Investor Sentiment as a Factor in an APT Model: An International Perspective Using the 
FEARS Index 
ABSTRACT 
Traditional finance theory surrounding the risk-return relationship is underpinned by the 
CAPM which posits that a single risk factor, specifically market risk, is priced into asset 
returns. Even though it is a popular asset pricing model, the CAPM has been widely criticised 
due to its unrealistic assumptions and the APT was developed to address the CAPM’s 
weaknesses. The APT framework allows for a multitude of risk factors to be priced into asset 
returns; implying that it can be used to model returns using either macroeconomic or 
microeconomic factors. As such, the APT allows for non-traditional factors, such as investor 
sentiment, to be included. A macroeconomic APT framework was developed for nine countries 
using the variables outlined by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) and investor sentiment was 
measured by the FEARS index (Da, Engelberg, & Gao, 2015). Regression testing was used to 
determine whether FEARS is a statistically significant explanatory variable in the APT model 
for each country. The results show that investor sentiment is a statistically significant 
explanatory variable for market returns in five out of the nine countries examined. These results 
add to the existing APT literature as they show that investor sentiment has a significant 
explanatory role in explaining asset prices and their associated returns. The international nature 
of this study allows it to be extended by considering the role that volatility spill-over or the 
contagion effect would have on each model.  
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1 Introduction 
Asset pricing can be broadly defined as a collection of theories whose aim is to determine the 
fair price of an asset. Moreover, there is a close relationship between the fundamental value of 
an asset and the appropriate return that asset should earn (which is determined by its price). As 
such, the collection of asset pricing theories is responsible for determining not only the fair 
price of an asset, but also its associated appropriate return (Krause, 2001). It is important to 
note that the fundamental value of an asset is often different to the observed price in the market. 
The fundamental value of an asset refers to the natural price such that it gives the owner a 
sufficient profit. On the other hand, the market price is determined by demand and supply and 
hence can deviate from the fundamental value; this deviation is short lived as the asset price 
will often return to its fundamental value in the long run (Smith, 1776).  
Traditionally, many theories are focused on the fundamental value of an asset; asset pricing 
theories, however, are widely used to explain observed or market prices. These theories can 
cover a whole host of assets, such as bonds, stocks, interest rates, exchange rates, and 
derivatives of those underlying assets. Furthermore, the understanding of asset prices and 
returns is fundamental to an economy as it affects asset allocation, the allocation of resources, 
the measurement and management of financial risks, and influences individuals’ decision 
making on a daily basis (Munk, 2013). Given the role asset pricing plays in the economy, it is 
critical that a thorough understanding of asset price behaviour is gained.  
Traditional finance theory surrounding the risk-return relationship is underpinned by the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) – developed collaboratively by Markowitz (1952), 
Sharpe (1964), and Lintner (1965) – which posits that one risk factor, specifically market risk, 
is priced into asset returns. The CAPM is widely criticised for its unrealistic assumptions and 
its weakness in empirical testing; the Arbitrage Pricing Model (APT) – developed by Ross 
(1976) – was developed to address the CAPM’s weaknesses. The most significant difference 
between the two models is that the APT allows for a multitude of risk factors to be priced into 
asset returns. This implies that the APT framework can be used to model returns using either 
macroeconomic or microeconomic factors. Research pertaining to the former was pioneered 
by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) who found that industrial production, and changes in both the 
risk premium and yield curve exhibited the strongest explanatory power for expected stock 
returns. On the microeconomic side, Fama and French (1993) found that the book-to-market 
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ratio and the size, as measured by market capitalisation, of portfolios have significant 
explanatory power for expected returns. 
As mentioned, the APT framework allows for the modelling of expected returns using various 
factors – this is advantageous as it allows for a multitude of different approaches to be taken. 
One of these can be provided by behavioural finance which has emerged as a key research area 
in the finance world, fuelled by the shortcomings of traditional finance theory. The study of 
psychology and sociology in conjunction with traditional finance ensures a more holistic 
understanding of both the investor as well as financial market dynamics. Investor sentiment 
which encompasses individuals’ emotions and how these impact decision making, is one 
principle of behavioural finance that can be applied to traditional finance. 
The measurement of investor sentiment has evolved substantially – the fundamental 
measurement tool being survey data. Measurement was then extended to include proxies in the 
form of various market variables – the most notable of these being the Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) investor sentiment index which was constructed using six market-specific variables. 
Most recently, however, technology has enabled us to use various forms of media data to 
measure investor sentiment. An innovative investor sentiment index is the Financial and 
Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS) index developed by Da, Engleberg and Gao 
(2015). The approach employed in the FEARS index involves using search volume data for a 
particular set of search terms from Google Trends. The search words used to construct the 
FEARS index encompassed both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ words that were economic and 
financial in nature. This was done despite literature demonstrating that, in the English language, 
negative words are more useful in identifying sentiment (Tetlock, 2007). The nature of the data 
allows for a large degree of flexibility in what can be measured as a change in the set of search 
words can change what the index measures. 
In their analysis, Da, Engelberg and Gao (2015) use a different set of words to construct both 
a microeconomic and macroeconomic FEARS index. Both indices were tested against: asset 
returns, a US volatility index (VIX) and daily mutual fund flows. When conducting their 
analysis the microeconomic FEARS index was found to have no statistically significant 
contemporaneous relationship with asset returns. The macroeconomic FEARS index, on the 
other hand, was found to have a strong and statistically significant contemporaneous 
relationship with asset returns. Specifically, increases in the macroeconomic FEARS index 
correspond with low market returns on the same day, but also predict high returns over the next 
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few days. Increases in the macroeconomic FEARS index also predicted a negative change in 
the VIX a few days later. Finally, when tested against daily mutual fund flows, it was found 
that increases in the macroeconomic FEARS index triggered investors to sell equity funds, but 
not bond funds, thus pushing down the price of equity funds. This evidence indicates that 
measuring investor sentiment using macroeconomic variables better captures the variation in 
asset returns, volatility and mutual fund flows. This is likely due to the nature of data as it is 
more aligned to what individuals are searching for on Google. 
The scope of this study is to replicate the FEARS index (Da, Engelberg, & Gao, 2015) using 
search volumes for macroeconomic key words from Google Trends for a variety of countries. 
Thereafter, this index will be used as an input variable into a macroeconomic APT model. 
Regression testing will be conducted both with and without the FEARS variable. The outcome 
will give an indication of whether the FEARS index is an appropriate risk factor with the ability 
to explain returns. It is important to note that this implies that the objective of the study is the 
feasibility of APT factors in explaining market returns, and not the creation of an APT model. 
The choice to focus on macroeconomic variables is driven by the following: 
1. Macroeconomics is the study of an economy as a whole as well as the variables that 
control that economy. As such, on a high level they would describe the drivers of a 
country’s economy as well as its stock market. A macroeconomic approach coupled 
with the international nature of this study implies that a level of comparison would be 
possible as to the drivers of the different economies – this would provide much richer 
insight into these countries than focusing on microeconomic factors which are subject 
to large amounts of noise from the individual countries. 
2. Hence, the macroeconomic APT model of Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) was chosen as 
the base for this study; it makes use of macroeconomic variables which have been 
shown to capture the variation in market returns. 
3. The evidence uncovered by Da, Engelberg and Gao (2015) indicated that their 
macroeconomic FEARS index outperformed the microeconomic alternative. This 
implies that macroeconomic household sentiment was able to explain returns better 
than their microeconomic sentiment index. 
4. The lowest frequency available for many macroeconomic metrics is monthly. Google 
Trends data, on the other hand, is available on both a monthly and weekly basis. This 
will provide insight into how quickly Google Trends data is reflected in stock prices 
as well as what information is captured in a trends variable. 
4 
 
5. Finally, when describing an asset pricing model to explain market returns it is 
important that there is consistency as to the nature of the variables – a macroeconomic 
base model should be accompanied by a macroeconomic sentiment variable. This 
consistency in approach implies that insights can be drawn about a specific topic – in 
this case, the macroeconomic drivers of a country’s stock market and whether investor 
sentiment plays a role in explaining the variation in returns as well. 
The empirical analysis will include South Africa, the remaining BRICS countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China) as well as a number of developed markets from the G71. The primary 
reason for pursuing this study on an international scale is that it will allow for comparisons 
across both developed and developing markets. Specifically, existing literature documents the 
vastly different characteristics of developing markets which include: higher expected asset 
returns, low correlations with developed markets, more predictable returns and higher volatility 
(Bekaert & Harvey, 1997). As such, understanding the differences between developed and 
developing markets as well as the drivers behind them will add further insight. 
It is important to highlight that the approach employed in this study is not to create the 
International APT (IAPT) of Solnik (1974) – this will be discussed in more detail in Section 
2.2.1. The IAPT involves using global macroeconomic factors to explain the variation in global 
stock returns – this approach does not necessarily allow for the level of insight and 
comparability desired in this study as comparing an IAPT for BRICS and various G7 countries 
would give little insight into the individual countries themselves. Moreover, the empirical 
testing of the IAPT is ambiguous as it tests a joint hypothesis that the IAPT holds and that 
global markets are integrated. As such, one would be unable to distinguish whether empirical 
results indicate that the IAPT holds or if international markets are segmented. For these 
reasons, the IAPT will be covered from a literature perspective but will not be empirically 
tested. 
This study yields insight into two different aspects of literature. Firstly, it builds upon existing 
APT literature as it considers the role a behavioural finance factor, such as investor sentiment, 
could have in explaining asset prices and their associated returns. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
1 The G7 is a group consisting of seven major economies, as identified by the International Monetary Fund, which 
regularly meet to discuss economic issues. 
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international nature of this study yields insight into the economies and stock markets of the 
various counties under examination. 
1.1 Issues and Problems to be Investigated 
The aim of many traditional finance models and theories has been to gain a better understanding 
of financial markets; specifically, which factors could be the drivers behind asset returns and 
which ones could be used to predict returns in the hopes of making superior returns. As much 
as these models provided valuable insight into financial markets, they were limited by their 
foundational assumptions which are largely unrealistic. As a result, academics sought 
alternative explanations for events in financial markets; one of which was to investigate the 
role that individuals’ emotions play in these markets. 
Behavioural finance has provided an exciting avenue of research into explaining financial 
markets and has been successful in explaining phenomena in the market that were previously 
unable to be explained under traditional finance models and theories. One aspect of behavioural 
finance which has received a lot of attention in its ability to explain stock returns is investor 
sentiment; this encompasses individuals’ emotions and how these impact decision making. 
Given the existing literature regarding investor sentiment and its ability to explain returns as 
well as the need to better understand the complexity of financial markets, the natural question 
is then whether financial market returns can be better explained by incorporating an investor 
sentiment factor into a return generating process (such as the APT). 
The problem facing many existing and traditional asset pricing models is that they are grounded 
in an assumption of a completely rational investor. Asset pricing models do not take into 
account the effect an irrational investor could have on explaining market returns. This is 
precisely what this study will consider. Considering investor sentiment, measured by the 
FEARS index, as a factor in an APT model will provide great insight into the effect that 
investors’ thoughts and beliefs may have on determining market returns. As such, the objective 
of this research is to determine whether investor sentiment has explanatory power for market 
returns in various countries around the world. More generally, the objective is the feasibility 
of various APT factors, including investor sentiment, in explaining market returns and not the 
creation of an APT model. 
A potential problem or limitation in pursuing research of this nature is the risk that investor 
sentiment could already be incorporated into any one of the factors in the return generating 
process. Hence, incorporating an investor sentiment factor into the APT would prove fruitless 
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as its effects would already be captured elsewhere. That being said, regression testing will be 
conducted both excluding and including the FEARS variable; thereafter, it will be determined 
which model is superior in explaining returns. This could reveal that the macroeconomic model 
without FEARS could be superior which could imply that investor sentiment does not play an 
explanatory role or that investor sentiment is captured elsewhere in one of the explanatory 
variables. Additionally, robustness checks will be conducted on the FEARS indices for the 
various countries to determine if any statistical relationship found between FEARS and market 
returns is a true statistical relationship or is in fact driven by noise traders. 
 
1.2 Feasibility of Study 
This study seeks to determine if investor sentiment is a suitable risk factor to be included in an 
APT model to explain stock returns. As demonstrated in the literature review, an APT model 
is quite dynamic in that it allows for a number of factors to model returns, with a large body of 
research investigating the suitability of various factors. The literature has also shown the effect 
that investor sentiment has on financial markets; with investor sentiment able to be measured 
using a number of different methodolgies. A study including an investor sentiment measure 
into the APT has not been attempted in South Africa, and has had limited coverage on the 
international scale. Therefore, this study will add to the existing literature about the role 
investor sentiment plays in asset pricing as well as determine the viability of investor sentiment 
as an explanatory variable in a macroeconomic APT framework. Given that much of the 
existing literature on asset pricing theory and investor sentiment has been conducted 
internationally and mainly in developed countries, the nuances of examining various 
developing markets including South Africa, will add an interesting dimension to the study. 
 
1.3 Research Objective and Hypothesis 
1.3.1 Primary  
Determine if an investor sentiment indicator, the FEARS index, is a statistically significant 
factor in explaining returns using the APT model. 
As such, the primary hypothesis is as follows: 
H0: Investor sentiment is not a statistically significant factor in the APT 
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HA: Investor sentiment is a statistically significant factor in the APT 
This validity of this hypothesis will be assessed according to the number of countries where 
FEARS was found to be statistically significant. If investor sentiment is found to be statistically 
significant in more than 50% of the countries tested, then the hypothesis can be declared valid. 
Despite the fact that the primary hypothesis is about the APT in general, the validity of the 
hypothesis will be determined by the data being used. 
1.3.2 Secondary 
Determine if investor sentiment is statistically significant in explaining market returns for 
various countries around the world. 
As such, the secondary hypothesis applicable to each country under examination is as follows: 
H0: Investor sentiment is not a statistically significant explanatory variable for explaining 
market returns in each country 
HA: Investor sentiment is a statistically significant explanatory variable for explaining market 
returns in each country  
 
1.4 Summary of Results 
The aim of this study is to determine if investor sentiment, as measured by the FEARS index, 
plays a statistically significant role in explaining market returns in various developed and 
developing nations around the world. The FEARS index is constructed using Google Trends 
search volume data and is then incorporated into a macroeconomic APT model. Regression 
analysis will determine if investor sentiment is in fact an explanatory factor in an APT 
framework. 
The results of the analysis can be explained in two parts. First, the results showed that different 
macroeconomic variables explained returns in different countries. The variables which had 
explanatory power in multiple countries include the real interest rate, risk premium, and term 
structure of rates. Variables such as inflation and industrial production had explanatory power, 
albeit in few countries. When the FEARS index was included as an explanatory variable the 
explanatory power of each country’s model improved, some with a greater magnitude than 
others. FEARS was found to have statistically significant explanatory power in five out of the 
nine countries examined. Specifically, investor sentiment can be used as a factor to explain 
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market returns in Russia, SA, Japan, UK, and the US. Unfortunately, investor sentiment lacked 
explanatory power in the remaining countries: Brazil, India, China, and Germany. These results 
address both the problem as well as the objective outlined in Section 1.1. The incorporation of 
the FEARS index, a macroeconomic investor sentiment measure, into an APT model addressed 
this problem. Furthermore, the results of the statistical testing meet the objective of determining 
whether investor sentiment has explanatory power for market returns in various countries 
around the world. Finally, no clear link could be established between investor sentiment’s 
explanatory powers in developed versus developing nations. 
These results provide insight into the countries under examination and can be used by both 
traders and policy decision makers to inform better decisions. Specifically, those 
macroeconomic variables found to explain the variation in market returns as well as the role 
that investor sentiment plays in certain economies can be exploited by traders to maximise their 
profits. On a high level, the regression results can be used by policy decision makers to ensure 
that policies are made in the best interests of the country as well as to address some of the 
factors which could make the country more susceptible to the effects of investor sentiment. 
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1.5 Chapter Outline 
The following chapters will be presented in this dissertation. 
Chapter Two provides the literature review for this study; it includes an overview of popular 
asset pricing models and their extensions, as well as a history and overview of investor 
sentiment, the various methods in which it is measured and the role it plays in explaining 
financial returns and other financial theories and phenomena. 
Chapter Three outlines the data used for this study as well as the methodology applied in the 
study. Specifically, it details the choice of countries, APT factors, and the creation of the 
FEARS index as well as the statistical testing conducted to meet the objectives of this study. 
Chapter Four presents the results uncovered in this study by each country under examination; 
it also includes a discussion of the results per country as well as on an overall level. 
Finally, Chapter Five presents the concluding remarks of this dissertation as well as avenues 
for further research. 
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2 Literature Review 
Fundamentally, this study focuses on asset pricing and how investor sentiment can play a 
significant and explanatory role when pricing assets. The first two sections introduce the 
relevant asset pricing frameworks, specifically the CAPM and the APT. The development of 
the CAPM, its underlying assumptions, and modifications over time are discussed with the aim 
of demonstrating that the demise of the CAPM, although fundamental in understanding asset 
pricing, lies in its assumptions. The APT model is then introduced and discussed as a 
framework which allows for a variety of factors to be used in explaining asset prices and 
returns. Thereafter, behavioural finance and investor sentiment are introduced as further 
explanatory variables in the APT. Lastly, an important aspect when conducting textual analysis, 
as is employed in this study, is to consider the asymmetric effect between positive and negative 
news. 
2.1 Asset Pricing Models 
2.1.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is considered to be the basic theory that links risk 
and return. Through the collaborative efforts of Markowitz (1952), Sharpe (1964), and Lintner 
(1965), it has been developed and refined in an attempt to understand the trade-off between 
risk and return in financial decision making.  
The theoretical background of the CAPM is underpinned by Sharpe’s initial work on the risk-
return relationship. His approach was based on the intuition that an investor chooses to create 
an efficient portfolio – one that maximises return for a given level of risk and minimises risk 
for a given level of return. Risk itself can be classified as either systematic or unsystematic. 
The latter component refers to the portion of risk that can be attributed to firm-specific events 
and thus can be eliminated through holding a diversified portfolio of assets. Systematic risk, 
however, refers to the risk inherent in a particular stock and hence cannot be eliminated through 
diversification. The fact that some risk can be diversified away is critical in capital market 
theory as it implies that any rational investor will eliminate the risk through diversification and 
hence it will become irrelevant. As a result, investors’ primary concern will rest with the level 
of risk that remains despite diversification efforts, non-diversifiable or market risk. This further 
implies that the level of non-diversifiable risk is of primary importance in selecting assets. The 
CAPM is an important tool used to link this non-diversifiable risk and return for assets; it 
measures a stock’s expected return based on its expected volatility in the market. Sharpe’s 
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proposition is that the expected return of any asset depends on the amount of risk it bears, as 
measured by its beta. 
The formation of the CAPM also made use of the theory of portfolio choice, developed by 
Markowitz (1952) to understand how individuals allocate their assets under uncertainty. This 
theory outlined that an investor’s portfolio choice can be reduced to balancing a trade-off 
between the expected return on the portfolio and its variance. Given that diversification allows 
for risk reduction of a given portfolio, as measured by its variance, portfolio risk will not only 
depend on the return and variance of each asset, but also on the pair-wise covariances of all 
assets in the portfolio. Under this theory the expected return of a portfolio is calculated as the 
sum of the weighted returns of the assets within the portfolio. 
Sharpe (1964) then expanded on the foundation built by Markowitz (1952) by considering the 
implication of adding a risk-free asset. Due to its nature, a risk-free asset’s returns have zero 
standard deviation and hence its returns will be uncorrelated with that of a risky asset. The risk-
free asset is simply viewed as compensation for the time value of money. The introduction of 
a risk-free asset into the portfolio choice selection implies that investors are now faced with 
the decision to either choose an optimum risky portfolio or allocate their funds between the 
risky portfolio and risk-free asset. Regardless of their decision, there will be implications on 
portfolio risk and return. As before, the expected return on the portfolio is calculated as the 
weighted sum of the individual assets that make up the portfolio – an adaptation to the initial 
equation is simply made to include the risk-free component. 
Put simply, the CAPM states that an asset’s risk premium is directly proportional to both the 
beta and risk premium of the market portfolio. 
𝐸(𝑅𝑃) =  𝑅𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑚[𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑟𝑓] (1) 
 
Where 𝐸(𝑅𝑃) is the expected return on the portfolio, 𝑅𝑟𝑓 is the risk free-rate, 𝐸(𝑅𝑚) is the 
return on the market portfolio. 
 
The formulation and application of the CAPM is underpinned by a number of assumptions: 
 Investors seek mean-variance efficient portfolios – investors seek low volatility and 
high returns. 
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 Markets are perfect and thus taxes, inflation, transaction costs and short-selling 
restrictions are not taken into account. 
 All investors have homogeneous expectation about returns, volatilities and correlations 
of securities. This implies that investors estimate identical probability distributions 
 All assets are infinitely divisible and perfectly liquid. 
 Investors can lend and borrow an unlimited amount of money at the risk-free rate 
 All investors plan for one identical period. 
 Capital markets are in equilibrium – all assets are priced properly in line with their risk 
level. 
It is clear that the assumptions of the CAPM are unrealistic and they have become a huge source 
of weakness and criticism of the model. Moreover, empirical evidence has shown that relaxing 
the assumptions only has a minor effect on the model and would not change its implications or 
conclusions (Black, 1972; Reilly & Brown, 2003). Another source of the CAPM’s weakness 
stems from empirical testing; in many cases the CAPM has demonstrated poor explanatory 
power in overestimating the risk-free rate and underestimating the market risk premium. 
Finally, beta which is the measure of market risk does not remain stable over time and hence 
beta can only be estimated based on historical data (Free, 2010). Given these points, the 
practicality and predictive power of the CAPM model is compromised. 
The criticisms against the CAPM have resulted in a number of extensions being made to the 
CAPM in the hopes of improving its explanatory power and overcoming its empirical 
weaknesses. The most notable of these extensions are listed below and will be discussed in 
further detail: 
 The International CAPM (ICAPM), first introduced by Solnik (1974), which uses the 
same inputs as the CAPM but also takes into account other variables that influence 
returns on assets on a global basis. 
 The Fama and French Three-Factor Model (1993) which incorporates size and value 
factors in addition to the market risk factor. 
 The Carhart Four-Factor Model (1997) which expands upon the aforementioned Fama 
and French Three-Factor Model (1993) by including a momentum factor. 
 The Fama and French Five-Factor Model (2014) which builds upon the Three-Factor 
model by including profitability and investment factors. 
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2.1.1.1 International CAPM 
The United States was the country of focus when the CAPM was developed and hence provided 
insight into that specific market. Although the CAPM has been empirically tested in various 
other countries around the world, it failed to account for an important phenomenon around the 
world: globalisation. The advent of technology enabled globalisation and forced individuals to 
consider not only their domestic market for investment purposes, but also foreign markets. 
Thus it became necessary to understand how global factors may affect asset returns as investors 
were now participating in multiple stock markets. This became a further source of criticism of 
the original CAPM as it only accounted for factors in a single country with no insight into 
global markets. The ICAPM, originally outlined by Bruno Solnik in 1974, was able to evaluate 
investment portfolios with different currency bases as it factored in global variables that may 
influence asset returns (Naderi, Amirhhoseni, & Ahmadinia, 2012). 
Mathematically, the ICAPM is outlined as follows: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) =  𝑅𝑓𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖[𝐸(𝑅𝑊𝑀) −  𝑅𝑓𝑤] (2) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑓𝑖 is the risk free rate in the country of security i, 𝑅𝑊𝑀 is the return on the worldwide 
market portfolio, 𝑅𝑓𝑤 is the worldwide risk-free rate and 𝛽𝑖 is the international systematic 
risk of security i. 
 
Equation (2) above is the first iteration of the ICAPM and was naturally a single factor model. 
Early research from Solnik (1974) and Sercu (1980) found that this method could not 
completely explain stock returns on a global scale (Naderi, Amirhhoseni, & Ahmadinia, 2012). 
It appears that even on an international stage more than one risk factor is needed in explaining 
asset returns (Perold, 2004). Thus it has been advocated that a multi-factor ICAPM would 
likely provide more insight in explaining asset returns.  
 
2.1.2 Fama and French Three-Factor Model 
As previously mentioned, the Fama and French Three-Factor Model (1993) explains the risk 
and return of shares by adding two variables to the original CAPM’s market risk factor; namely, 
size measured by market capitalisation that takes into account the extra risk in small companies 
and value, which demonstrates the value in owning out-of-favour shares that have attractive 
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valuations. This model is believed to be superior to the original CAPM as it not only reveals 
the primary factors that drive stock returns but also provides investors with a strategy for using 
those factors in their portfolios to secure a higher expected long-term return. 
Mathematically, the Three-Factor Model is outlined as follows: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑃) =  𝑅𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑚[𝐸(𝑅𝑚) −  𝑅𝑟𝑓] +  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝑆𝑀𝐵) + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿(𝐻𝑀𝐿)  (3) 
 
 
Where 𝐸(𝑅𝑃) is the expected return on the portfolio, 𝑅𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝐸(𝑅𝑚) is the 
return on the market portfolio, 𝑆𝑀𝐵 represents the size factor (small cap shares minus big 
cap shares) and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 represents the value factor (high book-to-market minus low book-to-
market shares). 
 
Empirically, under the single-factor CAPM, beta alone was able to capture 70% of a stock’s 
actual return; however the combination of the three factors was found to capture 95% of a 
stock’s actual returns. This model can be further applied in event studies of the stock price 
response to firm-specific information. In a single-factor model the residuals from a regression 
of the stock’s return on a market return are used to isolate the firm-specific component of 
returns. Fama and French (1993) found that a three-factor regression which includes the SMB 
and HML variables will do a better job at isolating the firm-specific component of returns. This 
Three-Factor Model has been tested rather extensively with the same result: adding a size factor 
and a value factor greatly improves upon the explanatory power of the CAPM. Thus it can be 
inferred that more than one systematic risk factor is at work in determining asset prices (Perold, 
2004). 
 
2.1.3 Carhart Four-Factor Model 
Momentum is a phenomenon first uncovered by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) who 
documented that “strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell 
stocks that have performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns” (1993, p. 
1). This was further attributed to the fact that investors underreact to the release of firm-specific 
information, which is a cognitive bias. Carhart (1997) posited that momentum could provide 
important insight into the expected return of a portfolio and hence built upon the Fama and 
French Three-Factor Model (1993) by including a momentum factor. Momentum was 
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calculated by subtracting the cumulative historical performance of the highest performing firms 
from the cumulative historical performance of the lowest performing firms, lagged by one 
month. A stock was said to demonstrate momentum if its prior 12 month average was positive.  
Mathematically, the Four-Factor Model is outlined as follows: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑃) =  𝑅𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑚[𝐸(𝑅𝑚) −  𝑅𝑟𝑓] +  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝑆𝑀𝐵) + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿(𝐻𝑀𝐿) +
 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷(𝑈𝑀𝐷)  
(4) 
 
Where 𝐸(𝑅𝑃) is the expected return on the portfolio, 𝑅𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝐸(𝑅𝑚) is the 
return on the market portfolio, 𝑆𝑀𝐵 represents the size factor (small cap shares minus big 
cap shares), 𝐻𝑀𝐿  represents the value factor (high book-to-market minus low book-to-
market shares) and, 𝑈𝑀𝐷 represents the momentum factor (the premium on winner minus 
losers). 
 
In his empirical testing, Carhart (1997) identified three important rules of thumb for those 
investors seeking to maximise their wealth: 1) Avoid funds with persistently poor performance; 
2) Funds with high returns last year have above average expected returns next year, but not in 
the years thereafter; and 3) The investment costs of expense ratios, transaction costs, and load 
fees all have a direct and negative impact on performance. 
 
2.1.4 Fama and French Five-Factor Model 
One of the factors in the Fama and French Three-Factor Model (1993) that provided significant 
explanatory power to the overall model was the value factor, measured by the book-to-market 
ratio. As corollary to their 1993 results, Fama and French considered if profitability and 
investment could add to the explanation of stock returns provided by the book-to-market ratio. 
As a result, Fama and French considered an augmented Three-Factor model which incorporates 
profitability and investment factors, thus making it a Five-Factor Model (2014). 
Mathematically, the Five-Factor Model is outlined as follows: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑃) =  𝑅𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑚[𝐸(𝑅𝑚) −  𝑅𝑟𝑓] +  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝑆𝑀𝐵) + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿(𝐻𝑀𝐿) +
 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊(𝑅𝑀𝑊) +  𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴(𝐶𝑀𝐴)  
(5) 
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Where 𝐸(𝑅𝑃) is the expected return on the portfolio, 𝑅𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝐸(𝑅𝑚) is the 
return on the market portfolio, 𝑆𝑀𝐵 represents the size factor (small cap shares minus big 
cap shares), 𝐻𝑀𝐿  represents the value factor (high book-to-market minus low book-to-
market shares), 𝑅𝑀𝑊  represents the profitability factor (the difference in returns on 
diversified portfolios of shares with robust and weak profitability) and 𝐶𝑀𝐴 represents the 
investment factor (the different in returns on diversified portfolios of low and high 
investment shares). 
 
The empirical outcome of this model was not as favourable as the Three-Factor Model as the 
Five-Factor Model failed to capture and explain the variation in returns. The authors, however, 
did estimate that the model could explain between 69% and 93% of the cross-sectional 
variation in returns (Fama & French, 2014). It would appear that there is a fine balancing act 
when it comes to multi-factor asset pricing models as one must balance the number of factors 
which could explain returns, the choice of these factors and the interaction of these factors with 
one another which might give spurious results. Three and four factor models appear to fare 
well in empirical testing and capture a large part of the cross-sectional variation in returns, 
however the five factor model, although still in infancy, did not perform well in empirical 
testing. As there is no right or wrong when it comes to choice of factors, the possible reason 
for this outcome could be the interaction of the chosen factors with each other.  
 
2.1.5 Summary 
The cornerstone of asset pricing can be found in the CAPM which asserts that the return on 
any given asset is a function of market risk. The CAPM, much like any other model, is based 
on a set of assumptions; in the case of the CAPM, however, these assumptions are quite 
restrictive and unrealistic which makes the CAPM weak in empirical testing. Various attempts 
have been made to address the pitfalls of the CAPM; many of these involved augmenting the 
original model to include various other risk factors. The most notable of these augmentations 
include the International CAPM, as well as a three-, four-, and five-factor models. Empirically, 
however, the ICAPM struggled in explaining global returns and it is possible that a multi-factor 
ICAPM could be more suitable. With respect to the other models, the three- and four-factor 
models were found to be empirically strong, whereas the five-factor was not as successful in 
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explaining the variation in returns. This could possibly be caused by the interaction amongst 
factors. 
 
2.2 Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), originally developed by Ross (1976) is an asset pricing 
model that explains cross-sectional variation in returns. Similar to the CAPM, the APT begins 
with an assumption on the return generating process: each asset return is linearly related to 
several common factors plus its own idiosyncratic disturbance. The APT posits that the 
expected return on any financial asset can be explained by two factors: macroeconomic or 
security-specific influences and the asset’s sensitivity to those influences; this has the 
advantage of allowing the user to adapt the model to the particular asset being analysed. 
The APT, as with any model, is based on a number of assumptions: 
 The theory is based on the assumption of capital market efficiency and hence assumes 
that all investors will trade with the intent of profit maximisation. 
 Moreover, it assumes that each investor will hold a unique portfolio with its own array 
of betas, as opposed to the identical and immeasurable market portfolio assumed under 
the CAPM. 
 It assumes that no arbitrage exists and if it were to occur the market participants will 
engage to benefit out of it and bring the market back to equilibrium levels. 
 It assumes markets are frictionless – there are no transaction costs, no taxes, short 
selling is possible and there are an infinite number of securities available. 
Assumptions are necessary in the development of any theoretical model; however, the 
assumptions of the APT are far less restrictive than those of the CAPM. Thus far, it may seem 
that the APT model is a superior one to the CAPM for a number of reasons, however the nature 
of the model, which makes it more customisable, also makes it more difficult to apply because 
determining the appropriate factors takes a tremendous amount of research. Not only is it 
practically impossible to detect every factor that may have an impact on the return of a security, 
but there is absolutely no indication of how many factors would be sufficient to make the model 
robust. Much of the empirical research has shown that one comes close to a robust model with 
between four and five factors (Roll & Ross, 1980). 
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The APT (Ross, 1976) in its barest form describes that for any asset, 𝑖, its expected return is 
described as follows: 
𝐸𝑖 =  𝜌 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸𝑚 −  𝜌)  (6) 
Where 𝜌 is the risk-free rate of return and 𝛽𝑖 =  
𝜎𝑖𝑚
2
𝜎𝑚
2  is the beta coefficient on the market, 
where𝜎𝑚
2  is the variance of the market portfolio and 𝜎𝑖𝑚
2  is the covariance between the 
returns on the 𝑖th asset and the market portfolio 
 
All asset pricing models are assumed to estimate a pricing kernel and hence describe the data 
generating process of returns. The APT, however, can be viewed as a framework where various 
factors can be used to explain asset prices and their associated returns. As such, the more 
general APT allows for 𝑛 return generating factors; hence the expected return for any asset, 𝑖, 
can be described as follows: 
𝐸𝑖 =  𝜌 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑃1 +  𝛽2𝑅𝑃2 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑃3 +  … + 𝛽𝑛𝑅𝑃𝑛  (7) 
 
Where 𝜌 is the risk free rate of return and 𝛽𝑛 is the sensitivity of the asset’s returns to that 
specific factor and 𝑅𝑃𝑛 is the risk premium associated with the particular factor. 
 
One distinct difference between the CAPM and APT models is that (6) and (7) hold in both 
equilibrium and disequilibrium situations. Another stark difference compared to the CAPM is 
that no particular portfolio plays an important role in the APT; specifically, the market portfolio 
plays no special role in the APT whereas it is the crux of the CAPM. The APT is also not 
restricted to a single period, as the CAPM is, as the APT will hold in both single and multi-
period scenarios (Roll & Ross, 1980).  
There are, however, some weak points in the assumptions and arguments Ross (1976) has made 
around the number of assets and the application of the law of large numbers. As the number of 
assets increases, wealth will also increase. As a result, the levels of risk aversion in some 
economic agents may change. The application of the law of large numbers implies that any 
noise2 becomes negligible for a larger number of assets; however, if the degree of risk aversion 
                                                 
2 Noise refers to trading which takes place using data other than fundamental data (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, 
& Waldmann, 1990).  
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increases as the number of assets increases then noise might no longer be negligible and in fact 
have a persistent influence on pricing (Ross, 1976). It is rare to find a model that is perfect, 
however having a number of options to consider in terms of asset pricing models can only be 
viewed in a positive light. 
Empirical testing of the APT centres on the choice and number of factors that should be 
included in the model. The latter component was examined by Roll and Ross (1980), who 
replicated and extended work done by Gehr (1975). Roll and Ross (1980) employed a data set 
spanning across the period 1962 to 1972. Returns for 1 260 securities were obtained, collected 
from both the NYSE and AMEX; these securities were also split in 42 groups of 30 each for 
the purpose of sub-period analysis.  
The results indicate that three factors are present in expected returns of equities traded on the 
NYSE and AMEX; the evidence of a fourth was present but less conclusive. Although these 
results are reassuring for the APT, the possibility does remain that other variables are also 
“priced” even though they are not related to non-diversifiable risk. In this particular APT 
model, these variables should not be able to explain expected returns and hence if some 
variables were found to have explanatory power, then this model of the APT would be rejected. 
Roll and Ross (1980) examined one variable in particular, the total variance of individual 
returns or “own” variance. Testing revealed that this variable does indeed have significant 
explanatory power which suggests that this particular APT might be false. Upon further 
analysis, it was found that the individual returns were found to be highly skewed. Skewness in 
data can create dependence between the sample mean and sample standard deviation and hence 
could explain the sample mean’s dependence on “own” variance. It would be unreasonable to 
reject this APT model based on these results but should always be a consideration when testing 
the empirical robustness of the APT. It is important to highlight that variance captures noise or 
exogenous variables and sentiment could very well be one of these variables. Thus, by adding 
a sentiment factor to the APT model it could eliminate a portion of this variance thereby 
improving the explanatory power of the APT. Nonetheless, the overarching conclusion of the 
research conducted by Roll and Ross (1980) was positive in that the APT performed well under 
empirical scrutiny and is considered a reasonable model for explaining the cross-sectional 
variation in average asset returns. 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) conducted research as to whether macroeconomic variables are 
risks that are rewarded in financial markets. This research is consistent with the APT (Ross, 
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1976) which dictates that asset prices should depend on their exposure to state variables that 
describe the economy. Their sample period covered 371 months from January 1953 to 
November 1983, with the following variables being included: 1) inflation (expected and 
unexpected), 2) the Treasury bill rate, 3) the return on long-term government bonds, 4) 
industrial production, 5) the return on low grade bonds, 6) the return on an equally-weighted 
index, 7) the return on a value-weighted index, 8) consumption and 9) the oil price. 
Individual stock returns were modelled according to a factor model as outlined below: 
𝑅 = 𝑎 +  𝛽𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑃 +  𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐼 +  𝛽𝑈𝐼𝑈𝐼 + 𝛽𝑈𝑅𝑃𝑈𝑅𝑃 +  𝛽𝑈𝑇𝑆𝑈𝑇𝑆 +  𝜀  (8) 
Where 𝑀𝑃 is the monthly growth in industrial production, 𝐷𝐸𝐼 is the change in expected 
inflation, 𝑈𝐼 is unexpected inflation, 𝑈𝑅𝑃 is the risk premium and 𝑈𝑇𝑆 is the term structure; 
the betas are the loadings on the state economic variables, 𝑎 is the constant tem and 𝜀 is an 
idiosyncratic error term. 
 
Their results were consistent with efficient market theory as well as rational expectations in 
asset pricing theory – asset prices were found to be dependent on their exposures to the state 
variables that describe an economy. Industrial production, changes in the risk premium, and 
changes in the term structure of rates were found to be statistically significant in explaining 
market returns. Weaker evidence was found for the explanatory power of both expected and 
unexpected inflation, albeit only during periods of high volatility. Overall, when stock returns 
are exposed to economic news, they are priced in accordance with their exposures. Moreover, 
economic news can be captured through innovations in state variables whose identification is 
grounded in simple and intuitive economic and financial theory. 
A British perspective is offered by Beenstock and Chan (1986) who conduct empirical analysis 
on both the viability of the APT and the CAPM as asset pricing models in the UK. During the 
time period from December 1961 to December 1981, data pertaining to 220 British shares was 
collected. It appears that in the UK the APT has the ability to explain a high proportion of the 
variance of estimated expected returns; this result is broadly similar to that which was obtained 
by investigators of the US market. Moreover, the explanatory power of a 20 factor APT model 
was found to be significantly greater than that of a 4 factor model, this indicates a relatively 
complex financial market as a large number of risk factors will be priced into the UK market. 
An important caveat is that this result should be viewed more as indicative as there is a large 
amount of ambiguity surrounding tests of the APT and the authors could not sure that none of 
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these factors are idiosyncratic. The last piece of empirical analysis pertaining to the single 
factor CAPM model yielded disappointing results as the CAPM was always rejected in favour 
of the APT. As a whole, the results indicate that the APT was a stronger asset pricing model in 
the UK and that the APT captures the complexity of the market through multiple factors. 
Much of the existing literature pertaining to the APT tests whether it has the ability to model 
expected returns using a number of risk factors. It would then be logical to wonder whether the 
APT could be used to model the value of other financial instruments. For example, in an option 
the underlying asset is the sole risk factor and hence in theory the APT could be used to derive 
an option-pricing formula as an alternative to the seminal Black-Scholes formula. An option-
pricing framework was developed by Chang and Shanker (1987); however the framework was 
kept largely general because it includes existing option-pricing formulas as special cases. 
Within this framework, the authors were able to derive a new and simple option-pricing 
formula by assuming that securities’ return distributions are truncated normal – this refers to 
the probability distribution of a normally distributed random variable whose value is either 
bounded below or above (or both) (Burkardt, 2014). Preliminary tests of this new formula 
suggest that it is simple to apply and performs as well as the Black-Scholes formula. The 
application of the APT to option pricing once again highlights the fluid and dynamic nature of 
the APT model compared to the rigidity of the CAPM. 
The aforementioned study by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) was based in the United States and 
hence provided great insight into that specific market; however, establishing the APT’s 
international robustness would assist in determining whether this model is suitable for use in 
various markets. Hamao (1988) addressed this gap by providing a Japanese perspective, thus 
providing a comparison to the initial work done in the US. At the time, the Japanese capital 
market was second in size only to the US Equities market value of $500 billion and an average 
daily trading volume of 300 million shares. One interesting similarity in these capital markets 
is that there are two sections to the Tokyo Stock Exchange, much like the dominance of the 
New York and American Stock Exchanges in the US. Following World War II, Japan 
developed an active equity market but did not develop an active bond market. Investors were 
dissuaded from entering the market due to government-imposed interest rate ceilings that were 
intended to stimulate investment. Corporations tended to rely on bank loans instead of bond 
issues and hence the bond market remained undeveloped. Moreover, no long-term government 
bonds were issued because a balanced budget was strictly sustained to prevent the occurrence 
of post-war hyperinflation. The first long-term government bond was issued in 1966 and 
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massive offerings only began in 1975. The idiosyncrasies of the Japanese capital market add 
an interesting lens to this robustness study; however, they also present some difficulties with 
respect to the availability of data. There is a lack of macroeconomic data that exactly parallels 
the US series; specifically, in order to know the slope of the yield curve and the risk premium, 
one needs data from an active bond market. The secondary bond market did not exist before 
1975 and hence the time frame and sample of this study is somewhat limited. Hamao (1988) 
employed the same variables as Chen, Roll and Ross (1986); specifically, industrial production, 
inflation, risk premia, the term structure, foreign exchange, market indices and oil prices. The 
results indicated that changes in expected inflation, unanticipated changes in risk premium and 
unanticipated changes in the slope of the term structure have a significant effect on the Japanese 
stock market. Changes in monthly production and changes in terms of trade were also found to 
have an effect; however the evidence was weaker in these instances. It was found that 
unanticipated changes in foreign exchange, value- and equally-weighted market indices neither 
have statistically significant risk premia nor do they capture systematic risk missed by other 
macroeconomic variables. Similar to the finding by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986), oil price 
changes were not factored into the Japanese stock market. These results are largely consistent 
with those uncovered in the US which is promising despite the study suffering from a short 
observation period and some data issues. It would appear that in this instance the APT was 
found to be robust on an international stage. 
An investigation into whether the APT or CAPM is a better indication of risk in the Indian 
stock market was conducted by Dhankar and Singh (2005). This study uses the closing prices 
of frequently traded shares of large and medium size companies listed on the BSE200, Nifty 
and Junior Nifty over a 12 year period from January 1991 to December 2002. The initial step 
involved using principal component analysis to approximate a factor structure. Thereafter, 
using monthly and weekly returns, the authors determined which model would be a better 
indication of asset risk in India. The evidence suggests that an APT model may lead to better 
estimates of expected returns than the CAPM as APT models explain the return generation and 
forecasts return much better than the CAPM. Moreover, when it came to checking if factors 
were priced and which model explained a larger percentage of variance the APT performed 
much better. Despite the idiosyncrasies of the Indian market, the final recommendation 
provided by the authors was that decision makers should give due consideration to multi-factor 
models like APT and not rely solely on single-factor models like the CAPM. Industrial 
production, changes in the risk premium and changes in the yield curve were found to have the 
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strong explanatory power in explaining expected stock returns. Unanticipated inflation and 
changes in expected inflation were also found to be significant, however exhibited a somewhat 
weaker relationship. A striking result from this research was that although the value-weighted 
NYSE explained a significant portion of the time-series variability in stock returns, it has an 
insignificant influence on expected returns when compared against the economic variables. 
Moreover, innovations in oil prices are not significantly related to asset pricing.  
 
2.2.1 International Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
The APT has largely been tested as a domestic asset pricing model; however the need for an 
international equivalent was identified. 
Solnik (1974) was one of the first to present an equilibrium model of the international capital 
market, by using the CAPM as the asset pricing model. The empirical tests were largely 
inconclusive based on the fact that the world market portfolio is un-identifiable (Roll, 1977). 
The second problem centred on disaggregating the assets of national investors using a number 
of different currencies. 
An attempt to extend the APT of Ross (1976) into the international area was made by Solnik 
(1983) who was able to overcome some of the difficulties mentioned above and developed the 
International APT (IAPT). The testability of the APT was hypothesised to be more robust than 
previous international asset pricing models as unlike asset returns, factors do not have to be 
translated from one currency to another. 
Empirical testing of Solnik’s (1983) model was conducted by Cho, Eun and Sebert (1986) who 
sought to test the joint hypothesis of international capital markets being integrated and the APT 
being valid internationally. The approach to estimate the systematic risks – that is the factor 
loadings for each asset – and the cross-sectional analysis to test the pricing implications of the 
IAPT were carried out in a methodology similar to Roll and Ross (1980). The result of this 
showed that there are three or four worldwide common factors, similar to the outcome reached 
by Roll and Ross (1980). The cross-sectional results led to the joint hypothesis being rejected 
implying that international capital markets are in fact segmented and that the APT might not 
hold up in an international setting. Unfortunately, due to the testing of a joint hypothesis, it 
remains unclear as to whether these results reflect that international markets are segmented or 
that the IAPT has failed. 
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Further empirical analysis on the IAPT was conducted by Abeysekera and Mahajan (1990) 
who sought to test the same two hypotheses outlined by Cho, Eun and Sebert (1986) – that is 
whether certain risk factors are priced in international capital markets which can be tested 
jointly with the hypothesis that international capital markets are integrated. The countries under 
investigation by Abeysekera and Mahajan (1990) are the three most developed nations in the 
world; namely, the US, UK and Canada. The basic data used in this study are the monthly 
returns on individual shares, the spot exchange rates and the Treasury bill rates in the three 
countries; the sample period of this study spanned 168 months in total, from January 1973 to 
December 1986. The results uncovered very weak evidence to support the IAPT as a valid 
international capital asset pricing model and that the number of factors in a given economy is 
invariant to the currency in which the returns are denominated. Overall, the results do not lend 
support to the IAPT as an international capital asset pricing model which is largely consistent 
with the conclusions reached by Cho, Eun and Sebert (1986). 
The aim of this study is not to create an IAPT for a group of countries, for example the BRICS 
or G7 nations, but instead to create country-specific APT models for each of the countries 
chosen. There are two reasons for adopting this approach: 
1. Constructing an IAPT for a group of countries would not allow for the level of insight 
desired in this study – comparing an IAPT for BRICS and G7 countries would reveal 
very little about the individual countries themselves. 
2. The testing of a joint hypothesis creates a problem as one would be unable to determine 
whether these results reflect that international markets are segmented or that the IAPT 
has failed. 
 
2.2.2 Empirical Testing of the APT 
Much of the research into the APT model focuses on its ability to outperform the CAPM or 
how many factors are optimal when seeking to explain returns in any given market. The 
flexibility of the APT has allowed academics to branch out beyond this type of research and 
begin to examine the real world applications of the APT. Empirical testing is essential to the 
APT because the theory itself is quite general. Although it states that several risk factors may 
affect returns, it does not specify the nature or the number of factors that should be utilised. 
Therefore, testing is required to ensure that the APT can be used in practical applications such 
as portfolio management. One of these real world applications is to use the APT framework to 
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determine the drivers of a specific country’s economy. This was the intention of the original 
Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) research and since then, the concept has been applied in a number 
of different markets. 
2.2.2.1 BRICS 
In the Brazilian market, Hsing (2004) showed that GDP has a relationship with the stock market 
in both the short and long-term. Sorokina (2013) showed that money supply also has a 
significant relationship with the Brazilian stock market. Finally, a positive relationship between 
exchange rates and stock prices was found to be statistically significant in Brazil; this implies 
that an appreciation (depreciation) of the Brazilian Real would have unfavourable (favourable) 
impact on the Brazilian stock market (Gay Jr, 2008). 
The nuances of the Russian market imply that risk factors, such as political risk (Goriaev & 
Sonin, 2004), and non-market factors such as affiliation with foreign partners and participation 
in unsavoury privatisation schemes in the past (Fedorov & Sarkissian, 2000) can also influence 
stock market performance. A positive relationship between the exchange rate and stock prices 
was also found to be statistically significant; this implies that an appreciation (depreciation) of 
the Russia Ruble would have unfavourable (favourable) impact on the Russian stock market 
(Gay Jr, 2008). 
In India, there is a body of literature that has identified money supply, gold and silver prices, 
exchange rates, trade deficit, and the inflow of foreign investment capital as all having 
explanatory power in the Indian stock market (Singh D. , 2010; Naik & Padhi, 2012; Patel, 
2012; Singh P. , 2014; Mohanamani & Sivagnanasathi, 2014). Gold, for example, tends to have 
an adverse effect on the Indian stock market due to the increasing interest in this commodity 
as an alternative form of investment. There is still a level of distrust in corporate, the Indian 
stock market as well as its regulatory bodies (Sehgal, Sood, & Rajput, 2009; Kavitha, 2015). 
This drives Indian investors to seek alternative investment instruments, much to the detriment 
of the development of the stock market. The exchange rate, mainly against the US dollar, also 
has a strong effect on the Indian stock market depending on the Rupee appreciation or 
depreciation against the US dollar. The reason behind this is simply the strong trade 
relationship between the two countries. 
In South Africa, initial research into the macroeconomic APT was conducted by van Rensburg 
(1995) who first employed criteria for selecting appropriate macroeconomic factors, outlined 
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by Berry, Burmeister and McElroy (1988)3; thereafter, van Rensburg (1995) employed a linear 
factor model to identify if unexpected changes in one or more of these variables are responsible 
for underlying returns on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). This was accomplished by 
measuring the sensitivities of the JSE to the pre-specified variables, as done in Chen, Roll, and 
Ross (1986). The factors chosen include: returns on the Dow Jones Industrial Index, the gold 
price, inflation expectations, and the term structure of interest rates. The results indicated that 
all four macroeconomic variables were significant when regressed against market returns – the 
JSE is significantly influenced by the chosen macroeconomic variables. A natural extension to 
this study is to investigate whether these factors are ‘priced’ in the JSE. This was undertaken 
by van Rensburg (1996) who employed the iterated non-linear seemingly unrelated regression 
(ITNLSUR) methodology, first pioneered by McElroy and Burmeister (1988). The results 
showed that all the factors outlined above, except the gold price, were associated with 
statistically significant risk premia; this implies that they not only explain returns but are priced 
factors in the APT. The subtle difference between an explanatory factor and a priced factor lies 
in the fact that a priced factor provides compensation to the investor for taking on the risk, 
whereas an explanatory factor merely explains the variation in stock returns, for example. In 
this instance, the evidence found by van Rensburg (1995; 1996) illustrated that returns on the 
Dow Jones Industrial Index, inflation and the term structure of rates not only explain the 
variation in JSE returns but also provide investors with compensation, due to the risk inherent 
in these variables. These results are consistent with Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), who found 
the same variables to be significant risk factors in the APT. 
 
2.2.2.2 G7 Countries 
In the German market, there is evidence that money supply and exchange rates could be used 
in explaining the German stock market (Masuduzzaman, 2012). Additionally, exchange rates, 
particularly between the Euro and other European currencies, could be especially useful due to 
                                                 
3 Economic variables that are legitimate risk factors must possess the following three properties: 
1. At the beginning of every period, the factor must be completely unpredictable to the market. 
2. Each APT factor must have a pervasive influence on stock returns. 
3. Relevant factors must influence expected return – they must have non-zero prices (Berry, Burmeister, & 
McElroy, 1988). 
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the degree of economic integration in the continent. Given the close proximity of countries, it 
is likely that other countries in Europe could have an impact on the German stock market. 
In the UK, Masuduzzaman (2012) shows that exchange rates and money supply have 
significant and strong explanatory power in the UK market. Exchange rates of other countries 
in close geographical proximity to the UK, such as the rest of Europe, are likely to have an 
impact on the UK given the phenomenon of volatility spillover or the contagion effect. This is 
similar to what would be expected in Germany. There has also been evidence that indicates 
that money supply, the credit spread, and GDP growth have explanatory power in the UK 
market (Sarwar, Mateus, & Todorovic, 2015). Other research indicates that measures of 
corporate default, private sector bank lending, and the current account balance could also be 
priced risk factors in the UK stock market (Clare & Thomas, 1994). 
Finally, in the US market monetary policy appears to have strong explanatory power in the 
market. Thorbecke (1997) uses three different methods to measure monetary policy: 1) Federal 
Reserve targeted non-borrowed reserves; 2) An index created using Federal Reserve open 
documents and records; and 3) Federal fund rate changes. All three measures were found to 
have a statistically significant effect on stock returns. Money supply, which is related to 
monetary policy, has also been shown to have an impact on market returns (Kraft & Kraft, 
1977; Flannery & Protopapadakis, 2002). Moreover, commodities are usually viewed as an 
alternative investment mechanism and hence their prices could also have an impact on market 
returns – evidence to support this was uncovered by Kia (2003). Finally, indicators of the health 
of an economy have also been found to be priced risk factors in the US; specifically, balance 
of trade, employment (Flannery & Protopapadakis, 2002), and unemployment (Chang & Ha, 
1997). 
This section has highlighted that the APT framework has been used by many academics in 
guiding their research into the macroeconomic determinants of a specific economy. The 
evidence highlights that the factors outlined by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) do not necessarily 
encompass the full universe of factors which could possibly explain returns. Furthermore, it 
also highlights that there are differences across countries as what explains market returns in 
one country does not necessarily explain market returns in a different country. It is important 
to highlight that the focus of many of these research papers was to determine which 
macroeconomic factors could have explanatory power in a given market. This study, however, 
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opts to use a uniform set of macroeconomic variables – those outlined by Chen, Roll, and Ross 
(1986) – for the following reasons: 
 The basis of this study is fundamentally asset pricing; however a specific focus was put 
on the role of investor sentiment in explaining returns and not which macroeconomic 
factors have more explanatory power across different countries. 
 Holding the macroeconomic variables constant allows for the full effects of investor 
sentiment to be isolated. 
 A uniform set of macroeconomic variables allows for a comparison across the various 
countries, as any potential results could not be due to differences in explanatory 
variables. 
 Uniformity allows for a comparison countries as the method applied should provide a 
much ‘cleaner’ result. 
The APT has demonstrated itself as a model that is able to be applied in a real world context; 
it has proven to be useful in determining macroeconomic variables driving a country’s 
economy. Although many have used the set of variables outlined by Chen, Roll, and Ross 
(1986); however, many country-specific factors have also been included and demonstrated 
themselves to have statistically significant explanatory power in explaining market returns. 
These include factors such as money supply, the gold price, GDP, and exchange rates. This is 
not unexpected as an individual country has its own history, characteristics and nuances which 
will impact the macro-economy. For the purposes of understanding the individual 
macroeconomic drivers of a country, applying this approach was useful; however, this study is 
focused on understanding the role of investor sentiment in explaining returns and hence a 
uniform data set is applied across all countries. 
 
2.2.3 Statistical Testing of the APT 
A critical component of developing an asset pricing model is determining the appropriate 
conditions for testing it; specifically, what conditions needs to be fulfilled to determine the 
empirical viability of the model and whether the model is robust in explaining returns. 
An important consideration in any research focused on macroeconomic factors is the concept 
of endogeneity. Endogeneity refers to a problem encountered when a given explanatory 
variable is correlated with the error term of the model. It can be the result of a measurement 
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error, omitted variables, or the nature of the variables (Wooldridge, 2013). The latter is likely 
to be true in this scenario as macroeconomic variables tend to be related to one another due to 
their role in the greater economy. As such, multiple macroeconomic explanatory variables are 
likely to be correlated and the resulting regression may suffer from endogeneity. Most 
commonly endogeneity is caused by: 1) An uncontrolled confounder (a variable which 
correlates with both the dependent and independent variable) which causes both the dependent 
and independent variables; and 2) A loop of causality between the independent and dependent 
variables in a regression model. If endogeneity is found in this analysis, it is likely that the 
latter is the primary cause. Endogeneity is identified by determining whether there is a 
statistically significant correlation between the residual of the model and each individual 
explanatory variable. Statistical significance would imply that that specific variable is 
endogenous, and statistical insignificance would imply that that specific variable is exogenous. 
In a model with purely exogenous variables, the OLS4 regression would hold; conversely OLS 
breaks down in the event of endogenous variables and hence an alternative regression method 
is required. 
Endogeneity is addressed through the application of the instrumental variables (IV) method 
and subsequently the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method. IV involves replacing the 
dependent variables with predicted values of those same variables that satisfy the following 
two conditions: 1) Exogeneity: the IV must be uncorrelated with the error term of the model 
and 2) Relevance: the IV is correlated with the independent variable. Only once both these 
conditions are satisfied is a variable considered to be an IV. This process will ensure that a 
consistent regression coefficient is obtained. In the instance of one variable being found 
endogenous, only one instrument is necessary and hence this instrument can be included in a 
standard OLS regression. This is performed in two steps; step one involves obtaining the IV 
values and step two involves running an OLS regression, but replacing the endogenous variable 
with the IV estimator. In the event of multiple endogenous variables and hence multiple 
instruments, the 2SLS regression method is applied. The 2SLS method allows for the inclusion 
of instrumental variables. The output of this regression, specifically the coefficients and 
associated p-values, is the same as that derived from an OLS regression. The difference with 
                                                 
4 OLS – Ordinary Least Squares. This is a method for estimating unknown variables in a regression model by 
minimising the sum of the squares of the differences between the observed and predicated data sets. 
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the 2SLS regression is that it allows one to test if the regressors are exogenous or not 
(Wooldridge, 2013). 
The earliest application of IV involved attempts to estimate demand and supply curves; a 
number of economists were interested in estimating the elasticities of demand and supply for a 
wide variety of products using time series data. Given that demand and supply curves shift over 
time, the observed data on price and quantity reflects an equilibrium point on both curves. An 
OLS regression of quantity on price would fail to identify either the supply or demand 
relationship. Wright (1928) confronted this issue in a seminal application of IV with positive 
results; many academics have used this as a base for the application of IV to their specific 
research. Instances where IV has been used have not been limited to economics or finance, but 
can be found in the social and health sciences as well. 
IV has been used to address the problem of endogeneity and omitted variables when estimating 
the impact of economic conditions on the likelihood of civil conflict in 41 African countries 
(Miguel, Satyanath, & Sergenti, 2004). Rainfall variation was used as an IV for economic 
growth, which is negatively related to civil conflict. The results indicated that the use of the IV 
was able to overcome the methodological problem of endogeneity and omitted variables and it 
was found that growth shocks have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of civil 
war. IV has also found a use in evaluating the empirical relation between the level of financial 
intermediary development and economic growth and productivity (Beck, Levine, & Loayza, 
2000). The IV estimator was used to extract the exogenous component of financial 
intermediary development; the result showed that financial intermediaries exert a large, 
positive impact on productivity which feeds through to overall GDP growth. Explaining firm-
level investment behaviour through the use of an IV estimator was tackled by Hubbard, 
Kashyap, and Whited (1995) who used firm tax payments as an IV estimator as it minimises a 
measurement error which was identified. The results indicated that capital market 
imperfections and dividend pay-outs are statistically significant in explaining and effecting 
firm-level investment decisions. 
The choice of how to model asset returns is also a statistical consideration; specifically one can 
apply either a linear or nonlinear model. A linear model assumes that the error term of the 
model is normally distributed; whereas a nonlinear model assumes that the error term is not 
normally distributed and hence accounts for this. The APT assumes that the risk-return 
relationship is linear in nature and hence there is no opportunity for arbitrage. If the risk-return 
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relationship is found to be non-linear in nature then arbitrage is possible. That being said, any 
attempts to arbitrage will force linearity in the relationship between risk and return. As such, 
the APT can be modelled both linearly and nonlinearly. The choice of model depends in part 
on the choice of explanatory variables as well as what specifically is being modelled. 
One such method of modelling the APT nonlinearly was employed by McElroy and Burmeister 
(1988) who replaced the unknown random factors of factor analysis with observed 
macroeconomic variables, as such they were able to recast the APT as a nonlinear regression 
model. The authors employed iterated nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression (ITNLSUR) 
to obtain the joint estimates of the asset sensitivities and their associated risk prices. The 
ITNLSUR technique overcomes many of the methodological problems experienced by other 
methodologies, such as loss of efficiency and un-robustness of the estimate if the errors were 
found to be non-normal. The choice of macroeconomic variables included the S&P500 index, 
an expected growth in sales, unexpected deflation, long-term government and corporate bonds, 
and a one month T-bill. The results were found to be in support of the nonlinear APT with 
measured macroeconomic factors; this indicates that the APT still holds its explanatory power 
even in nonlinearity.  
The IAPT, discussed in Section 2.1.1.1, developed by Solnik (1974) was further developed 
upon by Bansal, Hsieh and Viswanathan (1993). The authors use a nonlinear APT model and 
both a conditional and unconditional linear model to price international equities, bonds, and 
forward currency contracts. The advantage with the nonlinear APT model is that it requires no 
restriction on payoffs and hence can be used to price the payoffs of options, forward contracts 
and other types of derivative securities. They presented results in support of the nonlinear APT 
as it was the only model able to explain the time series behaviour of a cross section of 
international returns. Further support for this approach was provided by Bansal and 
Viswanathan (1993) who do not assume a linear factor structure for payoffs. As such, the model 
was able to be used to price the payoffs of both primitive and derivative securities. The 
empirical results using size-based portfolio returns and yields on bonds reject the CAPM and 
linear APT models and support the nonlinear APT. Moreover, the diagnostics on the nonlinear 
model showed that it was more capable of explaining variations in small firm returns.  
Reese (1993) employed a nonlinear approach to the APT on the JSE using the technique 
outlined by McElroy and Burmeister (1988). The author compiled a list of risk factors likely 
to affect shares, these included: gold price risk, growth rate risk, residual market risk, foreign 
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exchange risk, inflation risk, and default premium risk. These were then tested separately 
against mining and industrial shares on the JSE; tests against the mining shares found that gold 
price risk and growth rate risk were priced risk factors in the APT, whereas tests against the 
industrial shares found that all risk factors considered were priced risk factors in the APT. The 
ITNLSUR method was found to be robust in that it was able to assist the APT in explaining 
the variation in stock returns. 
Similarly, Bernat (2011) studied the impact of multiple pre-specified sources of risk on the 
return of three non-overlapping groups of countries using a nonlinear APT model, estimated 
using both the ITNLSUR and Generalised Method Moments techniques. Two strategies were 
employed to choose two sets of risk factors; the first uses macroeconomic variables prescribed 
by various sources of empirical literature and the second is to extract the factors by using a 
principal component analysis. The pre-determined macroeconomic factors include the market 
portfolio return, in this case the All Country World Index constructed by the MSCI, foreign 
exchange risk, the spread between LIBOR and a 90 US T-bill, and changes in the oil price. 
Moreover, five statistical factors were found as a result of the principal component analysis. A 
great resemblance was found between the first statistical factor and the world excess return 
implying that a world market portfolio is important in explaining the covariance structure of 
country returns. In both strategies employed, premiums associated with the world excess return 
were found to be robust. The other pre-specified risk factors were not necessarily prices, but 
did assist in reducing the absolute pricing error. Overall, the ITNLSUR approach with pre-
determined macroeconomic factors was found to be the best-fit model across all groups. 
Outside of the APT, nonlinear models have also proven to be superior in other instances. A 
nonlinear approach was also employed by Su (2012) in attempting to understand the 
relationship between the Renminbi (RMB) and macroeconomic variables in China. The RMB 
and various macroeconomic variables were found to have a nonlinear relationship which might 
have gone unnoticed if a linear model was employed. Nonlinear models are often used for 
forecasting purposes; Balcilar, Gupta and Kotzé (2013) applied this approach when forecasting 
macroeconomic data for South Africa. A nonlinear model was found to be statistically superior 
to a linear forecasting model. This has important policy implications as it highlights that when 
informing policy, one should seek to incorporate potentially important nonlinearities in the 
model structure. 
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Once a model has been developed and run, the robustness of said model should also be 
determined through various tests. Often this involves conducting various tests on the residual 
of the regression model. A unit root test, such as the Augmented Dickey Fuller or 
Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin test, is often conducted on the residual of the regression 
to test whether this series is stationary or non-stationary. If the residual series is found to have 
a unit root, the series is said to be non-stationary; this implies that the residual series has a time-
varying mean, time-varying variance or both. This implies that an OLS regression is perhaps 
not the most suitable to describe the regression. The residual is further tested for normality; as 
mentioned above a normally distributed residual implies that the model, in this case the APT, 
can be described using a linear model. Should the residual be found to display non-normalities, 
a nonlinear methodology such as the ITNLSUR needs to be applied when generating the APT. 
Another robustness check involves testing whether the observations are serially correlated with 
one another; this determined through the Lagrange Multiplier test which tests for the presence 
of ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) effects. This test is conducted as an 
uncorrelated time series can still be dependent due to a dynamic conditional variance process; 
this implies that a time series exhibits conditional heteroscedasticity. Statistically significant 
ARCH effects would imply serially correlated residuals. Finally, regression stability 
diagnostics can be run to determine the presence of outliers in the model as well as how good 
of a fit the regression model is. These stability diagnostics will often include leverage plots and 
influence statistics; leverage plots provide an indication of goodness of fit of every explanatory 
variable to the fit line or regression line, whereas the influence statistics will provide an 
indication of the presence of outliers in the overall model as well as for each explanatory 
variable considered. 
A final regression model robustness check dates back to Markowitz’s (1952) work on the trade-
off between the mean and the variance of risky assets. Ever since then the question of mean-
variance efficiency of an asset or a set of proposed asset-pricing pricing factors has been greatly 
important to finance researchers and capital market participants. Early empirical testing relied 
heavily on asymptotic econometric tests on relatively short records of a small set of portfolios 
and individual stock returns. These challenges were addressed by Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken 
(1989) (GRS) who presented a finite sample test of mean-variance efficiency of one or a set of 
assets with respect to another set of basis securities; as such, reliable inferences could be made 
using a limited historical time series of returns. The GRS is applied in time series regressions 
when there are multiple portfolios to compare and determine whether the alphas of each 
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portfolio are jointly equal to zero. Moreover, the statistical significance of the constant is jointly 
tested for a number of portfolios simultaneously. 
Mathematically, the GRS test can be represented as follows: 
𝐺𝑅𝑆 =  
(𝑇 − 𝑁 – 𝐾)
𝑁
𝛼 ′̂Σ−1̂?̂?
1 +  𝐹 ′̅Ω−1̂?̅?
 ~ 𝐹𝑁,𝑇−𝑁,−𝐾(𝜂)  (9) 
Where ?̅? and Ω̂ are the sample mean and covariance matrix of the excess returns on the 𝐾 
reference portfolios. The exact finite sample distribution, 𝐹𝑁,𝑇−𝑁,−𝐾  is the 𝐹  distribution 
with degrees of freedom 𝑁  and 𝑇 − 𝑁 − 1  and non-centrality parameter  𝜂 = [𝑇/(1 +
 𝐹 ′̅Ω−1̂?̅?] 𝛼 ′̂Σ−1̂. 
 
The GRS test has been employed in numerous asset pricing studies in determining whether a 
portfolio is efficient or not. Grinold (1992) employed the GRS test to determine whether equity 
benchmarks in the United States (S&P500), the United Kingdom (FTA), Australia 
(ALLORDS), Japan (TOPIX) and Germany (DAX) are efficient in terms of expectations. The 
results indicated that the first four indices were found to be efficient and only the DAX was 
found to be inefficient. The GRS test was also employed by Fama and French (1996) to test 
the efficiency of their three-factor model, outlined in Section 2.1.1. The GRS test rejected the 
hypothesis that their three-factor model explained the average returns on the 25 portfolios under 
consideration. Detzler and Wiggins (1997) sought to determine whether international funds 
that actively engage in country and security selection outperform passive global benchmarks; 
the GRS test was employed to test the efficiency of a variety of international mutual funds. 
One of the indices employed, a world equity index, was found to be inefficient under the GRS 
test, even after accounting for exchange rate risk; hence it cannot be used as an appropriate 
benchmark for testing a fund manager’s ability. Moreover, a multi-country benchmark index 
was also found to be inefficient under the GRS test; however, when the short sale constraint 
was accounted for, the multi-country benchmark was found to be efficient. Chen, Novy-Marx, 
and Zhang (2011) develop an alternative to Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model. This 
model comprises of a market factor, an investment factor and a return on assets factor; the 
results indicate that it is able to explain many more patterns in the cross-sectional returns than 
the Fama and French (1993) model. The GRS was used in determining the robustness of this 
model against both Fama and French (1993) and CAPM; the author’s three factor model is 
unable to be rejected by the GRS test, whereas both the Fama and French (1993) and CAPM 
are rejected under the GRS. This new three factor model was also useful in explaining other 
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anomaly variables such as earnings surprises, total accruals, net stock issues, and asset growth. 
The empirical results as well as the GRS test indicate that this new three factor model is robust. 
The outcome of the GRS test has multiple applications and implications; it can determine the 
efficiency or robustness of an asset pricing model as well as for a given portfolio of assets. As 
such, it has implications for asset pricing theory as well as for active managers and capital 
market participants. 
The GRS has demonstrated itself as a robust asset pricing test; however, the test is completely 
dependent on a uniform set of explanatory variables. Essentially the same set of explanatory 
factors should be used to jointly explain the returns on multiple portfolios. This study makes 
use of uniform data sets, but the data itself is different for each country. Employing the GRS 
test in this study would be ineffective as the GRS would, for example, test whether inflation in 
Germany affects ALSI returns in South Africa. Clearly, determining this would not provide an 
indication of the robustness of the individual country APT models. As such, the GRS test 
cannot be applied in this study. 
This section has outlined the various considerations for the statistical testing of asset pricing 
models, particular the APT. Macroeconomic variables have a tendency to suffer from 
endogeneity – this problem occurs when an explanatory variable and the error term of the 
model are correlated. This problem is usually as a result of a measurement error, omitted 
variables, or simply the nature of the variables; if not addressed, the inclusion of endogenous 
variables can result in spurious regression results. The instrumental variable and 2SLS methods 
are often employed to address the problem of endogenous variables. A further statistical 
consideration of asset pricing models is whether they should be modelled linearly or 
nonlinearly. Nonlinear models tend to be less restrictive and can, in some cases, prove to be a 
superior asset pricing model. There is evidence to indicate that a nonlinear APT model may be 
superior to the linear alternative as there are fewer restrictions, especially about the payoffs. 
This implies that other asset classes, apart from equities, can be modelled under the APT. The 
choice of linear versus nonlinear, however, is completely dependent on the data being used. 
Once an asset pricing model has been developed, its robustness also needs to be tested using 
various tests. This involves checking that the residual of the model is stationary and normally 
distributed (non-normal residuals would indicate that perhaps a nonlinear model is more suited 
to the data set). Leverage plots and influence statistics can also be used to detect the number of 
outliers as well as the stability of the model. A final test that can be applied to an asset pricing 
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model is the GRS test, which can be used to test the efficiency of an asset pricing model or a 
portfolio of assets. Both have implications and applications in the real world. 
 
2.2.4 Summary 
The APT was constructed to address the weaknesses of the CAPM, specifically its weakness 
in empirical testing as well as its unrealistic assumptions. Although the APT too is constructed 
using various assumptions, these assumptions are not as restrictive as those of CAPM. 
Fundamentally, the APT is a framework under which various factors can be used in explaining 
asset prices and their associated returns; as such, this makes the APT more flexible in nature. 
The APT, much like the CAPM, was also augmented to be used on an international scale. 
Unfortunately, empirical testing of the APT is grounded in a joint hypothesis that international 
markets are integrated and that the APT holds in an international context. The testing of this 
joint hypothesis creates a problem as one would be unable to determine whether the results 
reflect that international markets are segmented or that the APT holds internationally. As such, 
constructing an IAPT is not the focus of this study as it would not yield insights about the 
individual countries under examination. Much of the empirical research into the APT focuses 
on the correct number of factors to be used in the model, as well as what those factors actually 
are. The APT framework is also used to determine the macroeconomic drivers of a country’s 
economy and stock market; the individual nuances of a country has a large impact on this as a 
factor that has explanatory power in one country may not have explanatory power in another. 
Finally, there are a number of statistical considerations when testing an APT model, including 
accounting for endogeneity, choosing the appropriate type of model, and ensuring the model is 
robust by conducting various robustness checks. 
 
2.3 Behavioural Finance and Investor Sentiment 
This section provides an overview of the history and beginnings of behavioural finance and 
then goes on to describe a specific concept of behavioural finance, investor sentiment. Investor 
sentiment is then examined in detail; its role in explaining theories and anomalies in investment 
theory is outlined as well as its role in explaining market returns, using various measurements 
of investor sentiment. Finally, another behavioural finance concept is examined – the 
asymmetric effects of investor reactions between positive and negative news. 
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2.3.1 A Brief History of Behavioural Finance 
Investor sentiment is part of a much larger area of research field known as behavioural finance, 
which “is the study of the influence of psychology on the behaviour of financial practitioners 
and the subsequent effect on markets” (Sewell, 2010, p. 1). This concept is somewhat logical 
as ultimately it is people who are participating in market transactions; hence it would be 
reasonable to assume that an individual’s mental attitude would affect their decisions and 
finally, financial markets. Behavioural finance, much like any new theory, was not developed 
overnight; instead it was built upon by academics from both finance and psychology fields. 
Psychology of the Stock Market: Human Impulses Lead to Speculative Disasters written by 
George Selden in 1912 is the earliest manifestation of the combination of psychology and 
finance. This book was written on the premise that movements in prices on the exchanges are 
dependent on the mental attitudes of the investing and trading public. This in essence provides 
the foundation for investor sentiment as a concept. 
Based on the foundation of Selden’s book, it is clear that the mental attitudes of individuals 
will influence their decision making, hence affecting price movements on exchanges. An 
important aspect of decision making is the feelings and emotions one experiences when making 
a decision. Loewenstein (2000, p. 426) argues that these “often propel behaviour in directions 
that are different from that dictated by a weighing of the long-term costs and benefits of 
disparate actions.” This can easily be related to financial markets as equity pricing involves 
weighing long-term benefits (the right to a share in future net cash flow due to an equity stake) 
and costs (the riskiness of the future cash flows) and hence it seems reasonable to hypothesise 
that emotions and feelings will influence their pricing of equities (Lucey & Dowling, 2005). 
A psychological analysis of financial decision making would be incomplete without describing 
the role that risk plays. Risk refers to future uncertainty about deviation from expected earnings 
or an expected outcome. Holton (2004) argues that there are two ingredients that are needed 
for risk to exist; the first being uncertainty about the potential outcome and the second the 
outcome has to matter in terms of providing utility. Risk is an inherent component in any 
financial decision and investors will accept a certain degree of risk based on their specific risk 
profile, this implies a degree of asymmetry in risk profiles of individual investors. It is clear 
from the very nature of risk that it has an impact on financial decision making; however risk 
coupled with a framing bias suggests that an investors’ degree of risk taking will be affected 
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by how that individual frames their prospective gains or losses (Gärling, Kirchler, Lewis, & 
van Raaij, 2009). 
Decision making under risk is a critical component in the development of behavioural finance; 
there are two models that are used to analyse this concept. The first being expected utility 
theory (EUT), followed by prospect theory; interestingly, the latter was developed as a critique 
to the former. EUT is based on four axioms that define a rational decision maker, each is 
described below: 
1. Completeness: assumes that an individual has well-defined preferences and thus, can 
always decide between two alternatives. 
2. Transitivity: assumes that, as an individual decides according to the completeness 
axiom, they do so consistently. 
3. Independence: assumes that two gambles mixed with a third one maintain the same 
preference order as when the two are presented independently of the third one. 
4. Continuity: assumes that if there are three gambles (A, B, and C) and the individual 
prefers A to B and B to C, then there should be a possible combination of A and C in 
which the individual is then indifferent between the mix and gamble B. 
If the four axioms are satisfied, the individual is assumed to be rational and hence their 
preferences can be represented by a utility function. Essentially, this means that an individual 
will choose between risky or uncertain prospects by comparing the expected utility values 
(Anand, Pattanaik, & Puppe, 2008). 
The downside with EUT is that it only holds when all four axioms are met. This is precisely 
the critique described by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) who present a number of classes of 
choice problems where EUT does not hold. As a result, EUT cannot be viewed as an adequate 
descriptive model and instead the authors develop prospect theory. Under prospect theory, 
value is assigned to gains and losses; also probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The 
value function, therefore, is defined by a deviation from a reference point with the type of 
deviation providing an indication of whether an individual is risk averse or risk seeking. 
Decision making is largely an internal force – it is an individual’s decision – that has the ability 
to affect financial markets. However, an external force has an impact on how an individual will 
react to something, which also has the ability to impact financial markets. Investor reaction, 
specifically overreaction, is something that was considered by DeBondt and Thaler (1985), 
39 
 
with their research finding that individuals systematically overreact to unexpected and dramatic 
news events. The outcome of this research is viewed by many to be the beginning of 
behavioural finance. 
 
2.3.2 Investor Sentiment 
Many traditional finance models are underpinned by the assumption that the individuals 
participating in financial markets are rational. Rationality entails that investors, upon receiving 
new information, update their beliefs correctly in alignment with Bayes’ Theorem5 (Laplace, 
1812) and investors make choices that are normatively standard, that is consistent with 
Savage’s Subjective Expected Utility (Savage, 1954). However, given that an individual’s 
mental attitude affects their decision making, it would appear that they do not necessarily 
update their beliefs and make choices in a rational manner – a manner that is free of emotion. 
In fact, given Loewenstein’s (2000) view that emotions and feelings change an individual’s 
behaviour and hence, cause them to make decisions that are different than what would be 
dictated by a cost-benefit analysis, it would appear that individuals tend to behave more 
irrationally than rationally. 
By quantifying and studying investor sentiment, it allows one to see how an individual’s beliefs 
affect financial markets. In essence, it provides a much more realistic view of the mechanics 
of financial markets. 
The limitations of conventional finance theory gave rise to the study of behavioural finance, 
which seeks to understand the emotional processes of investors and how these processes 
influence their decision making – viewing the investor as irrational as opposed to rational 
(Ricciardi & Simon, 2000). The study of stock price movements that are seemingly unjustified 
by fundamental pricing theories can be attributed to the term “animal spirits” which was made 
popular by Keynes (1936).  
 
                                                 
5 Bayes’ Theorem describes the probability of an event, based on conditions that might be related to that event. 
This theorem was used to show how new evidence is used to update one’s beliefs and was further developed and 
published by Laplace (1812). 
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2.3.3 The Role of Investor Sentiment in Investment Theory 
The evidence outlined above has demonstrated that investor sentiment can be measured in a 
variety of ways and hence can be used to explain changes in financial returns. Essentially, the 
evidence considers investor sentiment in isolation and how it can explain financial returns. 
There is another aspect of investor sentiment that should be considered, and that is its role in 
explaining other theories or phenomena in investment theory. 
Investment theory “encompasses the body of knowledge used to support the decision-making 
process of choosing investments for various purposes.” (Goetzmann, 1996, p. 3). It includes a 
wide variety of topics which aim to understand how individuals and institutions make 
investment decisions; hence, a full understanding is not achieved until one understands broad 
investor behaviour. Many of these theories are founded on the concept of a rational individual; 
however, this is also the source of their weakness in empirical testing due to a gap where 
investor behaviour should be incorporated. Behavioural finance has found its way into a 
number of investment theories, such as the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and the CAPM. 
Investor sentiment, on the other hand, has played a role in explaining investor behaviour 
through the noise trader model, the CAPM, and the APT. 
2.3.3.1 Noise Trader Theory 
It has been debated quite extensively if uninformed investors or noise traders actually have an 
effect on financial assets. The neoclassical view is that an investor trading on anything other 
than fundamentals would fall prey to rational arbitrageurs and be forced out of the market. 
However, the work done by Black (1986) suggests that noise trading will persist in the market 
because it plays an important role in providing liquidity. As Black (1986, p. 530) put it: “Noise 
makes financial market possible, but also makes them imperfect. If there is no noise trading, 
there will be very little trading in individual assets.” As such, it was critical that academics gain 
a clearer understanding of how traders acting on non-fundamental information could affect 
stock price; the first group of academics to do this was De Long, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldmann (1990). 
Their model assumed two classes of investors – those trading on fundamental information and 
those who trade on a noisy signal. Noise traders affect stock prices as they trade when they are 
unusually bearish or bullish. Thaler (1993, p. 18) describes the difference between rational and 
noise traders as follows: “One way to think about noise is that it is the opposite of news. 
Rational traders make decisions on the basis of news (facts, forecasts etc.). Noise traders make 
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decisions based on anything else.” If several noise traders act together, their trading will cause 
prices to deviate from fundamentals. Given that arbitrage is now a risk – deviations from 
fundamentals could increase – rational traders now opt not to correct the mis-pricing. As a 
result, noise traders have effectively created an additional source of systematic risk that is 
priced in the market. This risk should manifest itself as added price volatility of assets affected 
by noise traders. The short-run and long-run impact of noise traders are addressed through 
various theories; in the short run, the ‘price pressure’ and ‘hold-more’ effect; and in the long 
run, the ‘Friedman’ and ‘create-space’ effect. The ‘hold-more’ effect implies that noise traders 
increased their holdings of risky assets when their sentiment is bullish, thus raising market risk 
which increases expected returns. Noise traders tend to overreact to good and bad news and 
hence asset prices are either too high or too low depending on their sentiment. This overreaction 
introduces ‘price pressure’ and lowers expected returns. Moreover, noise traders usually have 
poor market timing and hence their capital losses are larger the greater their misperceptions 
are. The ‘Friedman’ effect implies that these changes result in higher market risk and lower 
expected returns. Finally, the extent of the ‘Friedman’ effect on expected returns depends on 
the ‘space’ noise trading creates. A rise in noise traders’ misperceptions increases price 
uncertainty and crowds out risk-averse informed investors. So, the larger the proportion of 
noise trading the higher the expected returns will be (Lee, Jiang, & Indro, 2002). The fact that 
noise traders will trade when they are either extremely bullish or bearish implies that they are 
experiencing a level of either positive or negative sentiment which is then influencing their 
decision making. 
Testing the presence of noise traders involve ascertaining whether there is a relationship 
between investor sentiment and volatility. Brown (1999) tests the four hypotheses outlined by 
De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), however specific to closed-end funds. 
Specifically: 1) If sentiment is not fund specific, discounts on closed-end funds should be 
correlated; 2) Discounts should be a measure of sentiment; 3) New closed-end funds should be 
offered primarily when sentiment is overly bullish; and 4) Extreme levels of sentiment should 
be associated with noise trading and therefore an increase in volatility. Brown (1999) uses the 
AAII survey as well as closed-end fund discounts to determine if this relationship does in fact 
exist. Changes in investor sentiment were found to be associated with fund volatility during 
trading hours; this is expected as noise traders should only affect prices through their trading 
activities. The number of trades as well as the average size was also found to be affected by 
investor sentiment; the number of trades increased with unusually bullish or bearish sentiment, 
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with the average size of the trade decreasing. The most important conclusion from this research 
was that investor sentiment was found to be a statistically and economically significant variable 
in explaining trading activity – this bodes well as it provides support for the noise trader theory. 
The impact of noise trader risk on both the formation of conditional volatility and expected 
return is examined by Lee, Jiang and Indro (2002). The authors employ the II survey and jointly 
test the four behavioural effects outlined by De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann 
(1990). The authors found that shifts in sentiment are negatively correlated with the market 
volatility; that is, as volatility increases (decreases) when investors become more bearish 
(bullish). Investor sentiment playing a significant explanatory role on conditional volatility 
implies that conventional measures of temporal variation in risk omit noise as an important 
factor. 
Further support for the noise trader theory is provided by Verma and Verma (2007) who 
investigate the relative effects of fundamental and noise trading on the formation of conditional 
volatility. This study extends upon that of Brown (1999) as it considers both individual and 
institutional investor sentiment; individual investor sentiment is measured by the AAII survey 
and institutional investor sentiment is measured by the II survey. Market performance is 
characterised by the DJIA and the S&P500. Their evidence was in favour of irrational 
sentiment explaining volatility which is consistent with the view that investor error is a 
significant determinant of stock volatility. The direct implication, however, is that conventional 
measures of temporal variation in risk omit an important source of risk: noise. Therefore, noise 
can be seen as a priced risk factor. By extension, this supports the notion that investor sentiment 
plays a role in the noise trader theory in investment theory. 
Noise trader theory is fundamentally based on investor sentiment and that investors, who are 
either experiencing bullish or bearish sentiment, will trade based on their sentiment. Moreover, 
noise traders rarely act in isolation implying that when a number of them trade, the price of an 
asset is driven away from fundamentals which ultimately results in mis-pricing. Normally, 
arbitrageurs would act on this and any mis-pricing would be effectively traded away. However, 
what actually happens is that rational traders do not correct the mis-pricing which causes an 
additional systematic risk which is priced. Noise trader theory gives a clearer understanding of 
how irrational individuals, driven by their sentiment, behave in the market and what 
implications this has for risk and return. 
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2.3.3.2 Modifications of the CAPM 
The CAPM was discussed in detail in Section 2.1.1 where it was highlighted that the CAPM 
has come under criticism for its unrealistic assumptions, particularly that the model assumes 
all investors behave in an identical and rational manner. There are two important iterations of 
the CAPM which account for irrational investors and introduce psychological biases; the 
Behavioural Asset Pricing Model (BAPM) developed by Shefrin and Statman (1994) and a 
Sentiment CAPM (SCAPM) developed by Yang, Xie and Yan (2012). 
The BAPM was developed by Shefrin and Statman (1994) to allow for the presence of noise 
traders. The authors developed a CAPM in a market where noise traders, who do commit 
cognitive errors, interact with information traders, who are free of cognitive errors and base 
their decisions purely on fundamental data. The authors contend that the distinguishing factor 
between a price efficient market, where CAPM holds, and a price inefficient market, where 
abnormal returns are achieved, is the single driver property. This is the minimal amount of new 
information necessary to infer changes to the return distribution of the market portfolio. A noise 
trader would introduce a second driver into the market and hence drive prices away from 
efficiency. Moreover, the effect of noise traders in the market depends crucially on the type of 
errors they commit. Their theory encompassed a behavioural mean-variance theory, a 
behavioural option pricing theory, and a behavioural term structure theory. In a price efficient 
market, security prices are determined through a single driver, a sufficient statistic consisting 
of only new information. This single driver then drives the mean-variance efficient frontier, the 
return distribution of the market portfolio, the premium for risk, the term structure, and the 
price of options. Moreover, the volatility of the long-term interest rate is zero. However, when 
prices are not efficient, new information is no longer a sufficient statistic. Old information will 
still affect prices, volatility, risk premium, term structure and option prices. However, the effect 
of noise traders is not uniform across securities or time. Noise traders will have a larger impact 
on the term structure than the return on the market portfolio and can also distort option prices. 
Yang, Xie and Yan (2012) present the SCAPM which shows the relationship between 
sentiment perceived risk and sentiment perceived return. The authors derive a sentiment capital 
market line (SCML) as follows: 
𝑅𝑝𝑠 =  𝜇𝑓 +  
𝑅𝑀𝑠 −  𝜇𝑓
𝜎𝑀𝑠
𝜎𝑃𝑠 (10) 
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Where 𝑅𝑝𝑠 is the sentiment perceived return on portfolio P, 𝜇𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝑅𝑀𝑠 is 
the sentiment perceived return on the market portfolio, 𝜎𝑀𝑠 is the sentiment perceived risk 
of the market portfolio, and 𝜎𝑃𝑠 is the sentiment perceived risk of portfolio P. 
 
As well as a sentiment securities market line (SSML) as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠 −  𝜇𝑓 =  
𝜎𝑖𝑀𝑠
𝜎𝑀𝑠
2 (𝑅𝑀𝑠 − 𝜇𝑓) =  𝛽𝑖𝑀𝑠(𝑅𝑀𝑠 −  𝜇𝑓) (11) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑠 is the sentiment perceived return on risky asset i, 𝜇𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝜎𝑖𝑀𝑠 is 
the covariance of risky asset i with tangency portfolio M, 𝜎𝑀𝑠
2  is the sentiment perceived 
risk of the perceived market portfolio, and 𝛽𝑖𝑀𝑠 is the sentiment beta 
 
Equations (10) and (11) together form the SCAPM. The authors then compared these models 
with traditional asset pricing models as well as the BAPM. The results of the testing of the 
SCAPM revealed that an investors’ individual sentiment will lead to different SCMLs and 
SSMLs, which will lead to the investor having different perceived prices. The comparison with 
CAPM showed that the optimistic investor will have a higher perceived price, and the 
pessimistic investor will have a lower perceived price; thereafter, trade will occur between 
these parties. Based on this, the excessive trading anomaly can be interpreted using the 
SCAPM. When compared with the Fama and French (1996), it was found that investor 
sentiment is a key factor in asset pricing and that the sentiment beta in SCAPM can be easily 
determined. Finally, the comparison with BAPM yielded a challenge as the 𝛽 in BAPM is the 
sum of the 𝛽 in CAPM and the risk of noise traders. Unfortunately, the risk of noise traders is 
difficult to determine which makes the behavioural 𝛽 in CAPM difficult to measure, whereas 
SCAPM’s sentiment beta can be easily determined. 
Unfortunately, there is a lack of empirical evidence to support the behavioural finance 
augmentations of the CAPM. Nevertheless, the fact that theories have been developed which 
take into account both behavioural finance and investor sentiment is positive. It indicates that 
there is a role that investor sentiment can play in explaining asset returns. 
45 
 
2.3.3.3 APT 
The APT is discussed in detail in Section 2.2 and is the subject of this particular study as it 
allows for flexibility in the choice of factors used in the model. The flexibility of such a 
framework also breeds significant challenges; specifically, the number of factors to be included 
in the model as well as which factors. Nevertheless, such a flexible approach that is not 
hindered by the assumptions like CAPM should provide us with more insight. Including factors 
into the APT which incorporate behavioural finance concepts should also yield a greater 
understanding of asset prices. 
Building on the macroeconomic foundation of Chen, Roll and Ross (1986), Hasan (2010) 
includes a measure of investor sentiment to the model as a means to improve its explanatory 
power. The results of Hasan’s (2010) macroeconomic APT were poor in that only the change 
in expected inflation was found to be statistically significant in explaining returns. Chen, Roll 
and Ross (1986), on the other hand, found strong significance in four of the factors and 
somewhat weaker in two factors. This caused Hasan (2010) to re-evaluate and consider that 
there might be some other risk factors which could affect stock prices. The rationale behind 
incorporating an investor sentiment component was based on the fact that investors are 
becoming more well-informed and hence are able to make educated guesses about stock 
returns. As such, consideration was given to a variable that would capture the behavioural 
aspect of investors. Once this component was included – as measured by the Conference Board 
CCI – the joint significance of all six factors was improved. Overall, the explanatory power of 
the macroeconomic model improved. This indicates that investor sentiment does capture a risk 
factor which affects stock returns and a behavioural approach to the APT could yield a more 
holistic understanding of asset pricing. 
The five-factor macroeconomic model developed by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) was further 
built upon by Shen and Yu (2013) who developed an 11-factor model which incorporates 
investor sentiment. The macroeconomic factors includes consumption growth, total factor 
productivity, industrial production growth, term premium, default premium, unexpected and 
expected changes in inflation, aggregate market volatility, market returns, and labour income 
growth. Market-based investor sentiment is measured using the Baker and Wurgler (2006; 
2007) index. During periods of low sentiment, it is hypothesised that markets will be more 
rational and efficient and high risk firms should earn higher returns as sentiment-driven 
investors require larger compensation during this time. Evidence was found to support this 
hypothesis, implying a degree of rationality that is present. However, during periods of high 
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sentiment it is hypothesised that the opposite will be true. Evidence was also found to support 
this hypothesis; during periods of high sentiment, high risk firms earn lower returns than low 
risk firms as sentiment-driven investors do not require as much compensation during this time. 
Therefore, it appears as though mis-pricing plays a role in understanding asset returns and that 
it is important to incorporate investor sentiment into economic theory and asset pricing models. 
The APT as a data return generating process can also be viewed as a framework to explain 
asset prices and their associated returns. As such, it provides the opportunity to gain an 
understanding of the role irrational investors plays in explaining asset prices and returns. There 
is evidence that indicates that investor sentiment captures additional risk that may influence 
asset prices. Moreover, investor sentiment tends to cause mis-pricing in the market which also 
appears to be an important factor in understanding asset prices; the effects of mis-pricing also 
appear to be more pronounced during periods of high sentiment. 
A critical component of the definition outlined in the introductory paragraph is that investment 
theory involves understanding decision making. As such, a proper understanding involves 
understanding the role of irrational behaviour in making such decisions. The noise trader model 
is one manifestation of investor sentiment in investment theory; it provides an understanding 
of those traders who trade on information other than fundamentals and hence cause mis-pricing 
in the market, which also results in greater volatility in asset prices. The CAPM and APT are 
two of the fundamental asset pricing models in investment theory; both are used to understand 
the driving factors behind asset prices and returns. The CAPM has been built upon to include 
such concepts at behavioural finance and investor sentiment which helps in understanding the 
role investor sentiment plays in explaining asset prices (see BAPM and SCAPM in Section 
2.3.3.2). Moreover, the APT which is a framework for determining asset prices allows for a 
variety of factors to be used, including investor sentiment – similar to the topic of this study. 
The evidence has indicated that asset price explanations through the APT can be improved 
through the inclusion of an investor sentiment component. The role of investor sentiment in 
these various investment theories indicates that a more holistic understanding of investment 
decisions can be achieved by considering the behaviour of irrational investors.  
2.3.4 The Role of Investor Sentiment in Understanding Returns 
Inherent in the study of behavioural finance is the challenge of quantifying the concepts that 
lie within its realm. Investor sentiment, specifically, poses a challenge in that one is trying to 
quantify an individual’s beliefs, expectations and thoughts. Moreover, investor sentiment can 
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be defined as either direct or indirect. Direct investor sentiment refers to investors’ mood or 
expectations about the future and is usually measured via surveys and questionnaires that 
measure investors’ current financial conditions as well as their expectation of the future (Uygur 
& Taş, 2012). Indirect investor sentiment refers to a number of economic variables that are 
perceived to act as proxies for measuring investor sentiment (Uygur & Taş, 2012). 
Despite the challenge in measuring investor sentiment, there has been progress in the evolution 
of how it is measured. The traditional method is measurement by way of surveys, whereby a 
number of questions will assess an individual’s expectations of the future of the economy as 
well as their future purchasing power. This remains a commonly used tool as it gathers data 
directly from individuals and is seen to represent the general wellbeing of a country. 
Investor sentiment can also be measured, indirectly, through a number of market variables. 
These market variables are merely proxies of investor sentiment; however, a number of market 
variables have strong theory to support their use as proxies for investor sentiment. The clear 
downside of using market variables as proxies is that they are just that – proxies; they do not 
directly capture the beliefs or expectations of individuals. 
A further source for measuring investor sentiment is through media, specifically traditional 
media such as newspaper and magazine articles as well as through social media platforms such 
as Twitter or Facebook. Extracting investor sentiment from media generally involves textual 
analysis – analysing the words that are used to capture sentiment. Historically, this was done 
through traditional media sources, but has now evolved to include various social media 
platforms. This method is advantageous for two reasons: investor sentiment can be extracted 
directly from individuals which means much richer data, and with the extent of worldwide 
media and the popularity of social media, it allows for a variety of sources to be used. 
An extension to the use of media involves the use of Internet message boards; this method also 
employs textual analysis to analyse posts that have been made on these message boards. An 
advantage of this method is that you are likely to gather sentiment data from informed 
individuals based on the choice of message board. For example, gathering sentiment data from 
a finance-related message board, such as Yahoo! Finance, to use in financial empirical analysis 
implies that the sentiment data would be drawn from informed individuals as they are active 
participants in financial markets. 
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Regardless of how it measured, empirical evidence clearly indicates that investor sentiment has 
a significant relationship with asset returns, whether explanatory or predictive. Empirical 
evidence using each measure is outlined below. 
2.3.4.1 Surveys of Investor and Consumer Sentiment 
Early evidence of the use of surveys to measure investor sentiment was documented by Solt 
and Statman (1988) who constructed the Bearish Sentiment Index (BSI), the ratio of the number 
of investment advisors who are bearish to those who are either bearish or bullish, and tested its 
validity as an indicator of future stock prices. The BSI is seen as a contrary indicator, meaning 
that one should buy when investment advisors are bearish and sell when they are bullish. The 
data is sourced from Investor Intelligence (II), an investment service in New York that 
published data based on a survey of sentiment advisory newsletters. Investor opinions are 
classified as either bullish or bearish; this task is challenging however II standardises its 
classification criteria and personnel used from week to week. This indicator was then tested 
against the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) to determine the impact it would have. The 
sample period was chosen dependent on the investor sentiment data; the sample period runs 
from January 1963 to September 1985, amounting to a total of 1 000 observations. The results 
showed that the BSI was a useless indicator of future stock price changes, with the number of 
correct forecasts by the index equalling the number of incorrect forecasts. This result then 
begged the question: If the sentiment index has little or no predictive power, why do people 
continue to believe that it is useful? The authors provided two suggestions as to why this could 
be the case, both due to errors in cognition. The first is failure to recognise randomness and the 
second is the illusion of validity. Failing to recognise randomness originates from the belief in 
the “hot hand” in basketball. It is believed that a player is more likely to score a hit after a hit 
than after a miss. Although empirical evidence has refuted this theory, spectators, players and 
coaches persist in their beliefs. This explanation was investigated by the authors who found 
that changes in the DJIA during a period are unrelated to the level of the sentiment index – this 
indicates changes in the DJIA conditional on the sentiment index were found to be completely 
random, consistent with the Random Walk Hypothesis. The illusion of validity occurs when 
people experience confidence in highly fallible judgement (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). This 
tends to persist because people suffer from a confirmation bias where people seek confirmation 
of hypotheses rather than disconfirmation and hence will selectively search and interpret 
financial information (Hilton, 2001). Specific to this research, the investment advisors did 
indeed suffer from the illusion of validity and confirmation bias. 
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An important outcome of the noise trader model developed by De Long, Shleifer, Summers, 
and Waldmann (1990) is that it predicts that the direction and magnitude of changes in noise 
trader sentiment are relevant in asset pricing. Lee, Jiang and Indro (2002) found that evidence 
relating to this outcome was at best incomplete and hence sought to test the four behavioural 
effects in the noise trader model. Instead of using closed-end fund discounts as a proxy for 
investor sentiment, the authors opted for using the II sentiment index as a direct measure of 
investor sentiment. Furthermore, they tested the relationship between investor sentiment and 
excess returns using three different market indices, namely the DJIA, S&P500 and the 
NASDAQ. The relationship was tested for the entire sample period, as well as over a number 
of sub-periods. The authors employed a GARCH model to show that not only excess returns, 
but also conditional volatility, are affected by investor sentiment. Overall, investor sentiment 
was found to be a significant factor in explaining both conditional volatility and excess returns. 
Specifically, sentiment was found to be a priced risk factor; excess returns are 
contemporaneously and positively related to shifts in investor sentiment. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the shift has a significant impact on the formation of conditional volatility and 
expected returns. The significance of investor sentiment in explaining conditional volatility 
and excess returns was found to hold across the various indices and sub-periods. 
Research conducted by Otoo (1999) in the United States examined the relationship between 
movements in consumer sentiment and stock prices as well as delving deeper to examine the 
nature of the relationship between the two. The study made use of the Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index (MCSI) as the measure of consumer sentiment and the Wilshire 5000 stock 
price index as a proxy for the overall market. The sample period spanned from 1980 to 1990 
and monthly data was utilised. A significant and strong contemporaneous correlation between 
the two variables was found; although the relationship was found to be fairly robust, stock 
prices explained only 10% of the variation in consumer sentiment. In order to determine if there 
was a leading or lagging relationship between the variables, Granger causality6 tests were 
employed. The outcome of the causality tests suggest that stock price movements affect 
changes in consumer sentiment, but lagged changes in consumer sentiment have no explanatory 
power for stock prices. Thus, it can be concluded that stock price movements are a leading 
indicator for changes in consumer sentiment. In order to examine the nature of the relationship, 
                                                 
6 Granger-causality is based on predictability and considers the direction of the flow of time to determine the 
causal ordering of the chosen variables (Granger, 1969). 
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Otoo (1999) sought to answer the question, “Does an increase in stock prices raise aggregate 
sentiment because people are wealthier (wealth effect) or because they use stock price 
movements as an indicator of future economic activity and potential labour income growth 
(leading indicator)?” This question was answered using observations on individuals; the micro-
data has the advantage of endogeneity, as no single individual’s level of sentiment would affect 
the entire US stock market. The results provided strong support for equity prices being used as 
a leading indicator of economic activity as stock price movements appeared to have a greater 
impact on individuals’ assessments of business conditions. Although the evidence of a 
traditional wealth effect was found to be weak, it cannot be ruled out completely. 
The research conducted by Otoo (1999) was then built upon by Christ and Bremmer (2003) 
who used three additional stock indices to understand the relationship between consumer 
sentiment and stock price movements. In addition to the Wilshire 5000, the DJIA, the S&P500 
and the NASDAQ were used as proxies for the US market. Consistent with Otoo (1999), 
consumer sentiment was measured via the MCSI. All data sets consist of a monthly time series, 
covering a sample period of 1978 to 2003, with the exception of the NASDAQ whose data is 
available from 1984 to 2003. Cointegration tests were performed and it was found that there 
was no long run relationship between the measure of consumer sentiment and the equity 
indices. Given the outcome of no long run relationship between the variables, the short run 
relationship was examined using Granger-causality tests. The outcome of these tests revealed 
that changes in equity prices as measured by the four equity indices Granger-caused changes 
in consumer sentiment, consistent with the outcome from Otoo (1999). 
A European perspective was provided by Jansen and Nahuis (2003) who analysed 11 European 
countries from 1986 to 2011. Theirs was the first look into the effects of consumer confidence 
in the European market and as such, presented valuable insight from which to draw inferences. 
The consumer confidence indicator used was published by the European Commission for all 
EU countries excluding Luxemborg. The data is collected on behalf of the European 
Commission by various national institutes during the first 10 working days of the month. The 
surveys are harmonised, that is a uniform questionnaire is used across all countries, and results 
are seasonally adjusted. The questionnaire consists of four questions which gather public views 
regarding future household position, future economic situation in the country, future 
unemployment in the country and planned savings behaviour going forward. The countries 
included in the sample are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. The nature of their study was twofold, first they 
51 
 
analyse the relationship between the stock market and the aggregate consumer confidence 
index and second, they disaggregate the consumer confidence index into its components to 
provide insight into the nature of the relationship. Their results were positive in that they found 
a positive correlation between the two variables for nine countries, with Germany being the 
only country showing a disconnection. At a country level, they found that the UK demonstrated 
the highest correlation between these variables, while the remaining countries revealed lower 
correlations. These results can be said to reflect the fact that stock ownership in continental 
Europe is significantly lower than in the UK (Boone, Giorno, & Richardson, 1998). Moreover, 
they found that stock returns Granger-cause consumer confidence at short horizons, but not 
vice versa. Their further analysis found that the stock market-confidence relationship is driven 
by expectations about economy-wide conditions rather than personal finance. This suggests 
that the confidence channel is based on the leading indicator property of stock prices, and that 
it is not part of the conventional wealth effect. These results are largely consistent with the 
outcomes of research conducted by Otoo (1999) and Christ and Bremmer (2003). 
Similar analysis to Jansen and Nahuis (2003) was conducted by Karnizova and Khan (2010) in 
the Canadian market from 1961 and 2008 with similar results. The Canadian measure of 
consumer confidence is published on a quarterly basis by the Conference Board of Canada, and 
is based on a survey of Canadian households. The index combines responses to questions about 
current and expected personal financial position, employment prospects and current buying 
conditions. The S&P Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) composite is the primary indicator for 
Canadian equity markets. This data is extracted on a monthly basis and subsequently converted 
to quarterly by using the values in the last month of each quarter, consistent with the timing of 
the Conference Board Survey. The results found that changes in the stock and consumer 
confidence index are positively correlated, and that stock market changes Granger-cause 
consumer confidence index changes, consistent with the outcome of research conducted by 
Jansen and Nahuis (2003) in Europe. Stock market movements can influence consumer 
consumption through changes in wealth (the wealth channel), or indirectly by influencing 
consumer confidence (the confidence channel) – the results of this research provided support 
for both hypotheses. 
Charoenrook (2005) examines whether investor sentiment has any bearing on asset returns, by 
using the MCSI. Excess market returns are calculated using the CRSP market indices minus 
the one-month return of the Treasury bill that is closest to its 30 day maturity. These indices 
include shares listed on the AMEX, NYSE and NASDAQ. The outcome of this result was that 
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changes in consumer sentiment are positively related to contemporaneous excess market 
returns and negatively related to future excess market returns. Moreover, changes in sentiment 
predict value-weighted and equal-weighted excess market returns at one-month and one-year 
horizons. 
Further evidence of surveys used to measure investor sentiment can be found in the Australian 
market. Lin, Ho and Fang (2005) examine investor sentiment’s influence on the stock market 
in two stages. Firstly, they examine if investor sentiment captures any variation in market 
returns and secondly, they assess its predictive power on subsequent stock returns. The 
Australian consumer confidence indicator is compiled from the responses to five questions that 
address different aspects of respondents’ attitudes toward economic outlook. The five questions 
include the family financial situation over the past year, the expected changes in the family 
financial situation over the next year, the expected changes in economic prospects in the next 
year and the next five years, and the views on the buying conditions of major household items. 
Market returns are obtained from the S&P/ASX 300; moreover, based on the S&P 
classification there are 11 economic sectors in Australia. The authors documented that changes 
in consumer sentiment are positively related to aggregate returns. At a more granular level, it 
was found that energy, financials excluding property trusts, industrials, information technology 
and materials sectors are highly influenced by swings in sentiment. The reason behind this 
result is that these sectors tend to be characterised by less stable cash flows and are more 
subjective in their valuation. In tracing the source of the sentiment, it was found that the most 
important factor in the sentiment measure is the perception of next year’s economic condition. 
Their main finding is that public confidence in the short-term provides explanation for the 
variation in returns that cannot be explained by other variables. The second part of their analysis 
showed that consumer sentiment seemed to lack predictive power on subsequent aggregate 
returns for most of the sectors. This results support the outcome of Charoenrook’s (2005) 
research conducted in the USA. 
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) made use of the MCSI and the Conference Board Index of 
Consumer Confidence (CBIND) in order to assess the extent to which sentiment affects the 
prices of shares in times of optimistic and pessimistic assessment of market conditions by 
investors. Their analysis covered both rational and behavioural channels through which 
investor sentiment might be manifested in asset prices. First, consumer confidence was 
regressed against a set of macroeconomic variables (default spread, dividend yield, GDP 
growth, consumption growth, labour income growth, the unemployment rate, the inflation rate 
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and the consumption-to-wealth ratio). The residual from the regression was used as a measure 
of excessive sentiment (optimism or pessimism) unwarranted by fundamentals. The authors 
then employed lagged measures of fundamental and sentiment components of consumer 
confidence to explore the time-series behaviour of the betas and pricing errors for returns on a 
portfolio of long shares in the smallest decile and short shares in the largest size decile. It was 
found that, for the two decades under observation, consumer confidence exhibited forecasting 
power for the returns on small shares and for future macroeconomic activity. The sentiment 
component of confidence was found to forecast time-series variation in the size premium. 
When tested against the closed-end fund discount or the Baker and Wurgler (2006) composite 
measure of investor sentiment, there was no strong relation found indicating that the different 
measures either capture some unrelated components of investor sentiment or fail to capture 
some important aspects of investor sentiment. The puzzling result that emerged was that the 
relationship between consumer confidence and subsequent stock returns and macroeconomic 
activity was non-existent prior to 1977; this can possibly be attributed to the changing dynamics 
of participation of households in equity markets. Regardless, their evidence suggests that in 
recent years, consumer confidence has become a much better indicator of economic activity 
and investor attitudes. 
Lux (2008) investigated the causal relationship between investor mood and subsequent stock 
price changes in the German stock market. The author made use of sentiment survey data 
provided by Animus X, who provide a range of technical services and information for German 
investors. The market data used is that of the German stock price index, the DAX. The results 
highlighted the apparent informational inefficiency in the German stock market. The 
anonymously collected sentiment of a large number of individual and institutional investors 
has produced an overall indicator that has significant predictive power for near-term returns. 
The medium term sentiment measure is highly predictable and hence cannot be seen as a 
measure of new fundamental measure; rather it is seen as the slowly moving basic mood of the 
market that has very weak links to returns. The results using the medium term sentiment 
measure are hardly reconcilable with the notion of efficiency or the traditional noise trader 
model. In contrast, short-term sentiment shows alignment with the noise trader model as it 
performs wild, short-lived swings between euphoria and depression. 
An international perspective is offered by Schmeling (2008) who examines how investor 
sentiment, proxied by consumer confidence surveys, predicted the returns for eighteen 
industralised countries. The countries included in this sample are the US, Japan, Australia, 
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Japan, New Zealand, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the UK. The choice of markets was dictated by 
data availability; however the chosen markets do capture the largest share of international stock 
market capitalisation and cover the most liquid markets in the world, namely the US, Europe 
and Japan. In addition to the consumer confidence surveys collected for each country or region, 
monthly returns were gathered for the aggregate stock market, a portfolio of value shares and 
a portfolio of growth shares. It was found that the predictive power of investor sentiment is 
most pronounced for short and medium term horizons of one to six months and washes out for 
longer horizons of 12 to 24 months. Some international differences were picked up as the 
predictive power of investor sentiment varies across countries and in some cases investor 
sentiment contains no predictive power for several countries at all. These results are consistent 
with the findings of Jansen and Nahius (2003) who also provided insight into the relationship 
between investor sentiment and stock returns on an international scale. A cross-sectional 
analysis was conducted with the purpose of delving deeper into the differences found. The 
influence of noise traders was found to provide an economically intuitive explanation. The 
impact of investor sentiment on returns is much higher for countries that are more prone to 
herding behaviour and those countries that have less efficient regulatory institutions or less 
market integrity. The international evidence from Jansen and Nahuis (2003) and now, 
Schmeling (2008) demonstrate that one cannot simply transfer insights from the US to other 
markets and presume that noise traders move shares in general. It is important to note that 
institutional quality and cultural factors are strong determinants in the investor sentiment-stock 
return relationship. 
A different perspective is taken by Chen (2011) who examines whether the effect of shocks to 
consumer confidence on stock returns varies during different phases of the market cycle and 
whether decreased consumer confidence leads to a bearish stock market. The persistent lack of 
consumer confidence in the US since the 2008 subprime crisis has attracted a lot of attention 
and has led to concern over the effect of pessimism on the economy and stock market. The 
sample period spans from 1978 to 2009, the MCSI is used as the measure of consumer 
confidence and the S&P500 stock price index is used due to the focus on the US stock market. 
In order to measure a shock to consumer confidence variables such as the unemployment rate, 
CPI (inflation is constructed via CPI), the Federal Funds rate and real output measured by 
industrial production are included into a regression with the MCSI. A variety of Markov 
switching models were applied to characterise the fluctuation in the stock market and identify 
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the impact of market pessimism on stock returns and the switching behaviour between bull and 
bear markets. The author found strong evidence indicating that the lack of confidence has an 
asymmetric effect on stock returns. As was predicted, the impact is much greater in bear 
markets. They also showed that the greater the market pessimism the higher the probability of 
switching from a bull to bear market; moreover, a direct relationship was found between the 
severity of market pessimism and the time with which the market stays in a bear regime. 
Ho and Hung (2012) provide an international perspective of the predictive capabilities of 
investor sentiment measures in eight developed countries. The countries included in this sample 
are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand. Investor sentiment measures unique to that particular country were used in the 
analyses. In the US, the MSCI, the CBIND and the II surveys were used. For the European 
countries, the consumer confidence indices specific to a country are used, these are developed 
by the European Commission. In order to capture information not contained in the consumer 
confidence indicators, the Economic Sentiment Index (ESI), which measures the investment-
GDP growth relation, for European countries was also used. Consumer confidence indices are 
used as measures of investor sentiment in the Asia-Pacific countries; these indices adopt similar 
questions and calculation procedures to that of the MSCI. The major stock market index in 
each country was used to measure market performance; monthly returns were collected from 
the S&P500, FTSE100, CAC40, DAX30, MIB30, NIKKEI225, ASX20, and MZ50CAP. The 
fundamental information contained in the sentiment measures is controlled by using the 
dividend yield, inflation rate, T-bill rate and the rate of change in industrial production. It was 
found that consumer confidence exhibited predictive power for the subsequent stock market 
returns in the US, France and Italy where high consumer confidence predicts low excess stock 
market returns; this finding of a negative relationship is consistent with prior research (Fisher 
& Statman, 2000; Brown & Cliff, 2005) . An exception is found in Japan where the current 
consumer confidence level boosts the excess market return the following month; in this case a 
positive relationship was found. Finally, the ESI showed no predictive ability for return on the 
European markets. 
Molchanov and Stangl (2013) investigate the effects of investor sentiment on industry returns 
using industry portfolios constructed by Fama and French. The Fama and French industry 
classification maps all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ shares to one of 49 industries using the 
S&P Industrial Classification. Their analysis also employs two direct measures of sentiment, 
namely the American Association of Independent Investors (AAII)and II surveys, as well as 
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an indirect measure, namely the index created by Baker and Wurgler (2006). The II survey 
reflects the sentiment of financial newsletter writers, with the sentiment of the writers being 
classified as bullish, bearish or neutral. Although this is a subjective process, Brown and Cliff 
(2004), have argued that the II survey proxies the sentiment of professional investors as many 
of newsletter writers are retired institutional investors. The analysis uses a bull-bear spread for 
both the AAII and II surveys, calculated as the difference between the reported measure of 
bullish and bearish sentiment. The Baker and Wurgler (2006) index is the indirect measure of 
sentiment which is constructed using closed-end fund discounts, NYSE stock turnover, the 
number of IPOs, first day average returns on IPOs, the percentage of equity in capital budgets 
and the dividend premium between dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms. Market 
data is extracted for all stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. The primary result 
of this research is that investor sentiment positively predicts short-term and negatively predicts 
long-term market returns; the result also confirms that equal-weighted indices in which small 
shares have a greater weight are more susceptible to investor sentiment. At an industry level, 
the results document widespread investor sentiment predictability of industry performance for 
most industries; at long horizons, investor sentiment predicts negative industry performance. 
In South Africa, the only publicly available CCI is compiled and published by the Bureau of 
Economic Research on a quarterly basis. It is measured via consumer surveys which provide 
regular evaluations of consumer attitudes and expectations which are then used to evaluate 
economic trends and prospects. The survey is constructed using three questions, each carrying 
a different weighting; the CCI is then computed as the average of the result of the three 
questions. The CCI is expressed as a net balance, therefore revealing changes in consumer 
expectations. The net balance is derived as the difference between the percentage of 
respondents expecting an improvement, and those expecting a decline (Kershoff, 2000). The 
CCI was employed by Solanki and Seetharam (2014) who studied consumer confidence and 
its effect on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). JSE monthly price data was extracted for 
all companies listed on the JSE for the time period 1992 to 2011. In order to match the time 
period of the two sets of data, a time-averaging methodology was employed whereby the high 
frequency data (JSE stock returns) is matched to the low frequency data (CCI data). An 
Artificial Market Index (AMI) is created on a price-weighted basis from the JSE stock return 
data. As a comparable index, data for the All Share Index (ALSI) was also obtained. Granger 
causality tests are employed to investigate the relationship across time between the CCI, the 
AMI and the ALSI. The results show weak evidence of a contemporaneous relationship; 
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however significant evidence of a Granger caused relationship is apparent. Moreover, changes 
in investor sentiment Granger-cause changes in the AMI and ALSI generally with a lag of 9 or 
12 months, but the reverse was not found to be true. Thus, it was found that the CCI lead JSE 
performance during the sample period; this is seen to be contradictory to the common 
perception of consumer confidence lagging market performance. 
Surveys primarily serve as a direct measure of investor sentiment; it is advantageous in that the 
data, investors’ beliefs and expectations, is gathered directly from the source and not proxied 
by other variables. The effect of investor sentiment on stock price performance has been 
reported in numerous countries, using a variety of different investor sentiment surveys. There 
are, however, a number of downsides to using surveys. Firstly, the information content of 
surveys tends to vary from question to question implying that certain surveys will be more 
useful than others, as such there is no level of uniformity in this measure (Friesner, Khayum, 
& Schibik, 2013). Secondly, the data is sourced directly from the consumers who have been 
known to suffer from a number of psychological biases. This implies that the results provided 
might be clouded by their judgement in terms of what answers they feel they should provide 
versus the actual truth. Finally, differences in measurement across surveys make comparing 
the results quite challenging. Nevertheless, investor sentiment surveys have allowed academics 
to gain important insights into financial markets and enabled further research into this topic. 
 
2.3.4.2 Market Variables 
Surveys are a direct measure of investor sentiment; however, it can also be measured indirectly 
using market variables as proxies for investor sentiment. These market variables can be used 
as proxies as they capture behaviour in the market that is viewed to be investor sentiment 
driven. As such, investor sentiment became a tool employed to explain anomalies that were not 
easily explained using conventional finance theory. 
2.3.4.2.1 Mutual Fund Flows 
One such example is the closed end fund puzzle. A closed-end fund is a mutual fund which 
typically holds publicly traded securities. Unlike an open end fund, a closed-end fund issues a 
fixed number of shares that are traded on the stock market. To liquidate a holding in a fund, 
investors must sell their shares to other investors rather than redeem them with the fund itself 
for the net asset value (NAV) per stock as would be the case in an open-end fund. The closed-
end fund puzzle is the empirical finding that closed-end fund shares typically sell at prices not 
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equal to the per stock market value of the assets. Although funds sometime sell at a premium 
to their NAV, in recent years a discount of 10 to 20 % have become the norm (Lee, Shleifer, 
& Thaler, 1991). There have been a number of proposed explanations of the closed end fund 
puzzle, including agency costs, illiquidity of assets, and tax liabilities; however much of the 
empirical evidence often fails to explain this anomaly. Zweig (1973) originally theorised that 
discounts on closed-end funds reflect expectations of individual investors; this theory was 
supported by the “noise trading” model developed by De Long, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldman (1990). The rationale behind this theory is that fluctuations in investor sentiment can 
lead to fluctuations in demand for closed-end fund shares which is reflected in changes in 
discounts; Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) sought to provide further insight into the closed-end 
fund puzzle using these theories. The closed end fund data was obtained from 1960 to 1987, a 
total of 68 funds were used. For these funds, the weekly NAV per stock, stock price and 
discount per stock was collected from the Wall Street Journal. The conclusion from the research 
is that closed end fund discounts are a measure of individual investor sentiment; moreover, that 
sentiment is sufficiently widespread to affect the prices of smaller shares in the same way that 
it influences the prices of closed end funds. Apart from the empirical evidence, all the 
characteristics of the closed end fund puzzle can be explained through the effects of investor 
sentiment: 
Characteristic one: Closed end funds start out with a premium of almost 10% when organisers 
raise money from new investors and purchase securities 
Explanation: Holding the closed end fund is riskier than holding its portfolio directly, and 
because the risk is systematic, the required rate of return on fund shares must be higher than 
the same assets purchased directly. This means that the fund must sell at a discount to its NAV 
to induce investors to hold the fund’s shares. 
Characteristic two: Although closed end funds start at a premium, they move to an average 
discount of over 10% within 120 days from the beginning of trading 
Explanation: When noise traders are particularly optimistic about closed-end funds, 
entrepreneurs can profit by combining a number of assets into a closed end fund and selling 
them to the noise traders. Rational investors would not buy these funds in the beginning and 
hence irrational investors need to be introduced into this model to explain why anyone would 
buy the shares at the beginning when the expected returns over the next few months is negative. 
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Characteristic three: The discounts on closed end funds are subject to wide fluctuations over 
time 
Explanation: Investor sentiment implies that the discounts would fluctuate with changes in 
investor sentiment about future returns. In fact, the theory required that discounts vary 
stochastically as it is those precise fluctuations in the discount that make holding the fund risky 
and therefore account for the underpricing. If the discounts were constant then arbitrageurs 
would buy the fund and sell its portfolio and the discounts would disappear 
Characteristic four: When closed end funds are terminated through either liquidation or an 
open-ending, the stock prices and discounts shrink 
Explanation: When it is known that the fund will be open-ended or liquidated, or even when 
the probability of open-ending increases, the noise trader risk is eliminated as at that time an 
investor can buy the fund and sell its portfolio with guaranteed profitability. As a result, the 
closed end fund discount disappears. 
Neal and Wheatley (1998) investigate the predictive power of three popular proxies of investor 
sentiment: the closed end fund discount, the ratio of odd-lot sales to purchases and net mutual 
fund redemptions. In addition to these three metrics, market capitalisation data was collected 
to be used in conjunction with the fund discount data. The data was collected for a 60 year 
sample period, from 1933 to 1993. A value-weighted index was constructed using the fund 
discount and market capitalisation data. The odd-lot purchases and sales are obtained on a 
monthly basis and thus are temporally aggregated to create an annual series to match the 
discount data. Their analysis was based on the return behaviour of two size-based NYSE-
AMEX decile portfolios; these are value-weighted portfolios and are formed on the basis of 
the market value of equity at the beginning of each year. Their analysis produced somewhat 
mixed results. It was found that fund discounts and net redemptions do predict the size 
premium, the difference between small and large firm returns, but little evidence that the odd-
lot ratio predicts returns. With regards to whether sentiment measures provide information to 
predict the size premium beyond what is contained in its stock price, net redemptions do 
provide additional information that is both statistically and economically significant.  
Loss aversion is a psychological bias that many individual investors are subjected to and hence 
this is an important factor in measuring investor sentiment. This is the approach that Feldman 
(2010) employed when testing how an index that measures loss would perform in explaining 
60 
 
contemporaneous and future medium term returns. The Perceived Loss Index (PLI) was 
originally developed by Friedman and Abraham (2009) by incorporating two insights from 
behavioural finance. Firstly, investors suffer from loss aversion, meaning that investors are 
affected by losses more than gains. Once an investor experiences a loss, they become more 
pessimistic about the reward/risk prospects; loss aversion only subsides once an investor 
experiences gains. Secondly, investors tend to place greater weight on the most current 
performance; they remember the most current losses and forget losses from the past. Feldman 
(2010) augments the original model by using market variables as the input, specifically, mutual 
fund data is used. The PLI is created from data from more than 14 000 mutual funds and focuses 
on an exponential average of current and realised losses. A number of other sentiment measures 
were included in the study; these included the MCSI and the Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007) 
index. The results provided evidence that the PLI outperforms both the MSCI and Baker and 
Wurgler (2006; 2007) index in predicting future medium run returns, especially for one- and 
two-years horizons. This evidence was true not only for the broad market but also for 
capitalisation style and sector specific returns. In separate analyses, it was found that the PCI 
is a robust quantitative tool in detecting bubbles and financial crises in financial markets. 
The use of mutual fund flow data as a proxy for investor sentiment, first investigated by Lee, 
Shleifer and Thaler (1991), was employed by Chi, Zhuang and Song (2012) in the hopes of 
shedding some light on the role of investor sentiment in the Chinese stock market. The authors 
opted to focus on individual shares as opposed to the aggregate market. Quarterly data was 
obtained for the five year sample period, from 2004 to 2008. The evidence out of China was 
found to be contradictory to much of the existing empirical evidence (where if sentiment pushes 
a security price above its intrinsic value, high-sentiment shares should earn low subsequent 
returns). Chinese evidence indicated that high-sentiment shares earn higher subsequent returns 
than low-sentiment shares. Insight into the Chinese stock market can be gained from Drew, 
Naughton and Veeraraghavan (2003) which is especially necessary when interpreting these 
results as this stock market is considered an emerging capital market. Specifically, 60 million 
investors own shares in China with an almost total absence of domestic institutional trading. 
Domestic institutional ownership, although a portion of overall market capitalisation (21%), is 
a completely non-tradeable category held by state-controlled investment trusts. Moreover, a 
portion of the market capitalisation is completely state-owned (38%), which is also a non-
tradeable category. This implies that the majority of the Chinese stock market is non-tradeable. 
Regarding the investors, many participants are retail investors driven by a lack of alternative 
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investment opportunities. The view of these investors is that they lack a level of financial 
sophistication and hence tend to rely heavily on rumours, making this market largely 
momentum driven. Evidence has shown us that certain markets react more severely to the 
effects of investor sentiment (Baker & Wurgler, 2007) and the nuances of this specific market 
may be explanation for the contradictory results highlighted above. 
Mutual fund flows are, once again, used as a proxy for investor sentiment; specifically, shifts 
between bond funds and equity funds, known as net exchanges to equity funds, are used. This 
is popular proxy for investor sentiment as it measures the frequency with which investors shift 
their funds between the two instruments based on their beliefs about market movements. Ben-
Raphael, Kandel and Wohl (2012) use data of mutual fund flows from 1984 to 2008; the 
aggregate data contains 33 categories: five for domestic equity funds, four for international 
equity funds, four for mixed funds and 20 for bond funds. Market data is measured by a value-
weighted index composed of NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ shares. In addition to this data, 
Fama-French portfolios (“small stocks”, “big stocks”, “high book-to-market stocks”, and “low 
book-to-market stocks”) and the returns on the Russell 1000 and 2000 indices are used. The 
monthly aggregate net exchanges are related to contemporaneous changes in the stock market. 
Approximately 85% of this contemporaneous relation is reversed within four months, with the 
remainder being reversed within 10 months. The net exchanges were found to be negatively 
related to VIX (implied standard deviation of S&P 500 options); however the price reversals 
were too large to be explained by time-varying risk premia. As such, net exchanges can be 
interpreted as an indicator of investor sentiment. Consistent with this hypothesis, the effect was 
found to be stronger in smaller shares and growth shares which is also consistent with 
conclusions drawn by Baker and Wurgler (2006). It appears as though this measure of investor 
sentiment captures a different dimension of investor sentiment than other measures that have 
been used. Finally, this evidence supports the notion of “noise” in aggregate market prices that 
is induced by investor sentiment. 
Beaumont, Frijns, Lehnert and Muller (2014) used Lee, Jiang and Indro (2002) as a foundation 
for their investigation into the relationship between investor sentiment and market returns. 
Similar to their predecessors, the authors opted to test the relationship against three different 
indices: the DJIA, S&P 500 and the NASDAQ 100. In contrast, the authors opted for an indirect 
measure of investor sentiment instead of a direct measure as was used by Lee, Jiang and Indro 
(2002); daily mutual fund flow data was used. The results, regardless of the choice of investor 
sentiment metric, were consistent with Lee, Jiang and Indro (2002) in that investor sentiment 
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was found to have significant explanatory power for excess returns. Moreover, a strong positive 
relationship between investor sentiment and excess returns across all indices was found. 
2.3.4.2.2 Baker and Wurgler Index 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) built upon the findings of Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) and used 
a number of proxies, including the closed end fund discount, as proxies for investor sentiment. 
The authors sought to investigate the effect of investor sentiment on the cross section of stock 
prices by using a number of practical proxies for investor sentiment; the methodology 
employed in measuring investor sentiment has since been used by numerous academics. The 
reason for using proxies is due to the fact that identifying cross-sectional patterns of sentiment 
driven mispricing is difficult and hence they chose to examine whether cross-sectional 
predictability patterns in stock returns depend on proxies for beginning-of-period sentiment. 
Apart from the closed end fund discount which is grounded by empirical research, the approach 
to proxies was practical in nature. The proxies included trading volume measured by NYSE 
turnover (TURN), the dividend premium (PDND), the closed-end fund discount (CEFD), the 
number and first-day returns on IPOs (NIPO and RIPO respectively) and the equity stock in 
new issues (S). A principal component analysis was employed in order to create an index of 
sentiment levels as well as an index of sentiment changes. The levels index is the first principal 
component of the six proxies and similarly, the changes index is first principal component of 
the changes in the six proxies. Monthly stock returns between 1963 and 2001 are used and 
formed into equal-weighted portfolios based on firm characteristics. It was shown that the 
cross-section of future returns is conditional on beginning-of-period sentiment proxies. With 
respect to firm characteristics it was found that when sentiment is estimated to be high, shares 
that attractive to speculators and unattractive to arbitrageurs – young, small, unprofitable, non-
dividend paying, highly volatile, growth and distressed shares – tend to earn relatively low 
subsequent returns. However, when sentiment levels are low these cross-sectional patterns 
completely reverse. Baker and Wurgler (2007) built upon their previous research and sought 
to explain specifically, which shares are likely to be most affected by sentiment. Their results 
suggested that the same types of shares are more susceptible to broad waves of investor 
sentiment. The reason being these shares tend to be harder to arbitrage and they are more 
difficult to value, making biases more insidious and valuation mistakes more likely. 
The Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007) sentiment index is a simple, straightforward measure that 
has shown positive results in quantifying the effects of investor sentiment. It has filled a huge 
void in the literature in terms of quantifying investor sentiment by use of market variables. As 
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a result, it has become a popular measure used in numerous academic journals spanning across 
multiple countries. The ability of this index to be replicated in other countries with promising 
results further commends its usefulness and robustness. Some of the international evidence is 
provided below: 
 Analysis is performed on a global and local scale when Baker, Wurgler and Yuan 
(2012) constructed investor sentiment indices for six major stock markets and 
decomposed them into one global and six local indices. The purpose of this research 
was twofold: firstly, to investigate the effect of global and local components of investor 
sentiment on major stock markets, at the level of both the country average and the time 
series of the cross-section and secondly, to consider whether and how sentiment spreads 
across markets. The data is drawn from 1980 to 2005, covering Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. In order to provide a 
degree of external data validation not found in existing literature, dual-listed shares are 
used. These are pairs of shares that claim equal cash flows but trade in different markets 
and sometimes at substantially different prices. The authors document that twins’ 
relative prices are positively related to the relative local sentiment indices of their 
respective markets, proving the empirical validity of their indices. They also found that 
investor sentiment affects the time series of international market-level returns as well 
as the time series of the cross-section of international returns. Global sentiment was 
found to be a significant contrarian predictor of market returns. Both global and local 
components of sentiment help to predict the time series of the cross-section; namely 
they predict high returns on highly volatile, small, distressed and growth company 
shares. Finally, they found that investor sentiment appears to be contagious across 
markets and one of the mechanisms that drive this is international capital flows. 
 Evidence in the Chinese market is provided by Huang, Yang, Yang and Sheng (2014) 
who examine the relationship between investor sentiment and stock returns on an 
industry-specific level. Country-specific market information is sourced from 2005 to 
2013 and divided into 23 industries. Their results showed that investor sentiment is 
positively correlated with the current period industry return and negatively correlated 
with that for one period lagged. Moreover, the investor sentiment coefficients for the 
current level are greater than those for one period lagged, indicating a one-period price 
overreaction in the Chinese stock market – evidence that is consistent with the 
overreaction hypothesis outlined by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). In their secondary 
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analysis using a two-state Markov switching model, it was found that investor sentiment 
has a different effect on different industries’ returns during different states of the 
market. 
Staying with the study of developing markets, Dash and Makahud (2013) saw the need to 
understand the role of investor sentiment in a developing market such an India. The Indian 
market specifically has a high level of institutional and promoter ownership and low levels of 
retail investor participation and thus will provide out of sample insight into the effects of 
investor sentiment. The choice of sample period, from 2003 and 2011, was conditional on the 
availability of the required data. The authors extracted monthly returns for companies listed on 
the National Stock Exchange (NSE) in India, with the only exclusion being financial 
companies. The sentiment index was constructed using an approach similar to Baker and 
Wurgler (2006; 2007); however the authors extended the number of market variables to 11. 
The list of variables includes turnover volatility ratio, stock turnover velocity, advance decline 
ratio, change in margin borrowing, buy-sell imbalance ratio, put-call ratio, number of IPOs, 
equity issue in total issue, dividend premium, fund flow and cash to total assets. The results 
show that investor sentiment accounts for the cross-sectional variation in stock returns, even 
after controlling for market, size, book-to-market, momentum and liquidity factors. Moreover, 
the negative pricing effect of sentiment risk is attributable to the fact that positive sentiment 
results in an overvaluation the shares and hence lower subsequent returns are expected. An 
interesting insight is that despite the characteristics of the Indian market it is not a special case 
for sentiment driven mispricing; this is promising as it highlights that research into developing 
markets is yielding results consistent with those in developed markets. 
Corredor, Ferrer and Santamaría (2013) analysed the investor sentiment effect in four key 
European stock markets: France, Germany, Spain and the UK. This particular study made use 
of the Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007) index as well as composite indices of the four countries. 
This was done to account for the fact that this study was conducted in Europe, while Baker and 
Wurgler (2006; 2007) conducted their study in the US. These composite indices were 
constructed using three market variables: turnover, the volatility premium and the consumer 
confidence index as published by the European Commission. This research bears similarity to 
the work by Jansen and Nahuis (2003); specifically the markets under consideration and the 
use of the consumer confidence index. In addition to the country-specific indices, an overall 
European index was also created using the four composite indices. All indices were constructed 
in accordance with the Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007) methodology of principal component 
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analysis. Financial market data pertaining to all shares currently or formerly listed in the four 
markets was extracted for the period from 1990 to 2007, thus removing any potential 
survivorship bias. The stock characteristics considered were book-to-market, size (market 
capitalisation), volatility and dividend per stock. Investor sentiment was found to have a 
significant effect on the future returns of shares in these financial markets. Furthermore, 
consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2007) this effect was more pronounced for shares that are 
hard to value and more costly and risky to arbitrage. Stock characteristics were found to have 
explanatory power with respect to cross-country differences in sentiment effects; factors such 
as cultural or institutional differences also played a very key role. This is an important 
conclusion as the results of studies involving several countries may be biased unless these two 
dimensions were controlled for, as both are sources of investor sentiment. Finally, the choice 
of sentiment proxy was found to be a determining factor of the relationship as the results from 
the Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007) index were the clearest in revealing the investor sentiment 
effect. The choice of variables for the construction of the proxy also played a key role as the 
explanatory power changed when the input variables changed. It is possible that the US market 
is a greater generator and spreader of investor sentiment or that the quality of the data used to 
construct the European indices lacks sufficient richness. 
The methodology employed by Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007) was employed by Dalika and 
Seetharam (2015) who created a Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007) index for South Africa, using 
a combination of factors employed by Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007) as well as alternative 
variables. Their analysis was also extended to include understanding which stocks would have 
greater reactions when sentiment was either higher or lower. The market proxies include a 
volatility premium, IPO volumes, first day returns on IPOs, number of IPOs, and market 
turnover. The volatility premium was not employed by Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007); 
however, it was included due to the theoretical prediction that sentiment has its strongest effects 
on hard to value and hard to arbitrage stocks. Each of the market variables was then 
orthogonalised against three macroeconomic variables: inflation, employment growth, and 
industrial production growth. The results indicated that investor sentiment has a strong impact 
on stock returns in SA. When sentiment is low, subsequent returns are relatively high on 
smaller stocks, high volatility stocks, extreme growth stocks, and young stocks. Conversely, 
when sentiment is high, the patterns are fully reversed. This result is broadly consistent with 
the results uncovered by Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007). 
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2.3.4.2.3 Liquidity and Trading Volume 
An anomaly similar to that of the closed end fund puzzle is the concept of market liquidity and 
its effects on expected returns. Investors anticipate having to sell their shares at some point in 
the future and recognise that when this occurs they will face transaction costs. When the 
transaction costs are greater, investors rationally discount the asset by more. Although this 
explanation is straightforward, it becomes less clear when trying to explain time series results 
for the aggregate market. Firstly, it is unclear what drives the common time series variation in 
measures of liquidity and secondly, the predictive power of aggregate liquidity for market 
returns is large. Baker and Stein (2004) propose an alternative theory to explain the connection 
between liquidity and expected returns. Specifically, they focus on why time-variation in 
liquidity, at a firm or market level, might forecast changes in returns. Their model rests on short 
sales constraints and irrationally overconfident investors. Overconfidence manifests itself in 
two ways in this model: firstly, when overconfident investors receive private signals, they tend 
to overweight them which leads to either positive or negative “sentiment shocks”; secondly, 
when overconfident investors observe the trading decisions of others, they tend to underreact 
to the information contained in these decisions as they (erroneously) consider others to be less 
informed than they are. This lowers the price impact of trades and boosts liquidity in general. 
Trading volumes are often seen as a proxy for investor sentiment; a modified trading index was 
used by Rahman, Shien and Sadique (2013) to provide insight into a frontier market such as 
Bangladesh. The noise trader model developed by De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman 
(1990) was tested in this market using data from the Dhaka Stock Exchange. There are a 
number of reasons for choosing a frontier market such as Bangladesh: firstly, compared to a 
developed market, the Bangladesh capital market is not as well organised and managed. The 
market is largely driven by unsophisticated individual retail investors who are information 
constrained, lack the ability to process financial information and do not have the advice of 
financial analysts. As such, investment decisions of these investors are likely to be swayed by 
swings in investor sentiment. As presented by Schmeling (2008) the impact of investor 
sentiment on stock returns is higher for countries which have less market integrity and prone 
to herd-like behaviour and overreaction. Secondly, arbitrage opportunities in this market are 
severely limited as there is a complete short sell band and no derivative market. Due to the 
limited level of sophistication in this market, it is no surprise that market variables must serve 
as proxies for investor sentiment. In this case, a modified trading index is used as a proxy; this 
is a measure of relative strength of trading volume in relation to advancing shares against that 
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of declining shares. The results showed that irrespective of the state of the market, daily excess 
returns are positively and contemporaneously related to shifts in investor sentiment. This result 
is consistent with much of the evidence uncovered in numerous developed and developing 
countries. 
2.3.4.2.4 Other 
A novel idea for a measure of investor sentiment was pioneered by Lutz (2013) who aggregated 
returns on lottery-like shares to measure investor sentiment. The shares used were speculative 
shares with high betas; these are high risk, high return shares. The returns on these shares were 
controlled for the effect of macroeconomic variables and measures of time-varying risk 
measures. In general, these lottery-like shares have less information available which allows 
investors to defend a wide range of valuations. They are also very risky to arbitrage due to the 
high idiosyncratic volatility and hence lottery-like shares are classified as highly speculative. 
If the findings from Baker and Wurgler (2007) are applied to this context, it is expected that 
these shares will be more susceptible to broad waves of sentiment as they are harder to arbitrage 
and more difficult to value. The outcome of this research was consistent with previous research 
in that high sentiment relates to low future returns over their entire sample period (1951 to 
2009). In sub-period analysis, it was found that the effects of investor sentiment were weak but 
positive during trough-to-peak episodes of investor sentiment (sentiment expansions), but 
negative and large in peak-to-trough periods (sentiment contractions). These findings suggest 
that the relationship between returns and investor sentiment is highly asymmetric. Overall, the 
findings were found to correspond with investor sentiment theory involving synchronisation 
risk where arbitrageurs take long positions as sentiment expands and attempt to reduce their 
holdings of speculative securities when sentiment contracts. As an aside, it was found that the 
effects of sentiment were stronger after 1978, which supports the theory that a number of social 
factors led to increased sentiment since the early 1980s. 
Research from the African continent, specifically in the Tunisian market, was conducted by 
Boubaker and Talbi (2014). The focus was on using indirect indicators to construct a sentiment 
index, using principal component analysis. Over a 4 year period (2004 to 2008) monthly data 
on premium volatility, dividend premium and the index performance were extracted. The 
Tunisian financial market has some peculiarities in that there are a limited number of 
companies listed and the market is dominated by large companies in the financial sector. 
Despite the idiosyncrasies in the market, a strong negative relationship was found to exist 
between investor sentiment and future returns. Essentially, a high-sentiment stock was found 
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to have lower subsequent returns and sentiment drives the price of the security away from its 
fundamental value. This relationship is consistent with previous empirical evidence and 
highlights that anomalies found in developed markets can also be found in developing markets. 
There are a number of market variables that have proven useful as proxies of investor 
sentiment. As mentioned above, survey data, although useful and insightful, is plagued with a 
number of nuances; hence the need for alternative measures. Using market variables has the 
advantage that the information is correctly measured, often independently collated and readily 
available through various databases. The most notable of these proxies is the closed end fund 
discount, the Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007) index, mutual fund flows, book to market and 
market capitalisation. When tested against stock price performance, these variables 
demonstrated significant explanatory power as well as predictive power. Although these 
proxies are indirect measures of investor sentiment, they do still provide valuable insight into 
the role that investor sentiment plays in financial market performance. 
 
2.3.4.3 News and Social Media 
Survey information and market variables are but a few of the measurements of sentiment that 
can be used to explain “animal spirits” in the stock market. Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) 
pioneered research into the link between news and stock prices when they sought to estimate 
the fraction of returns that can be attributed to different kinds of news. Firstly, the authors 
studied the relation between stock returns and macroeconomic news using vector regressions. 
They found that these news proxies were able to explain about one third of the variation in 
stock returns. Due to the possibility that the stock market can move in response to information 
that did not enter their vector regressions, the authors then considered stock performance 
coinciding with major news events. The evidence indicated that although identifiable world 
news such as news about wars, the US Presidency and major changes in financial policies did 
affect stock prices, the authors find it implausible that “qualitative news” can account for the 
return component that cannot be traced back to macroeconomic news. Their evidence 
supported the observation that many of the largest market movements occurred on days when 
there were no major news events. This research opened opportunities for other to pursue 
research into the relation between news and financial markets. 
In the development of this area of research, Tetlock (2007) attempted to characterise the 
relationship between the content of media reports, specifically the Abreast of the Market 
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(AOTM) column in the Wall Street Journal and daily stock market activity. This column was 
seen as a natural choice as a data source as it reflects and influences investor sentiment due to 
the WSJ’s impressive circulation figures and its strong and established relationship with 
investors. The sentiment indicator was constructed using the General Inquirer (GI) 
methodology which converts the column into numeric values, which is it counts the number of 
words in each day’s column that fall within various word categories. The word categories are 
neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive – one word may fall into multiple categories while 
others may not be categorised at all. The results show that high levels of media pessimism 
robustly predict downward pressure on market prices, followed by a reversion to fundamentals. 
Interestingly this relationship is bi-directional meaning that low market returns lead to high 
media pessimism. The outcome of this research is important for two reasons: firstly, measures 
of media content can serve as proxies for investor sentiment and secondly, it provides support 
for the “noise trading” theory outlined by De Long, Schleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990). 
As an extension to Tetlock (2007), Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky and Macskassy (2008) sought to 
quantify the language used in financial news stories in an effort to predict accounting earnings 
and stock returns. The authors investigated the impact of negative words in all WSJ and Dow 
Jones News Service stories for individual S&P 500 firms from 1980 to 2004. Their primary 
result was that negative words convey negative information about firm earnings, beyond stock 
analysts’ forecasts and historical accounting data. This implies that qualitative verbal 
information does not merely echo traditional measures of firm performance but provides value 
and insight not captured by firm fundamentals. A second result was that the stock market 
exhibits a delayed response to the information embedded in negative words on a subsequent 
trading days. As a result, potential profits could be earned by basing trading strategies on the 
words used in these publications. Further investigation focused on analysing negative words in 
news stories whose main content focused in firm fundamentals. It was found that negative 
words in stories about firm fundamentals predicts earnings and returns more effectively than 
negative words in other stories. These three findings highlight that linguistic media content 
captures aspects of firm fundamentals that are: 1) Hard to quantify and 2) Quickly incorporated 
into stock prices. 
Textual analysis was employed by Ferguson, Guo, Lam and Philip (2011) in examining the 
relationship between media sentiment and stock returns in the UK. The authors sought to shed 
some light on the UK market as differences between media coverage in the US and UK have 
been well documented (Shaw, 1999). Specifically, US media was found to have much greater 
70 
 
conformity, whereas the UK media has much greater dispersion of opinion and media 
independence. Given these findings, it would be incorrect to assume that the evidence that has 
been widely documented in the US is consistent across other countries. Using stock returns for 
FTSE 100 companies over the period 2005 to 2010 as well as news articles from the Financial 
Times, FT.com, The Times, Guardian and The Mirror, Guo, Lam and Philip (2011) 
investigated the presence of return predictability inherent in media sentiment. In total, just over 
23 000 media articles were used in the analysis that covered 68 FTSE 100 companies. The use 
of textual analysis allowed the authors to create a positive and negative measure of media 
sentiment based on the fraction of positive or negative words in a given news article. It was 
found that positive (negative) media sentiment in company-specific news articles has a 
significant positive (negative) relationship with stock returns. This relationship was found to 
be stronger on the day the news articles were published. When testing for stock return 
predictability on the day following the publication of news articles, it was found that only 
measures of negative media sentiment contained significant predictive power, consistent with 
Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky and Macskassy (2008). These results suggest that the UK market is 
fairly efficient at incorporating information and sentiment contained in media articles into stock 
prices; most media sentiment was incorporated into stock prices the day the articles were 
published. The fact that there was a trace of return predictability due to negative media 
sentiment indicates some cognitive dishonesty towards bad news by investors, resulting in 
some underreaction on the day of media publication; this is consistent with Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) as the underreaction to negative news provides motivation to monitor financial 
results and news. 
Uhl (2011) made use of Reuters news articles to create a measure of investor sentiment, that is 
a positive or negative feeling, opinion, or emotion induced in a reader while reading a certain 
Reuters news article. This measure of investor sentiment was used to ascertain whether it could 
explain changes in stock market prices, specifically using the Dow Jones Industrial Index. The 
majority of textual analysis is conducted by simply coding positive and negative words into a 
database and matching the content of news articles to words in this database. This study 
attempts to replicate the work of Tetlock (2007); however Uhl (2011) felt that his General 
Inquirer tool was limited in that it is only able to account for negative words, but neither 
positive words nor the context of the article. The methodology employed by Thomson Reuters 
takes this analysis one step further by taking into account the context in which the article was 
written. This improved methodology is in itself a significant contribution to the existing 
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literature on measuring investor sentiment. The dataset from Thomson Reuters consists of high 
frequency sentiment rated Reuters news pieces, classified from a wide list of topics pertaining 
to the US market. It was concluded that markets were not fundamentally efficient as positive 
correlations were found between negative (positive) sentiment and declines (gains) in stock 
returns; negative sentiment was observed to possess much stronger explanatory power than 
positive sentiment. Moreover, behavioural factors, such as Reuters sentiment, was found to 
explain stock returns better than fundamental factors. 
Although there is evidence of a relationship between media coverage and financial markets, 
the relationship is sometimes labelled as purely speculative and the research is often based on 
circumstantial assumptions that make drawing inferences particularly difficult. Nonetheless, it 
is worth highlighting that although the media is often labelled as a faceless institution, its 
primary output – news articles – are written by people. The creativity inherent in writing allows 
an author’s views and biases to enter into the finished product; this was precisely the 
relationship found by Dougal, Engelberg, Garcia and Parsons (2012). The authors made use of 
the AOTM column and the DJIA, spanning a sample period of close to four decades. The 
authors were also cautious about making a distinction between a reflective and a causal role 
for financial media; this required exogenous variation in news content or reporting uncorrelated 
with underlying events. The methodology employed addressed this concern as in the sample 
period, columnists rotated frequently according to regular schedules and differed in their 
writing styles. The results showed that in the short-term, returns on the DJIA can be predicted 
using only the author of the AOTM column – that is a causal relationship was found. This result 
is surprising because at any point in time, individual columnists are unlikely to possess 
information relevant to the market as a whole and thus any predictability related to the specific 
authors was interpreted to arise from their own sentiment. Two inferences may be drawn from 
the results of this research; firstly, financial journalists have the potential to influence investor 
behaviour in the short-term and secondly, the interpretation of public news is important as the 
strongest effects were found when journalists wrote about significant market movements. 
Insight into the German financial market is provided by Singer, Laser and Dreher (2013) who 
develop a new investor sentiment measure for the German market using published stock 
recommendations (by professional analysts) in both print and online media. The first data set, 
sourced from print media, provides selected analyst forecasts published in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, a high-profile German newspaper; the second data set, sourced from 
online media, uses stock recommendations from dpa-AFX Wirtschaftsnachrichten GmbH, a 
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leading financial news agency in a specific region. Both sources in question categorise 
recommendations as buy, sell, and hold which allows a traditional bull-bear spread to be 
applied. Since the stock recommendations are made by professional analysts, it is assumed that 
this will be a measure of professional investor sentiment. The performance of the German 
financial market is measured by the DAX index. Using vector autoregressions, weekly 
sentiment was found to have no near-term forecasting power on returns. However, sentiment 
was found to be a strong predictor of itself and that past stock movements drive sentiment. 
Unlike the evidence from Solt and Statman (1988) and Brown and Cliff (2004) who find that 
sentiment follows a positive feedback process, the evidence from German indicates the 
opposite. In this instance, professional analysts express optimism in their printed stock 
recommendations when previous market returns were negative. Weak evidence for the positive 
feedback process was found in the case of online media sentiment, however this relationship 
was found not to be Granger causal. In the case of print media, there was strong and causal 
evidence demonstrating that professional analysts follow reversals. The authors postulate that 
their results are in line with the “bargain shopper hypothesis” outlined by Brown and Cliff 
(2004); when analysts see shares becoming a bargain (indicated by a negative return) they see 
a buying opportunity and thus become optimistic. 
Until recently, media effects were examined by utilising conventional media such as newspaper 
and magazine articles. However, the Internet has enabled an increasing amount of user 
generated information through the explosion of social media networks. This is not only seen as 
a primary source of information for both consumers and businesses alike, but also provides a 
further mechanism with which to understand and measure investor sentiment (Yu, Duan, & 
Cao, 2013). Social media provides a platform for creating, sharing and exchanging user 
generated information; as a result there are many people sharing their opinions and experiences 
and hence forms an aggregation of personal wisdom and different opinions. Although these 
aggregations have limitations with viewpoints continually changing, if extracted and analysed 
appropriately the data can provide a large volume of valuable insight (Yu & Kak, 2012). 
Moreover, a large part of the existing literature focuses on role of conventional media outlets 
where the investor is the recipient of information; social media, however, enables investors to 
not only consume but also generate information (Chen, De, Hu, & Hwang, 2011). This provides 
a much richer data source for mining the opinions of investors. 
The recent years have seen tremendous growth in the user bases on various social media 
platforms, and hence have caused a fundamental shift in public disclosure and communication 
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in society. Previously, a major barrier for someone seeking to distribute information throughout 
a community was the cost of technical infrastructure required to reach a large enough group of 
people. However, with increased Internet penetration the bottleneck has been removed and 
hence the mainstream adoption of social media has changed the dynamics of information 
diffusion (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2013). Research into the role of social media in information 
diffusion has been conducted with results emphasising the strength of its role. Bakshy, Marlow, 
Rosenn and Adamic (2012) evaluated how much exposure to a unique URL 7  on one’s 
Facebook News Feed would increase an individual’s propensity to share that URL, beyond 
what would be expected through Facebook friends. They found that those individuals who are 
exposed are significantly more likely to spread information and do so much sooner than those 
who have not been exposed. Moreover, emotions appear to play a critical role in information 
dissemination as was found by Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan (2013). In this case, Twitter, the micro-
blogging social media platform, was used as the ability to ‘retweet’ is seen as a powerful 
mechanism of information sharing. Two data sets – one with emotionally charged tweets and 
one with emotionally neutral tweets – were used, amounting to 165 000 tweets in total. The 
authors found that the emotionally charged tweets tend to be retweeted more often and quicker 
compared to the neutral ones. The wealth of data on social media platforms as well as its role 
in information diffusion are important determinants in studying its effects. 
Seeking Alpha (SA), a personal finance social media website, is a platform for investors to 
provide insight and analysis garnered from their own personal experiences. Websites such as 
SA have become increasingly popular due to the rise in the trend of peer-based advice; SA is 
the most popular of these websites and hence was chosen for opinion mining in a study 
conducted by Chen, De, Hu and Hwang (2011). The authors sought to investigate how the 
views expressed on SA affect investor trading and hence stock prices of over 3 000 companies 
over a 4 year period. A strong link was uncovered between the views expressed on SA and 
contemporaneous and subsequent stock returns, even after controlling for the effect of 
traditional advice sources. This relationship was found to be stronger for articles that receive 
the most attention and companies whose shareholders are mainly retail investors. The outcome 
of their research highlights the growing role, not only of peer-based advice, but also of social 
media in financial markets. 
                                                 
7 A URL is a Uniform Resource Locator which refers to the global address of documents and other resources on 
the World Wide Web. 
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Similar results were uncovered when Yu, Duan and Cao (2013) investigated the effects of 
social and conventional media on short-term firm stock performance. They employed a much 
broader media dataset than previous studies by using daily media content from social media 
outlets such as blogs, forums and Twitter; and conventional media sources such as newspaper 
and magazine articles. Additionally, the company dataset was also much broader as they 
examined 824 companies, spanning 6 industries including pharmaceuticals, retail, software, 
savings institutions, health care and accommodation. The sentiment index was created by 
employing the same algorithm used by Antweiler and Frank (2004) – Naïve Bayes. This 
algorithm was used to detect which text segments contained sentiment signals, followed by 
determining the polarity and strength of that sentiment. The polarity and strength were 
measured on a scale from -1 to 1; a score of 1 (-1) means that the media source has a positive 
(negative) view for the company. Through their analysis, the authors showed that overall social 
media sentiment has a stronger impact on firm stock performance than conventional media, 
while social media and conventional media have a strong interaction effect on firm stock 
performance. These results highlight two important inferences for further research. Firstly, it 
is important to examine both social and conventional media when considering sentiment as the 
evidence has shown that both indicators have an impact on firm stock performance. Secondly, 
there may be an industry effect at work as evidence of a relationship was found spanning across 
6 industries, however when Internet service companies (Tumarkin & Whitelaw, 2001) and tech 
sector companies (Das & Chen, 2007) were studied there was very little evidence found to 
support this relationship. 
Twitter provides up to the minute information and is a novel way of capturing investor opinion. 
It is for this reason that Zhang, Fuehres and Gloor (2009) used this platform to gauge investors’ 
emotions when investigating whether stock market indices could be predicted by analysing 
Twitter posts. They made use of the Dow Jones, S&P 500 and NASDAQ indices and collected 
Twitter feeds for a 6 month period in 2009. Due to the nature of Twitter, short posts with a 
generally simple meaning where one or two words are able to capture the topic, the authors 
used mood words such as “fear”, “hope”, and “worry” as emotional tags of a tweet. The 
emotion expressed on a daily basis was calculated as simply the number of tweets with each 
specific mood word. Although only preliminary results were presented, it was found that when 
investors are negatively emotionally charged, expressing large amounts of fear and hope, the 
Dow Jones Index declines the following day. Similarly, when investors were positively 
emotionally charged, the Dow Jones Index increases the following day.  
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Twitter was once again used as a data source when Sprenger and Welpe (2010) sought to 
answer two questions: 1) Whether and to what extent the information content of Twitter posts 
reflects financial market developments and 2) Whether Twitter posts provide an efficient 
mechanism to weigh and aggregate information. In accordance with Antweiler and Frank 
(2004) the Naïve Bayesian classification method was employed to classify messages into a 
buy, hold or sell signal. Financial data was collected for the S&P100, which encompasses 
shares that trade on the NASDAQ and NYSE. Accordingly Twitter messages were aligned 
with US trading hours (9:30 to 16:00) by assigning messages posted after 16:00 to the next 
trading day. The results show that increased bullishness of Twitter posts is associated with 
higher returns; both a contemporaneous and lagged relationship was found between bullishness 
and abnormal returns. Twitter users were found to follow a contrarian strategy as “buy” signals 
were accompanied and followed by abnormal returns, far exceeding the assumed level of 
transaction costs. Conversely, “sell” signals were found to have no predictive power for returns. 
The information content of Twitter posts was found to be incorporated into market prices 
quickly; however transaction costs make it difficult to exploit the market inefficiency. An 
interesting feature of Twitter is the ability to gauge reputation; in this instance, the authors 
found that users who provide above average investment advice are given credit and greater 
share of voice through higher levels of re-tweets and followers. 
Much of the existing research relating to social mood and its effect on security prices tends to 
focus on the sentiment of individuals and how this affects their decision making; Bollen, Mao 
and Zeng (2011) sought to determine if this phenomenon applied to large societies. Their 
primary research question was “Can societies experience mood states that affect their collective 
decision making?” The measurements of collective mood were derived from large scale Twitter 
feeds; this was then tested against the DJIA to ascertain correlation over time. Two tools are 
used to measure variations in public mood: OpinionFinder and Google-Profile of Mood States 
(GPOMS). OpinionFinder analyses the text content of tweets recorded on a given day to 
provide a positive versus negative daily time series of public mood. GPOMS also analyses the 
text content of tweets to generate a six dimensional daily time series of public mood (these 
dimensions include Calm, Alert, Sure, Vital, Kind and Happy); this provides a more detailed 
view of changes in the public along a variety of different mood dimensions. First and foremost, 
changes in the state of public mood state can be tracked from the content of large scale Twitter 
feeds through simple text processing techniques. This once again validated the use of Twitter 
as a tool for measuring both individual and collective sentiment. Among the observed mood 
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dimensions only some were found to be Granger causative of the DJIA; changes of the public 
mood along these mood dimensions match shifts in the DJIA values 3 or 4 days later. This 
effect was not observed for OpinionFinder’s general assessment of public mood, but rather for 
the GPOMS dimension labelled “Calm”. The calmness of the public is thus predictive of the 
DJIA as opposed to general levels of sentiment. Overall, the prediction accuracy of standard 
financial market predictions models can be significantly improved when certain mood 
dimensions are included. The outcomes of this research have important implications for 
sentiment tracking tools, specifically surveys which involve individuals evaluating the extent 
to which they experience happiness, satisfaction or dissatisfaction with life. These surveys tend 
to be expensive and time-consuming and may not allow the measurement of public mood 
dimensions that are relevant to assess socio-economic indicators. Public mood analysis using 
Twitter feeds provides an automatic, free, fast and large scale addition to sentiment tracking 
which can be optimised to measure various dimensions of public mood state. 
The computer hardware and software industries were put under scrutiny when Luo, Zhang and 
Duan (2012) sought to determine if there is a predictive relationship between social media and 
firm equity value and if this social media effect is stronger than a conventional media effect. 
The reason for choosing these two industries is the theory that the customers of these companies 
are more likely to participate in and be influenced by digital media and hence these industries 
need to leverage social media. Their results indicate that social media, in this particular case 
blog posts, are a leading indicator of firm equity value and have stronger predictive power than 
conventional media metrics. As a secondary objective, they measured the level of investor 
attention using Google searches and web traffic and found that these metrics have only 
moderate predictive power. The implication of these results is that social media, rather than 
being viewed as cost, should be viewed as an important tool to influence firm equity value and 
hence investment in social media and information technology is justifiable. 
Chen, De, Hu and Hwang (2014) once again made use of Seeking Alpha to investigate the 
extent to which opinions transmitted through social media predict future stock returns and 
earnings surprises. In addition to the textual analysis conducted on articles published on the 
website, the authors analysed the commentary written in response to the articles. Articles 
posted between 2005 and 2012 were downloaded from the SA website; the authors opted to 
focus on single-ticker articles whereby only one stock was discussed, this amounted to just 
over 97 000 articles. The commentary for each of the articles was also downloaded; in this 
instance, the authors focused on commentary that was written within the first two days of the 
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article being published. Authors’ opinions were extracted by assuming that the frequency of 
negative words used in an article captures the tone of the report (Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock, Saar-
Tsechansky, & Macskassy, 2008). Articles were gathered from the Dow Jones News Service 
in order to determine if SA articles and commentary have an effect above and beyond news 
released through traditional media outlets; these articles were used to construct a measure of 
information revelation. It was found that the opinions revealed through SA articles and 
commentary strongly predicts future stock returns and earnings surprises. This relationship was 
found to hold even after controlling for the effect of traditional advice sources such as 
newspaper articles. This highlights the usefulness and value in a peer-based advice system. 
Unlike a number of previous studies, Karabulut (2013) used the social networking platform 
Facebook to determine its predictive power of movements on the US stock market over a 3 
year period. The sentiment variable, the GNH index, is compiled by determining the sentiment 
from the content of Facebook status updates. GNH is calculated using the word-count 
methodology in which Facebook measures a status update’s positivity (negativity) according 
to relative frequency of with which positive (negative) emotion words are used. The results 
showed that the GNH has the ability to predict statistically significant and economically 
meaningful changes in aggregate market returns. Moreover, the positive influence of the GNH 
on market returns is temporary and completely reverses during the following trading weeks. 
These results are not only consistent with noise trader models (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, & 
Waldmann, 1990) but the evidence of an initial increase and subsequent return reversal 
supports the hypothesis that the GNH serves as a proxy for investor sentiment. 
It is clear that investors are making use of social media platforms to voice opinions and share 
their own personal experiences; this indicates that investors are allocating attention to a 
particular topic or stock. Gaining an understanding of investor attention and its effects is as 
much of a challenge as trying to quantify and explain the effect of investor sentiment. The 
primary reason for this is that many indirect proxies are used to measure investor attention, as 
is the case when trying to measure investor sentiment. The proxies for investor attention include 
extreme returns, trading volumes, news and headlines, advertising expense and prime limits 
(Da, Engelberg, & Gao, 2011). In order to gain a thorough understanding of investor attention, 
which can be used as a proxy for investor sentiment Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011) developed 
a new and direct measure of investor attention by the Search Volume Index (SVI) made 
available by Google Trends. The authors opted to focus on the largest 3 000 companies that 
comprise the Russell 3000 index in the United States. In order to identify a stock on a Google 
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search, the stock ticker itself was used as the search word as it implies that an investor searching 
for the ticker name is interested in financial information concerning the company. Their results 
showed that an increase in SVI for any Russell 3000 stock predicts higher stock prices in the 
next 2 weeks with an eventual price reversal occurring within a year. The use of search volume 
is a key development in understanding investor attention and sentiment as it provides an 
objective way to collect and quantify investors’ interests. 
Joseph, Wintoki and Zhang (2011) conducted research similar to that which was undertaken 
by Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011). Using data from Google Trends and choosing to focus solely 
on financial shares, the authors tested the predictive ability of search volumes of stock tickers 
on abnormal stock returns and trading volumes, measured from the S&P 500. The motivation 
for the use of tickers and not the actual company is similar to that outlined by Da, Engelberg 
and Gao (2011); an investor searching for a ticker name is more likely to be interested in 
financial information concerning the company than someone merely searching for the company 
name which could yield information far removed from an investment decision. The search was 
narrowed to financial tickers as the effort required to process the results of a ticker query is 
worthwhile only for someone seriously considering an investment decision. On a weekly basis, 
the sample of S&P 500 firms was divided into five quintiles based on the search intensity the 
previous week. The subsequent stock returns and trading volumes across all quintiles is 
examined to determine the predictive power of search intensity. Over a weekly horizon, online 
search intensity reliably predicted abnormal stock returns as well as trading volume. Moreover, 
the sensitivity of returns to search intensity is positively related to how easily a stock can be 
arbitraged. Specifically, the sensitivity of returns to search intensity is lowest (highest) for easy-
to-arbitrage (difficult-to-arbitrage), low (high) volatility shares. It is important to note that this 
finding is validated by Baker and Wurgler (2007), who used a selection of market variables to 
measure investor sentiment. The fact that this relationship was found when the choice of market 
measure (S&P 500 versus stock price returns) and measure of investor sentiment (online search 
volumes vs. market variables) were different points to the robustness of the relationship. The 
outcome of this research, taken together with Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011) and Baker and 
Wurgler (2007) provide a consistent story: the intensity of search for ticker symbols serves as 
a valid proxy for investor sentiment which is useful for forecasting stock returns and volume. 
Moreover, this measure is able to provide a cross-sectional analysis which provides further 
insight. 
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Rao and Srivastava (2012) make use of Twitter to investigate the relationship between tweets 
and financial market metrics, such as stock prices. The analysis covered more than 4 million 
tweets between 2010 and 2011 for the DJIA, NASDAQ-100 and 13 other large capitalisation 
technology shares. The tweets were classified as positive or negative using the Naïve Bayes 
algorithm and considered characteristics such as bullishness, message volume and agreement. 
The first set of results came from testing the correlation results between Twitter sentiment and 
stock prices for the different companies and indices. A very strong correlation was found to 
exist between these two variables, the highest being 0.88. Granger-causality tests were then 
employed to ascertain the causal relationship between the two variables, which also 
demonstrates whether a leading or lagging relationship exists. The movement in stock prices 
and indices was found to be greatly affected by Twitter discussions, however only in the short-
term. This implies that Twitter sentiment is seen to follow the leading indicator property. 
Finally, in order to determine the predictive power of the Twitter sentiment an Expert Model 
Mining System (EMMS) was implemented. The results were somewhat mixed in this regard, 
with Twitter sentiment only demonstrating predictive power for the DJIA and none of the other 
shares or indices. These results imply that both negative and positive dimensions of public 
mood carry strong cause-effects relationships with price movements in individual shares and a 
number of indices. 
Evangelopoulos, Magro and Sidorova (2012) explored a framework for understanding the role 
social media sites play in informing clients at an individual message (micro) and aggregate 
(macro) levels. According to the authors, social media sites are seen to play a dual informing 
role, “as a platform for individual informing actions and as a macro informer, informing its 
clients about their user community and, by extension, by the society at large” (Evangelopoulos, 
Magro, & Sidorva, 2012, p. 250). In order to validate this framework the authors examined if 
an aggregate of Twitter messages can be used as a predictor of future stock prices of 18 Fortune 
500 companies. Using latent semantic analysis, semantic and conceptual content is extracted 
from tweets in the form of key themes. Thereafter, a regression model is fit using tweet volume 
and tweet topic strength to predict the variability in security prices beyond what can be 
explained by fluctuations in the stock market. Their regression predicted 8.3% of the variability 
in security prices that is unexplained by normal security market fluctuations; implying that 
Twitter is an effective stock market predictor and a leading indicator of stock marker 
performance. At a macro level, Twitter content can be analysed using text mining 
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methodologies which can inform potential unintended clients about future economic activity, 
such as stock market performance. 
An innovative approach was taken by Da, Engelberg and Gao (2015) who constructed an index 
based on the volume of search queries and then quantified the effects of this index on asset 
prices and fund flows. Their objective was to build a list of search terms that reveal sentiment 
towards economic conditions; this list of words includes “bankruptcy”, “unemployment”, 
“crisis”, “inflation”, “recession” and “security”; as such their index was named the Financial 
and Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS). In total they compiled a “primitive” 
list of 149 words; the next step was to understand how these words were searched in Google. 
This was done by inputting each primitive word into Google Trends and then extracting the 
related terms for a specific term. At the end of this their primitive list of 149 words generated 
1 245 terms after duplicates were removed. Their remaining data sets were four highly liquid 
exchange traded funds as well as Treasury portfolio returns for the 10 year constant maturity 
Treasury file. When FEARS was quantified against asset prices it was found that although 
increases in FEARS correspond with low market level returns today, they predict high returns 
over the next few days – the FEARS index predicts return reversals. This effect was found to 
be stronger for shares favoured by sentiment investors and those that are difficult to arbitrage. 
Through their analysis regarding mutual fund flows, it was found that increases in FEARS 
triggered daily mutual fund flows out of equity funds and into bond funds. This evidence is 
broadly consistent with the “noise trading” theory outlined by De Long, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldmann (1990). 
The FEARS index, as a measure of investor sentiment, has been used as a measure if investor 
sentiment; however the results have been somewhat mixed: 
 Lien and Hauge (2012) sought to understand the role of fear and ambiguity in the 
Norwegian financial market by constructing a volatility index (NVIX) and a specific 
Norwegian FEARS index (NFEARS). NFEARS was found to have very little 
explanatory power when tested against their market index. Instead, NVIX was found to 
capture fear and ambiguity in the Norwegian market. 
 Chen, Han and Pan (2014) examine sentiment risk as a determinant of hedge fund 
returns. Sentiment risk is captured through three different measures: the Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) index, the MCSI, and the FEARS index. The central finding was that 
hedge fund exposure to sentiment risk is significantly and positively related to their 
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expected returns. This outcome was found to be robust across all three measures of 
sentiment risk and therefore it can be concluded that sentiment risk is priced into the 
cross-section of hedge fund returns. 
The viability of Google Trends and social media platform StockTwits as stock market 
predictors was studied by Loughlin and Harnisch (2013). There exists both a bullish and bearish 
StockTwits index; messages were compiled for a 3 month period with the total amounting to 
19 000 messages. The Google Trends data was compiled and aggregated directly from the 
website; the index includes search terms relating to a particular company such as the company 
name and its products and/or services. This particular chose to focus on Apple, Google, 
Microsoft and Facebook with the aim of modelling the rapid movement in technology shares 
using fast estimators such as StockTwits and Google Trends. Unlike Da, Engelberg and Gao 
(2011), the authors reported that Google Trends was not a significant predictor of stock returns. 
It is possible that this outcome was due to the study only covering four technology shares over 
a 3 month period. Conversely, StockTwits was found to have significant predictive power in 
predicting returns for Apple, Google and Microsoft. Moreover, when the StockTwits data was 
lagged, the bull and bear indices were significant in predicting Apple and Microsoft stock 
returns. This outcome suggests that StockTwits is a significant leading predictor of stock 
returns.  
Extracting investor information from newspaper and magazine articles is a relatively new 
concept and has had quite a slow uptake; however, once the benefits of the initial studies were 
realised, the popularity of this methodology has increased. Much of the data is extracted 
through textual analysis and positive results have been observed. Using a variety of newspaper 
and magazine sources as well as numerous methodologies, investor sentiment measures were 
constructed which were found to have a significant relationship with stock price performance. 
The use of media as a data source evolved even further with the advent of social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Once again, academics saw these platforms as rich 
sources of data as it extracted insight straight from investor opinions. Investor sentiment indices 
were constructed using the data from these social media platforms and their effects tested on 
stock price performance. Positive results were uncovered through a significant relationship 
found between the two variables. News and social media has become an important tool in 
measuring investor sentiment, mainly due to the quality of data it produces. 
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2.3.4.4 Internet Message Boards 
In the United States, Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) sought to investigate the relationship 
between Internet message board activity – a proxy for investor attention – and abnormal stock 
returns and trading volumes. They made use of the Internet forum Raging Bull (RB) and were 
able to create a quantitative measure of investor opinions on a daily basis over a 12 month 
period. Furthermore, the focused purely on 73 Internet service companies as it was 
hypothesised that they, as a group, would be most affected by the information contained in 
these forums. Although this study was supported by a logical rationale and a strong 
methodology, the authors found no statistically significant association between the postings on 
RB and companies’ stock returns. The results beg the question, is there information content 
present in stock message boards?  
Antweiler and Frank (2004) sought to answer this question by making use of the RB and 
Yahoo! Finance (YF) message boards. The sample of stocks was a combination of 45 stocks 
that together made up the DJIA and the Dow Jones Internet Commerce Index. The Naïve Bayes 
algorithm was employed to assess the content of each stock message. They found that there is 
useful information present on the stock message boards, with the magnitude of these effects 
being quite large relative to other features of the stock market that have attracted attention. 
They were able to conclude that although a statistically significant relationship between 
investor opinion and stock returns exists, it is economically small due to plausible transaction 
costs.  
Das and Chen (2007) studied 24 tech sector stocks that were present on the Morgan Stanley 
High-Tech Index. The purpose of this exercise was to focus on the tech sector and to leverage 
the large amount of activity on their message boards. Their sentiment index was created by 
first, extracting articles on these message boards over a 2 month period and then using 
algorithms to assess each message and determine its sentiment. They then proceeded to create 
an index from their chosen stocks and a link from sentiment to the index was found at an 
aggregate level. Upon delving deeper, they found no strong relationship from sentiment to 
stock prices on average across the individual stocks.  
Sehgal and Song (2007) identified stock message boards as a source of rich financial 
information due to the popularity in exchanging ideas and information. Through the use of 
various algorithms, the authors scanned financial message boards and extracted the sentiment 
expressed by individual authors. They used this sentiment to create and index and tested 
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whether this index could predict movements in financial markets. Over a 6 month period and 
using the Yahoo! Finance message board, over 26 000 messages were collected for 52 popular 
shares that trade on the NYSE or NASDAQ, covering many different industries. Apart from 
posting messages, Yahoo! Finance users can express the sentiment of their posts as “Strong 
Buy”, “Buy”, “Hold”, “Sell” or “Strong Sell”. The sentiment index was modelled according to 
a Markov process and was created using Naïve Bayes. An interesting concept, unique to this 
research, was the concept of trust. The authors were well aware of the fact that web financial 
information is not always reliable and hence crated a measure of trustworthiness called 
TrustValue. This measure improved the accuracy of the prediction by filtering irrelevant or 
noisy sentiment. The results showed that sentiment and stock value are closely related and web 
sentiment is an effective and accurate predictor of stock behaviour. 
The somewhat mixed results found in the above studies could be attributed to either the small 
sample sizes employed, or the infancy of social media at the time the studies were conducted, 
in which case the initial inconsistencies are expected. The results of research conducted in later 
years yielded more consistent results indicating an evolution in this new area of research. 
Further support for the prediction hypothesis was provided by Oh and Sheng (2011) who made 
use of the Yahoo! Finance message board as well as Stocktwits, a variant platform of Twitter 
that aggregates only stock-related postings. Over the course of 3 months, the authors collected 
over 200 000 stock micro blog posts for stocks that are listed on both the NASDAQ and NYSE. 
Each micro blog post was labelled as bullish, bearish or neutral sentiment. Sentiment was 
aggregated using the bullishness index introduced by Antweiler and Frank (2004). The 
outcome of the study reiterated the existing evidence that stock discussions are not noise and 
that they do in fact have predictive power, consistent with Antweiler and Frank (2004). 
Furthermore, their effect on economic outcomes is real, substantial and of great value to 
individual and institutional investors seeking an effective way to predict stock returns. 
A Chinese perspective was offered by Wang (2012) who took a cross-sectional view and tested 
the hypothesis that the length of postings on Internet message boards is a determinant of 
financial market performance. This particular study considered 2.85 million postings (ignoring 
the comments section) of 58 firms listed on the HS300 index in China. EastMoney.com was 
used as the source for message postings as it has become the most influential financial 
information service provider in China. Submission times were used to classify postings, any 
post before 15:00 was classified as today’s postings, while anything after 15:00 was classified 
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as tomorrow’s post. It follows that anything posted before the Chinese stock exchange closed 
would influence that specific days’ sentiment; similarly, anything that was posted after the 
stock market closed would only have an effect on the next day’s sentiment. Overall, it was 
found that the number of postings on stock discussion boards often leads to a slight decline of 
stock return and an increase in volatility. After dividing the postings into five different groups 
in terms of text length, it was found that postings with different words play different roles. The 
magnitude of correlation between postings and stock returns varies by the number of words – 
postings with fewer words are emotion-expressed and were found to have a positive correlation 
with returns; longer posts are too rational to bring information to affect the stock market and a 
negative correlation with returns was found; finally postings with a large number of words 
were part of financial reports or official news which convey useful information to the market 
and hence a positive correlation with returns was found. 
Most recently, Kim and Kim (2014) examined the relation between investor sentiment and its 
effect on future stock returns by constructing a sentiment index using pots from Yahoo! 
Finance message boards. This study’s approach is similar to work conducted by Tumarkin and 
Whitelaw (2001), Antweiler and Frank (2004) and Das and Chen (2007) however the authors 
opted to expand the time period as well as the variety of stocks in terms of firm size and 
industry. Over their six year sample period, the authors analysed 91 firms with the most active 
Yahoo! Finance message boards and opted to perform their analyses over several different time 
horizons. Most importantly, new functionality on the Yahoo! Finance message board, post 
2004, allowed investors to reveal their sentiment using five categories: “Strong Buy”, “Buy”, 
“Hold”, “Sell” and “Strong Sell”. This provides a more robust way to examine the relation 
between investor sentiment and stock returns. Despite a more thorough methodology than its 
predecessors, the evidence showed no evidence in intertemporal analyses that investor 
sentiment forecasts future stock returns, both at an aggregate and individual firm level. 
Internet message boards provide an advantage over and above that which is provided by news 
and social media: there are dedicated internet message boards for specific topics e.g. finance 
and those who participate in these discussions are assumed to be informed to a certain extent. 
Therefore extracting information from Internet message boards is simpler, in that a specific 
finance board can be targeted, and the data extracted is assumed to be from informed investors. 
Data from numerous finance Internet message boards was used to construct a measure of 
investor sentiment; this was then tested against stock price performance. The outcome showed 
that the information content on Internet message boards can be used as a measure of investor 
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sentiment and a significant relationship between the two variables was uncovered. Internet 
message boards are now viewed as an important data source, not just for measuring investor 
sentiment but for gathering data on a number of topics. 
 
2.3.5 The Asymmetric Effects of Good and Bad News 
An important part of analysing investor sentiment, particularly textual analysis, is 
understanding the difference between the effects that good and bad news have on financial 
markets. Essentially, individuals have different reactions to good news and bad news, hence 
affecting their decision making and ultimately their actions. Thus, when it comes to analysing 
investor sentiment through textual analysis, it implies that words with positive connotations 
and those with negative connotations will have different impacts on investor sentiment. 
The asymmetry between positive and negative is a phenomenon largely grounded in 
psychology theory, which has subsequently been applied to various domains. The positive-
negative asymmetry effect has repeatedly been confirmed, with the outcome of research 
indicating that negative is significantly stronger than positive (Anderson, 1965; Peeters & 
Czapinski, 1990). It should be heeded though that this does boil down to a game of numbers; 
it is not always the case that negative triumphs over positive; rather positive events may prevail 
over negative ones due to the force of numbers. A number of positive events can overcome the 
effects of a single negative event; however, when there are equal measures of positive and 
negative the effects of the negative events tend to outweigh those of the positive events 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). 
In terms of offering an explanation as to why negative is stronger than positive, much of theory 
points to the fact that it is evolutionarily adaptive for negative to be stronger than positive. For 
example, a person who ignores the possibility of a positive outcome may later experience 
regret, but nothing directly terrible is likely to result. Conversely, a person who ignores danger 
could end up in a terrible outcome. Evolution dictates that survival requires urgent attention to 
possible negative outcomes, but is less urgent when it comes to positive outcomes. Therefore, 
it may be concluded that it is adaptive to be psychologically designed to respond to the 
negatives more than the positives (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). It is 
this positive-negative asymmetry that has then been applied to various domains, such as 
financial markets. 
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One of the earliest examples of stock markets reacting asymmetrically to positive and negative 
elements is De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) work on the overreaction hypothesis. Monthly return 
data for NYSE shares between the period January 1926 and December 1982 is used; focus is 
put on shares that have experienced either extreme capital gains or extreme losses over periods 
of up to five years. In other words, the ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ portfolios are formed conditional 
upon past excess returns. The core finding of this work was the presence of overreaction on the 
stock market; however this effect was found to be asymmetric in that overreaction is much 
larger for the ‘loser’ portfolio than for the ‘winner’ portfolio. 
Positive-negative asymmetry also has a place in investigating momentum strategies, as was 
uncovered by Hong, Lim and Stein (1998). An information-diffusion model is used to 
understand the medium-term momentum in stock returns that was originally identified by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Two primary factors were considered in their explanation: size 
and analyst coverage. Analyst coverage, however, is the only factor available to be influenced 
either negatively or positively. In the results it was shown that momentum strategies work well 
for shares that have low analyst coverage, with this effect being more pronounced for shares 
that were classified as past losers than shares who were past winners. This outcome is 
consistent with the hypothesis that firm-specific information, particularly negative information, 
diffuses across the investing public with a significant asymmetric effect. 
Giner and Rees (2003) investigated whether accounting systems recognise bad news more 
promptly than good news, using changes in the stock price as a proxy for news. Their analysis 
covered France, Germany, and the UK between 1990 and 1998. The rationale for choosing 
these particular countries is that these are the originators of three distinct legal traditions; with 
previous studies having indicated that asymmetric recognition is sensitive to legal background 
and history. The results showed that in all three countries the contemporaneous association 
between earnings and returns is much stronger for bad news (negative stock price changes) 
than for good news. This implies that bad news is recognised more quickly in the accounting 
systems of these countries than good news is. 
Soroka (2006) investigated possible asymmetries in mass media responsiveness to positive and 
negative economic shifts in the UK using time series data of media and public opinion. Strong 
evidence of asymmetry was found as public responses to negative economic information were 
found to be much greater than public responses to positive economic information. The same 
trend was observed in mass media content which served to enhance the asymmetry in public 
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responsiveness. This serves to confirm the presence of the positive-negative asymmetry effect 
in the UK media. 
Support for Soroka’s (2006) outcome in the UK was provided by Ju (2008) who investigated 
whether a negatively biased news coverage of the economy was present in South Korea, and 
whether this affected public perception. The pattern found was similar to Soroka’s (2006), as 
negative economic news tended to appear more frequently on the front pages of two different 
Korean newspapers than positive news, regardless of the state of the economy. Surprisingly, 
even when the economy went through a period of improvement, no positive economic news 
appeared on the front pages. Regression testing was employed and the negative bias was 
observed there as well: negative news coverage was found to be associated with the real 
economy while positive news coverage was reduced even when the economy was improving. 
These results support the notion that news media fulfils people’s demand for threat-detecting 
news, consistent with the evolutionary explanation provided by Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer and Vohs (2001). 
The presence of the positive-negative asymmetric effect implies that when studying any given 
economy, differentiating between positive and negative news could potentially lead to richer 
insights. This was the focus of the study conducted by Knif, Kolari and Pynnönen (2008) that 
used CPI and PPI to test the effect of good and bad inflation news announcements on US stock 
market returns. Their results indicated that positive and negative inflation shocks can have a 
relatively large cumulative effect on aggregate stock returns depending on the economic state 
as well as investors’ perceptions of these inflation announcements. Moreover, when inflation 
announcements are viewed by investors to be negative, the impact on stock returns is much 
greater than in the case of announcements being viewed as positive. Apart from the presence 
of the positive-negative asymmetric effect, a key point to be drawn from this study is that by 
not differentiating between positive and negative elements, there exists a risk that any potential 
effects on financial markets may be diluted. 
Evidence of the positive-negative asymmetry effect appears to be present in a number of areas 
in the finance realm – the bond market is no different. Beber and Brandt (2010) examine how 
US Treasury bond returns and their volatility react to good and bad macroeconomic news in 
economic expansions and recessions. Strong evidence of asymmetry was uncovered as the 
information content of the announcements was found to be the most important for bond returns 
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when it contained bad news for the bond market in expansions, and to a lesser extent, when it 
contained good news for the bond market in contractions. 
Much of the existing literature pertains to the fact that the positive-negative asymmetry effect 
is present in the public arena; however, there is evidence to show that asymmetry exists at a 
much more granular level as well. One such example is in the construction of the FEARS index 
of Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2015), which is constructed using search words and data from 
Google Trends. In this instance, a backward run regression was used to determine which search 
words, of the complete list, would have the largest impact on financial market returns. The 
results indicated that those words with negative connotations had a much larger impact on 
returns than words that were positive in nature. Thus, the ‘negative’ words were the ones 
included in the construction of the index which was subsequently tested against asset returns 
and a volatility index with positive empirical results. 
Apart from the application of the positive-negative asymmetry effect in the financial context, 
there is evidence that suggests this effect is present in social discrimination studies 
(Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Mummendey, Otten, Berger , & Kessler, 2000), the impact of 
reputation on e-commerce companies (Standifird, 2001), website attribute performance and 
satisfaction (Cheung & Lee, 2005), voting behaviour (Kernell, 1977; Arangones, 1997), and 
the trustworthiness of studies regarding health risks (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2001). 
Explanations of the positive-negative asymmetry effect from the psychology viewpoint and 
thereafter the application to financial markets – as well as other realms of research – indicates 
that individuals have a stronger response to possible negative outcomes or bad news as opposed 
to possible positive outcomes or good news. If this is related back to investor sentiment and 
textual analysis, it would be expected that negative search words would have a much larger 
impact on investor sentiment and subsequently financial returns than positive search words 
would have. 
2.3.6 Summary 
Behavioural finance studies the influence psychology has on financial practitioners and their 
behaviour; essentially, is the intersection of psychology, sociology and conventional finance 
theory. Where conventional finance theory assumes that capital market participants are rational 
consumers, behavioural finance allows for irrationality and explores how the world can be 
explained from a psychological and sociological point of view. Investor sentiment, specifically, 
focuses on how an investors’ emotions and feeling might influence their financial decision 
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making which, ultimately, has an impact on financial markets. Investor sentiment has gained 
popularity in its ability to explain aspects of both investment theory and returns. Specifically, 
investor sentiment has made an appearance in explaining noise trader theory, been used to 
modify the CAPM and used in the APT model to better explain returns. In terms of investor 
sentiment measurement, it can be quantified in multiple ways: using survey data, proxied by 
market variables, through news and social media and finally using Internet message boards. In 
explaining returns, investor sentiment has been able to do so across all these mediums of 
measurement. Finally, an important aspect of investor sentiment and its measurement is the 
asymmetric effect individuals experience between positive and negative information. 
Individuals tend to react stronger to negative information than positive information; this 
implies that the effect of negative news on the stock market could be much greater than the 
effect of positive news. This effects becomes especially important to understand when 
conducting textual analysis to capture investor sentiment. 
 
2.4 Literature Review Summary 
The literature review has demonstrated that investor sentiment is not only a critical component 
of behavioural finance but also plays a large role in explaining other aspects of finance theory.  
A fundamental building block in asset pricing is the CAPM which asserts that asset prices and 
their associated returns are a factor of market risk, and market risk alone. The model has come 
under criticism due to the assumptions underpinning the model, as they are viewed as restrictive 
and unrealistic when applied to the real world. Augmentations to the original CAPM have been 
done throughout the years; it has been developed under an international lens and has been 
expanded to include explanatory factors other than market risk. The APT was developed to 
address a number of the empirical challenges faced by the CAPM; it was developed as a 
framework for explaining asset returns. It is a more flexible model in nature as it allows for a 
multitude of factors to be used in explaining asset returns. Much of APT’s empirical research 
focuses on which factors to include as well as the optimal number of factors which can be used 
to fully explain asset returns. One of the developments in APT literature is the development of 
a macroeconomic APT, which has become the focus of this study. The nature of a 
macroeconomic model implies that different macroeconomic variables can be used to explain 
market returns in different market – what might explain market returns in one country does not 
necessarily hold as much explanatory power in a different country. That being said, the 
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flexibility of the APT implies that a degree of creativity can be applied when seeking to explain 
asset returns. This lends itself to the inclusion of a behavioural finance concept, such as investor 
sentiment, to be included as an explanatory factor. 
The role that investors’ emotions play in financial markets has been used as an explanation in 
various other aspects of finance – in both investment and corporate finance theory. Investor 
sentiment has also been used in various instances to explain market returns, with various 
measurement options being applied in different contexts. The measurement has evolved quite 
substantially over the years; surveys are the only direct measure of sentiment and have been 
used extensively to understand the role investor sentiment plays in explaining returns. 
Measurement of sentiment has also extended to include proxies, such as market variables, and 
sentiment indices developed from news, social media and Internet discussion boards. 
Regardless of the measurement, however, investor sentiment has demonstrated itself as a 
critical component in understanding and explaining stock returns. 
Overall, investor sentiment plays a significant role in explaining various components of finance 
as well as market returns; the macroeconomic APT with an investor sentiment factor now 
presents an opportunity for investor sentiment to explain asset pricing. 
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3 Data and Methodology 
The choice of sample period is dependent on the availability of the required data sources. Due 
to the international nature of this study as well as the data sources used, unfortunately different 
sample periods will be used for the different countries. Although this limits the study in terms 
of comparability between countries, it ensures that the study remains statistically robust. As 
such, the various sample periods of each country are outlined below: 
 Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, Germany, US: February 2010 to June 2015 (65 
monthly observations). 
 UK: March 2010 to June 2015 (64 monthly observations). 
 China, Japan: January 2012 to June 2015 (42 monthly observations). 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 Choice of Countries 
In addition to studying the South African market, the remaining BRICS countries will be 
studied; this includes Brazil, Russia, India and China. For the purposes of this study, the BRICS 
nations will be grouped as the developing nations. 
In terms of the choice for the developed markets, the G7 countries were used as a starting point. 
The G7, as ranked by the IMF, include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The developed countries chosen for this particular study will 
include Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and United States. The reasons for choosing 
these specific four countries are as follows: 
 The United States was chosen for comparability purposes as the studies of Chen, Roll 
and Ross (1986) as well as Da, Engelberg and Gao (2015) were conducted in the US 
market. 
 Germany and the United Kingdom were chosen due to the size of their economies and 
prominence in the European Union. Understanding the drivers of two of the largest 
European economies will ensure the results are far reaching and relevant. 
 Japan was chosen as it is the only Asian country in the G7 and its inclusion will include 
an additional layer of insight to the international nature of this study. 
 Applying the same reasoning as the previous bullet points, the remaining countries in 
the G7 – Italy, France and Canada – were excluded. That is, comparability, size of the 
economy and geographic diversity. 
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3.1.2 Country-Specific Market Data 
For all BRICS and the selected G7 countries, market index data is required as the independent 
variable of the regression equation. The closing prices for each market index are gathered on a 
monthly basis for the various sample periods. 
3.1.3 Choice of APT Factors 
The choice of APT factors will be closely aligned with the initial empirical work conducted by 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986). The following independent variables, collected on a monthly 
basis, will be the input/ explanatory factors into the APT: 
1. Risk free rate – for the purposes of this study, a one year government bond is used to 
represent the risk free rate. This is true for all countries except South Africa, where 
instead the discount rate on a 90 day Treasury bill is used. 
2. Long-term government bond – for all countries under consideration, a 10 year 
government bond is used. 
3. Inflation – this measure can either be extracted directly or derived using a country’s 
consumer price index (CPI). In this case, a combination of inflation percentages and 
CPI index data is gathered, dependent on each country. 
4. Industrial production – for all countries under consideration, an industrial production 
index or a producer price index (PPI) is used. 
5. Return on high yield bonds – this factor is seen to represent the trade-off between return 
and risk – higher risk implies higher return. Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) measured this 
using the return for bonds rated Baa and under. This data is available for the US, but is 
challenging to retrieve for the remaining countries under examination. Thus, this study 
employs a variety of high yield bond indices (which track non-investment grade bonds) 
to capture the risk-return relationship. Table 1 below describes which index will be used 
for each country. 
 
Table 1: High Yield Bond Indices 
Country Index Frequency Abbreviation 
United States 
Bloomberg USD High Yield Corporate 
Bond Index 
Monthly BUHY 
United Kingdom 
Bloomberg GBP High Yield Corporate 
Bond Index 
Monthly BGBH 
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Germany 
Bloomberg EUR High Yield Corporate 
Bond Index 
Monthly BEUH 
Brazil, Russia, 
India, South 
Africa 
Bloomberg USD High Yield Emerging 
Market Corporate Bond Index 
Monthly BEAC 
China, Japan 
Barclays USD Asia High Yield Bond 
Index 
Monthly AHYG 
 
6. Oil price – this is simply measured as the price of a barrel of crude oil in each country’s 
respective currency. 
The data for each of the factors provided above is collected for each of the countries outlined 
in Section 3.1.1 above, in line with the different sample periods chosen for each of the 
countries.  
In all cases the data for each country was complete for the entire sample period, barring one: 
the Brazil 10 year government bond. The data extracted from Bloomberg had a number of 
missing data points, specifically between January 2010 and May 2010. There was however 
data on either side of those dates, which made interpolation possible. There are various 
interpolation methods which could be applied in a scenario such as this one (Bourke, 1999). 
 Linear interpolation involves simply joining the points straight line segments; however 
this method is not very precise, especially for non-linear functions, and can sometimes 
result in discontinuities at each point and hence is not as smooth an interpolation as one 
would desire. 
 Polynomial interpolation estimates values between known data points using a 
polynomial function. This method becomes problematic, however, if the underlying 
data is not a true polynomial. 
 Cardinal spline interpolation is a subset of Hermite interpolation and is the simplest 
method that guarantees true continuity between data points. This is because it requires 
more than just the two endpoints of the data segment, but also the two data points on 
either side of them. As it provides a ‘smoother’ interpolant, it is also more accurate than 
linear interpolation. 
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Given the need to have a continuous and smooth data set following the interpolation, the 
Cardinal Spline method was employed. When there are missing data points in a data set, the 
Cardinal Spline method uses the previous two non-missing values and the next two non-
missing values and tries to fit the missing data to a non-linear or curved pattern. The data is 
interpolated according to the formula below: 
𝐼𝑉𝐶𝑆 = (2𝜆
3 −  3𝜆2 −  1)𝑃𝑖−1 + (1 − 𝑡)(𝜆
3 −  2𝜆2 + 𝜆)(𝑃𝑖+1 −  𝑃𝑖−2)
−  (2𝜆3 −  3𝜆2)𝑃𝑖+1 + (1 − 𝑡)(𝜆
3 − 𝜆2)(𝑃𝑖+2 − 𝑃𝑖−1) 
  
(12) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑖−2 and 𝑃𝑖−1 denote the previous two non-missing values,  
𝑃𝑖+1 and 𝑃𝑖+2 denote the next two non-missing values, 
𝜆 is the relative position of the missing value divided by the total number of 
missing values in a row, and  
𝑡 is the tension parameter and affects the curvature of the spline 
 
 
Using Cardinal Spline interpolation allowed the data gap to be filled, ensuring that a data set 
for the entire sample period is used.  
As a final point about the choice of APT factors, there is literature to support that country-
specific macroeconomic factors might play a greater explanatory role in explaining the returns 
of that specific country. However, a uniform data set will be applied across all countries. The 
motivation behind this, although discussed in Section 2.2.2, is due to the following: 
 The basis of this study is fundamentally asset pricing; however a specific focus was put 
on the role of investor sentiment in explaining returns and not which macroeconomic 
factors have more explanatory power across different countries. 
 Holding the macroeconomic variables constant allows for the full effects of investor 
sentiment to be isolated. 
 A uniform set of macroeconomic variables allows for a comparison across the various 
countries, as any potential results could not be due to differences in explanatory 
variables. 
 Uniformity allows for a comparison between countries as the method applied should 
provide a much ‘cleaner’ result. 
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The country-specific data set chosen to satisfy the requirements for each independent variable, 
its source and frequency is outlined in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
3.1.4 Measure of Media Sentiment 
As this study will replicate the FEARS index of Da, Engelberg and Gao (2015), the 
methodology will be closely aligned to their methodology. Recent literature in textual analysis 
uses the Harvard IV-4 Dictionary as well as the Lasswell Value Dictionary as a starting point 
(Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, & Macskassy, 2008). These dictionaries classify 
words into categories such as “positive”, “negative”, “weak” and so on; the purpose of the 
FEARS index, however, is to capture household sentiment towards the economy, hence words 
that are “economic” and have either “positive” or “negative” sentiment are chosen.8 These 
search filters results in a list of 163 words; 92 related to positive sentiment and 71 related to 
negative sentiment. This initial list of words, termed the primitive word list, includes words 
such as “unemployed”, “poverty”, “prosper”, “affluent”, “crisis” and “bankruptcy”. 
The next step is then to understand how each word in the primitive word list is searched in 
Google. Each primitive word is inputted into Google Trends which returns the top searches 
related to that specific word. This will then generate a list of terms related to each word in the 
primitive list. 
 
The next step is to eliminate the terms that have insufficient data. Finally, the terms that are 
clearly not related to economics or finance are removed. For example, if one were to input 
“depression” into Google Trends, the related searches would include “depression symptoms”, 
“depression signs”, and “postpartum depression”. These topics are not related to economics or 
finance and hence are removed. This process was completed for all search words. 
 
The steps outlined above generate a list of words that are related to the original primitive list 
of economic words, free of duplicates, have sufficient observations and include only words 
related to economics and finance. 
 
Thereafter, the SVI for each word in the final list is downloaded from Google Trends for the 
different sample periods for each country. This data is collected on a country by country basis 
                                                 
8  Specifically, from http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/spreadsheet_guide.htm all economic words (those 
with tags “Econ@” or “ECON”) which also have a positive or negative sentiment tag (those with tags “Ngtv”, 
“Negativ”, “Postiv”, or “Pstv”) are chosen. 
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for all countries under observation; Google Trends makes this possible via a country filter 
function, which uses the IP address9 of a given search term to track where someone is accessing 
content from. This implies that the data extracted for each country will represent the sentiment 
of the households of that specific country.  
 
Unlike all the macroeconomic data mentioned above, some of the Google Trends data is 
provided on a weekly basis. Therefore, data transformation is required to match the high 
frequency data (Google SVI data) to the lower frequency data (macroeconomic data). The 
solution employed to achieve this is to take a weekly average in order to obtain a monthly data 
point. Specifically, 
 
𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =  
𝑆𝑉𝐼1 +  𝑆𝑉𝐼2 + ⋯ + 𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑛
𝑛
 
(13) 
 
Where 𝑛 is the number of weeks in any given month  
 
Thereafter, the monthly change in search term j will be calculated as follows: 
 
∆𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡 = ln(𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡) − ln(𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡−1) (14) 
 
An important aspect of Google Trends data is that it is subject to extreme values, specifically 
seasonality and heteroscedasticity (Da, Engelberg, & Gao, 2015). To mitigate these concerns, 
the raw data is adjusted as follows: 
 Each series is winsorised10 at the 5% level (2.5% in each tail). 
 To eliminate seasonality from ∆𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡 , it is regressed on month dummies and the 
residual is kept. 
 To address heteroscedasticity and comparability, each time series is standardised by 
scaling each by the time series standard deviation. 
                                                 
9 An IP address is the numerical label that is attached to a device, for example a computer or tablet which 
enables location identification. 
10 This is a method of transforming the data by limiting extreme values or outliers. Typically, all outliers are set 
to a specified percentile of the data. 
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As such, the final product is an adjusted (winsorised, deseasonalised and standardised) monthly 
change in search volume, ∆𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡, for each of the search words. 
The final step in creating the FEARS index is to let the data identify which search terms are 
most important for returns. This can be determined by running expanding backward rolling 
regressions of ∆𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑗,𝑡 on market returns to determine the historic relationship between search 
and contemporaneous market return for each of the search terms. For example, a sentiment 
value for February 2015 is obtained by regressing any given word on market returns from the 
start of the sample period until January 2015. Similarly, a sentiment value for March 2015 is 
obtained by regressing any given word on market returns from the start of the sample period 
until February 2015. 
This step will indicate that if a search term has a strong relationship with the market, whether 
that relationship is a positive or negative one. In six out of nine countries where a search word 
had a strong relationship with the market, it was almost always negative. This occurs even 
though both positive and negative economic words were included from the Harvard and 
Lasswell dictionaries. This is consistent with the findings of Tetlock (2007) and Da, Engelberg 
and Gao (2015) who found that negative terms in the English language appear to be the most 
useful for identifying sentiment. This finding also gives strong support to the positive-negative 
asymmetry theory which highlights that when it comes to news or shocks, one tends to observe 
a greater impact of the negative news than the positive news (see Section 2.3.5). The countries 
where a negative relationship was found include Brazil, India, Germany, SA, the UK, and US. 
Conversely, for the remaining three countries – China, Japan, and Russia – where a strong 
relationship between a search word and the market was found, this relationship was almost 
always positive in nature. Once again, this occurs despite having included both positive and 
negative economic words from the Harvard and Lasswell dictionaries. Although these findings 
are contrary to what would be expected, it is worth noting that the body of research pertaining 
to sentiment and positive-negative asymmetry in these countries is not as extensive as those 
mentioned above. 
Given the above, the t-statistic from each word and each regression is ranked from most 
negative to most positive (for six out of nine countries) and most positive to most negative (for 
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three out of nine countries). Thereafter, the top thirty terms are then used to form the FEARS 
index for each country11. 
Formally, FEARS at month t can be defined as follows: 
FEARSt =  ∑ 𝑅
𝑖(∆𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
(15) 
 
Where n will represent the number of search words in the sample, and 𝑅𝑖 is the 
ranking of the t-statistics 
 
 
Given the relatively short sample period, an expanding rolling window is chosen to maximise 
the statistical power of the selection. The cut-off of thirty is chosen as it is often considered to 
be the minimum number of observations needed to diversify away idiosyncratic noise (Da, 
Engelberg, & Gao, 2015). 
This historic regression-based approach of selecting terms is advantageous in that it allows the 
data to “speak for itself”. It brings to light words that were not ex ante obvious, and is also an 
objective way of selecting search terms. For example, a word that may be considered to be an 
economic word of positive sentiment by the Harvard and Lasswell dictionaries may be found 
to have a negative relationship with market returns. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 The APT 
The methodology to estimate the factors in an APT model will closely follow that of Chen, 
Roll and Ross (1986). 
The independent variable in each APT model will be the returns on the market indices of the 
countries under examination. Using the closing prices of each index12, a return is calculated as 
follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = ln (
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1
) (16) 
 
                                                 
11 Please see Appendix C for the list of words used for each country’s FEARS index 
12 All closing prices have been adjusted for dividends 
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Table 2 below outlines the explanatory variables that will be included in this study, as well as 
how they are defined. 
Table 2: Definitions of Explanatory Variables 
Symbol Variable Definition 
I Inflation 
Percentage change in a country’s consumer 
price index 
GB Treasury bill rate Return on a one year government bond 
LTB 
Long-term Government 
Bonds 
Return on a 10 year government bond 
IP Industrial Production 
Percentage change in a country’s producer price 
index 
LGB Low Grade Bonds Return on a high yield bond index 
VWE Value-Weighted Equities 
Return on a value-weighted portfolio of shares 
specific to a given country 
OP Oil Price 
Log relative of Producer Price Index/ Petroleum 
series 
 
From the variables outlined in Table 2, a further series of variables is defined, shown in Table 
3 below. 
Table 3: Definitions of Derived Variables 
Symbol Variable Definition 
𝑀𝑃𝑡 Monthly growth in industrial production 
[
𝐼𝑃𝑡
𝐼𝑃𝑡−1
] − 1 
𝐼𝑡 Monthly inflation [
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡−1
] − 1 
𝑅𝐼𝑡 Real interest rate 𝐺𝐵𝑡−1 −  𝐼𝑡 
𝑅𝑃𝑡 
Risk premium 𝐿𝐺𝐵𝑡 − 𝐿𝑇𝐵𝑡 
𝑇𝑆𝑡 Term structure 𝐿𝑇𝐵𝑡 − 𝐺𝐵𝑡−1 
 
Due to the nature of the economic variables used, it is necessary to conduct a correlation 
analysis as it would reveal relationships between the variables and provide an indication of 
which variables may give spurious statistical results. The correlation and results will also 
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indicate which variables may be redundant as their effects might be captured in a different 
variable. 
In addition to the variables outlined in Table 2 above, the FEARS index will be included as a 
further independent variable. These explanatory variables will then be regressed against market 
indices for the countries outlined in Section 3.1 above. Mathematically, the regression equation 
will take the following form: 
𝑅𝑀 = 𝑎 +  𝛽𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑃 +  𝛽𝐼𝐼 +  𝛽𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑃 +  𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆 +  𝜀  (17) 
 
It is important to highlight that equation (17) is also a mathematical representation of the fact 
that the objective of this study is to determine the feasibility of various APT factors, one of 
which happens to be investor sentiment. 
3.2.2 Robustness Checks 
A critical component of any empirical analysis, particularly regression testing, is robustness 
checks. This refers to how certain core regression coefficient estimates behave when the 
regression specification is altered in some way (Lu & White, 2014). A number of robustness 
checks will be completed for this study to provide strong support to the results. 
3.2.2.1 Controlling for Endogeneity 
Given that the FEARS index is based on search volumes, it becomes necessary to determine 
whether FEARS is a response to traditional market factors or not. Essentially, the nature of the 
index implies endogeneity could be an issue when running the regression outlined above. 
Endogeneity refers to one or more of the variables in the regression being correlated with the 
error term (Wooldridge, 2013). In this particular case, endogeneity can be caused by a loop of 
causality between the independent and dependent variables in the regression model. 
Identifying endogeneity will be carried out using a correlation test between the residual of the 
model and each individual variable. If the variable is statistically significantly correlated with 
the residual of the model, then it can be concluded that the specific variable is endogenous. 
Conversely, if the variable is not statistically significantly correlated with the residual of the 
model, then it can be concluded that that specific variable is exogenous. 
In order to overcome any possible endogeneity in this regression, the instrumental variable (IV) 
method will be employed. IV involves replacing the dependent variables with predicted values 
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of those same variables that satisfy the following two conditions: 1) Exogeneity: the IV must 
be uncorrelated with the error term of the model and 2) Relevance: the IV is correlated with 
the independent variable. Only once both these conditions are satisfied is a variable considered 
to be an IV. This process will ensure that a consistent regression coefficient is obtained. In the 
instance of one variable being found endogenous, only one instrument is necessary and hence 
this instrument can be included in a standard OLS regression. This is performed in two steps; 
step one involves obtaining the IV values and step two involves running an OLS regression, 
but replacing the endogenous variable with the IV estimator. In the event of multiple 
endogenous variables and hence multiple instruments, the Two Stage Least Suqares (2SLS) 
regression method is applied. The 2SLS method allows for the inclusion of instrumental 
variables. The output of this regression, specifically the coefficients and associated p-values, 
is the same as that derived from an OLS regression (Wooldridge, 2013). 
3.2.2.2 Regression-Specific Robustness Checks 
In order to determine the robustness of the best suited APT model, the error term of the model 
needs to be analysed. 
First, the error term is tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. If the 
error term is found to be stationary, then this could imply that the model is a suitable fit. 
A further test involves testing for Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) 
effects in the APT model. Essentially, this tests if the monthly return series is non-constant and 
if the squares of the monthly return series are correlated. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 
statistic and its associated p-value are used to determine the presence of ARCH effects. 
However, an additional test, the Breusch-Godfrey test, is employed to ensure the result is 
robust. If the LM finds no ARCH effects, this does not necessarily imply that the conditional 
variance of the monthly return series is constant; this can occur if disturbance terms are serially 
correlated. Hence, the Breusch-Godfrey test is employed as a serial correlation LM test. 
The stability of the regression model also needs to be tested; this is done through a number of 
diagnostic tests. 
 Leverage plots – this will show how well the explanatory variables fit the model. 
 Influence statistics – the influence statistics for the RStudent, Hat Matrix, DFFITS and 
COVRATIO will identify any possible outliers in the model. 
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 Scaled difference in coefficients (DFBETAS) – this will also give an indications of the 
possible outliers in the model. 
 
3.2.2.3 Volatility and FEARS Correlation Tests 
There is evidence from Black (1986) which suggests that both investor sentiment and the noise 
trading effect can affect both the level and volatility of asset prices. If uninformed noise traders 
made decisions based on sentiment, then any extreme sentiment changes will temporarily lead 
to more noise trading, greater mispricing, and excessive volatility. If this holds true, then any 
changes in FEARS will be accompanied by a change in volatility – which will lend support to 
the noise trading theory outlined by DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990). 
Moreover, this will also provide an indication as to whether any relationships found in the 
regression analysis are true statistical relationships or are merely caused by correlation with a 
volatility index. 
As such, a correlation analysis will be run on the FEARS index against its respective country-
specific volatility index, where available.  
Of the nine countries under examination, six have their own volatility indices as outlined in 
Table 4 below. As for the countries where no volatility index was available, they were excluded 
from the correlation analysis.  
Table 4: Volatility Indices for Countries 
Country Volatility Index Source 
Brazil Not available  
Russia Removed due to insufficient data  
India India VIX Bloomberg 
China Not available  
South Africa South African Volatility Index JSE 
Germany Volatility DAX Bloomberg 
Japan Nikkei VIX Bloomberg 
United Kingdom FTSE 100 VIX Bloomberg 
United States S&P 500 VIX Bloomberg 
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This section outlined the methodology that will be undertaken to address the validity of the 
hypotheses presented in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 above. It describes the macroeconomic 
explanatory variables employed as well as the form the regression equation will take once 
completed. Furthermore, numerous robustness checks are outlined to ascertain the strength of 
the regression output. 
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4 Results 
This chapter, as well as Appendices B and C, present the results of the various tests described 
in Section 3.2 as well as the discussion of the results on an individual country basis. The 
regression results are shown below; Table 5 for BRICS and Table 6 for the selected G7 nations. 
The discussion of each country’s results is structured by: 1) Understanding the role a country’s 
economic and financial history has in explaining their regression results and 2) Understanding 
why investor sentiment is statistically significant in some countries and not in others. The 
discussion on the latter point includes, but is not limited to, the strength of a country’s 
regulatory bodies, the level of trust investors have in the country’s economy and capital market, 
the level of sophistication of the country’s investors and the level of Individualism prevalent 
in the country’s society13. Thereafter, the results of all the countries are considered together to 
identify a number of key outcomes and implications for the study overall.
                                                 
13 Individualism is measured using Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimension theory which serves as a framework for 
cross-cultural communication. It describes the effects of a society’s culture on the values of its members and how 
these relate to behaviour. The dimensions employed in the index include: power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and indulgence. The Individualism dimension, 
specifically, describes the degree of interdependence a society maintains among its members. The scale is from 1 
to 120, with a higher score indicating a more individualistic society. Recently, this index has been used to 
understand the link between individualism and momentum in a given market. It has also been used to understand 
the link between individualism and the effects of investor sentiment – the higher the score on the Individualism 
dimension, the lower the effects of investor sentiment should be. 
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Table 5: Regression Results: BRICS 
 
 
 
 
Intercept Inflation 
Industrial 
Production 
Real Interest 
Rate 
Risk 
Premium 
Term 
Structure 
Oil Price FEARS R2 
Adjusted 
R2 
Brazil 
[BOVESPA] 
1 
-0.013313 
[0.5266] 
0.344756 
[0.8346] 
-0.416924 
[0.2261] 
1.381797 
[0.0000]* 
1.482409 
[0.0000]* 
1.392697 
[0.0000]* 
-0.021228 
[0.7197] 
 0.478923 0.425019 
2 
-0.015895 
[0.4547] 
0.418664 
[0.8004] 
-0.401074 
[0.2454] 
1.312081 
[0.0000]* 
1.41665 
[0.0000]* 
1.328835 
[0.0000]* 
-0.028402 
[0.6348] 
-0.000689 
[0.3626] 
0.486513 0.423453 
Russia 
[MICEX] 
1 
0.006105 
[0.9685] 
1.967105 
[0.048]* 
-0.138815 
[0.677] 
0.867847 
[0.0297]* 
0.915265 
[0.0026]* 
0.705785 
[0.0607]** 
0.019132 
[0.9168] 
 0.41256 0.35179 
2 
-0.0324 
[0.8306] 
1.635386 
[0.0935]** 
-0.22407 
[0.4928] 
0.468437 
[0.2724] 
0.602142 
[0.0645]** 
0.330203 
[0.4125] 
-0.031428 
[0.8611] 
0.00163 
[0.0388]* 
0.455309 0.388417 
India 
[NIFTY] 
1 
-0.067827 
[0.3837] 
-1.666947 
[0.2949] 
0.131386 
[0.1342] 
0.534003 
[0.0617]** 
1.092711 
[0.0000]* 
0.667758 
[0.0197] 
-0.050215 
[0.3441] 
 0.340932 0.272752 
2 
-0.073028 
[0.3507] 
-1.578942 
[0.3226] 
0.132683 
[0.1312] 
0.475522 
[0.1043] 
1.043976 
[0.0000]* 
0.618219 
[0.0338]* 
-0.053738 
[0.3137] 
-0.000457 
[0.3694] 
0.350263 0.27047 
China [SSE] 
1 
0.244624 
[0.0063]* 
0.084473 
[0.9729] 
1.374127 
[0.5841] 
0.578255 
[0.4185] 
0.404908 
[0.4842] 
0.458733 
[0.5233] 
0.294306 
[0.0096]* 
 0.186796 0.04739 
2 
0.245379 
[0.0074]* 
0.053802 
[0.9833] 
1.370932 
[0.5905] 
0.588014 
[0.4272] 
0.409972 
[0.4889] 
0.467035 
[0.5281] 
0.295176 
[0.0111] 
-0.000044 
[0.9477] 
0.186901 0.019498 
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Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below the coefficient 
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance; **Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance 
South Africa 
[ALSI] 
1 
-0.012058 
[0.7734] 
0.125129 
[0.9087] 
-0.637855 
[0.3393] 
0.811492 
[0.0018]* 
0.802582 
[0.0000]* 
0.81412 
[0.0001]* 
-0.026076 
[0.5773] 
 0.32706 0.257446 
2 
-0.013107 
[0.7250] 
 
0.164039 
[0.8658] 
-0.421562 
[0.4788] 
0.649494 
[0.0053]* 
0.677961 
[0.0000]* 
0.657736 
[0.0007]* 
-0.0253 
[0.5433] 
-0.00159 
[0.0002]* 
0.476798 0.412545 
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Table 6: Regression Results: Selected G7 Countries 
 
 
Intercept Inflation 
Industrial 
Production 
Real Interest 
Rate 
Risk 
Premium 
Term 
Structure 
Oil Price FEARS R2 
Adjusted 
R2 
Germany 
[DAX] 
1 
-0.025138 
[0.0592]** 
1.995865 
[0.1586] 
1.562822 
[0.2379] 
1.664428 
[0.0000]* 
1.676344 
[0.0000]* 
-0.025138 
[0.0000]* 
0.124068 
[0.0706] 
 0.541707 0.494298 
2 
-0.021672 
[0.1064] 
1.984123 
[0.158] 
1.172157 
[0.3824] 
1.541898 
[0.0000]* 
1.559616 
[0.0000]* 
-0.025138 
[0.0000]* 
0.108609 
[0.1147] 
-0.000873 
[0.1761] 
0.556313 0.501825 
Japan 
[NIKKEI] 
1 
-0.000415 
[0.9984] 
0.148215 
[0.9339] 
0.416378 
[0.4591] 
0.279035 
[0.5303] 
0.19571 
[0.6645] 
0.304085 
[0.4943] 
-0.010721 
[0.9176] 
 0.133348 -0.01522 
2 
0.128551 
[0.5039] 
0.148215 
[0.9339] 
0.178799 
[0.7314] 
0.104828 
[0.7988] 
0.022166 
[0.9577] 
0.111331 
[0.7872] 
0.054845 
[0.576] 
0.002599 
[0.0088]* 
0.293726 0.148317 
UK 
[FTSE100] 
1 
0.019087 
[0.4636] 
-5.859118 
[0.281] 
0.929621 
[0.103] 
-4.913118 
[0.3737] 
-0.151151 
[0.4026] 
-0.109817 
[0.5453] 
0.02177 
[0.7617] 
 0.09536 0.000135 
2 
0.021142 
[0.3291] 
-5.358581 
[0.2355] 
0.978014 
[0.0403]* 
-4.556404 
[0.3208] 
-0.127387 
[0.3957] 
-0.110349 
[0.4644] 
0.007593 
[0.8987] 
-0.001979 
[0.0000]* 
0.387728 0.311194 
US 
[S&P500] 
1 
0.015456 
[0.006]* 
-0.593695 
[0.6446] 
-0.355041 
[0.7274] 
0.018349 
[0.9459] 
-0.208591 
[0.4484] 
-0.003804 
[0.9888] 
-0.039876 
[0.34] 
 0.306652 0.234926 
2 
0.015536 
[0.0032]* 
-0.355804 
[0.767] 
-0.232572 
[0.8065] 
-0.0907 
[0.7217] 
-0.290737 
[0.2607] 
-0.103379 
[0.6845] 
-0.044406 
[0.2553] 
-0.001111 
[0.0027]* 
0.408569 0.335937 
Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below the coefficient 
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance; **Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance 
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4.1 BRICS Nations 
4.1.1 Brazil 
The regression results in Table 5 above show the two regression models; (1) and (2). Model 
(1) is the macroeconomic APT model without the FEARS variable. This model explains 42.5% 
of the variation in Bovespa returns; the real interest rate, risk premium, and term structure 
variables are all statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. Moreover, the variables 
share a positive relationship with Bovespa returns, which implies that any increases in these 
variables will result in an increase in Bovespa returns. Model (2) is the macroeconomic APT 
model with the FEARS variable. This model explains 42.3% of the variation in Bovespa returns 
– this is lower than (1) implying that the addition of the FEARS variable does not improve the 
explanatory power of the model. Moreover, the FEARS variable itself is statistically 
insignificant. The same variables from (1) are found to be statistically significant at the 5% 
level of significance in (2). This relationship remains positive; however, the strength of the 
relationship is somewhat reduced in (2). 
The macroeconomic nature of the variables warranted a correlation analysis, to ascertain the 
presence of any correlation between variables (Table C1 in Appendix C). This analysis showed 
that the three variables mentioned above are statistically significantly correlated with each 
other at the 5% level of significance; this is not surprising as all three variables are related to 
the interest rate as they are in some way related to the government bond return. A step-wise 
regression procedure indicated that the real interest rate variable is redundant as its effects are 
likely captured in the other two interest rate-related variables. This implies that the explanation 
of Bovespa returns is properly captured by the risk premium and term structure variables, with 
FEARS playing no statistically significant role in explaining Bovespa returns. As such, it would 
appear that (1) is a superior model for explaining Bovespa returns.  
When considering why the real interest rate, risk premium, and term structure variables were 
found to play a significant role in explaining Bovespa returns, it is useful to understand the 
macroeconomic drivers in the market. Research into what exactly influences interest rates in 
Brazil has found that macroeconomic conditions play the primary role in determining interest 
rates. Macroeconomic conditions are measured using variables such as inflation, risk premium, 
economic activity and required reserves (Afanasieff, Lhacer, & Nakane, 2002). In addition, the 
interest rate was also found to have significant explanatory power in explaining business cycles 
in Brazil, which in turn affects the performance of the stock market (Neumeyer & Perri, 2005). 
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If this result is used to explain the outcome of the Brazil APT, the other explanatory factors 
employed in this study actually explain interest rate movements in Brazil. This explains why 
only the interest rate variables were found to be statistically significant – the remaining 
variables determine the country’s interest rates. The explanatory power of the risk premium 
can be explained by acknowledging that Brazil is perceived as a high risk country; in fact it 
was ranked as the eighth most risky country by Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2015)14, 
implying that there is a high risk of default. As such, investors would require additional 
compensation for taking on this risk and hence it would be expected that the risk premium paid 
to investors has explanatory power for market returns. 
The fact that FEARS did not contribute any explanatory power to the regression model does 
not necessarily imply that investor sentiment is not an explanatory factor in the Brazilian 
market. From the literature, it is quite clear that there are a number of different ways to measure 
investor sentiment, with each one capturing something different. It is possible that in the 
Brazilian market investor sentiment is better captured through market proxies (Yoshinaga & 
De Castro Junior, 2012) or even textual analysis on news articles (Daszyńska-Żygadło, 
Szpulak, & Szyszka, 2014), tweets, and Facebook posts. Culturally, Brazil is viewed to be a 
collectivist nation – they score 38 on the Individualism dimension on Hofstede’s (2001) culture 
index. In a collectivist culture, it is expected that the effects of investor sentiment are larger 
(Schmeling, 2008). Therefore, using an alternative measurement of investor sentiment could 
provide support for this hypothesis. 
The results of the regression as well as the economic history and theory outlined above indicate 
that interest rates are pivotal to Brazil’s economy and stock market. A thorough understanding 
of this link is critical as it has implications for those participating in the capital market, such as 
traders, as well as those making policy decisions. The results can therefore be used in assisting 
traders in making larger profits, as well as policy decision makers to ensure they are acting in 
the best interests of the economy. The regression results indicated that FEARS did not display 
statistically significant explanatory power in the market; however, this does not necessarily 
mean that investor sentiment does not have explanatory power in the Brazilian stock market. 
There is evidence which indicates that investor sentiment, measured in a different way, does 
have an impact on the Brazilian market. 
                                                 
14 This is determined by a credit default swap spread which measures the risk of default on sovereign debt – the 
higher the spread, the greater the risk of default. 
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4.1.2 Russia 
The regression results in Table 5 above show the two regression models; (1) and (2). Model 
(1) is the macroeconomic APT without the FEARS variable. This model explains 35.1% of the 
variation in Micex returns; the inflation rate, real interest rate, risk premium, and term structure 
are all statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. Moreover, all these variables 
share a positive relationship with Micex returns, which implies that any increases in any of 
these variables will result in an increase in Micex returns. Model (2) is the macroeconomic 
APT model with the FEARS variable. This model explains 38.8% of the variation in Micex 
returns. This is higher than (1) which implies that the addition of the FEARS variable improves 
the overall explanatory power of the model. Unfortunately, the inclusion of the FEARS variable 
causes the real interest rate and risk premium variables to become statistically insignificant. It 
also changes the level of significance in both the inflation rate and risk premium variables – 
these variables now become statistically significant at the 10% level of significance instead of 
the 5% level of significance as in (1). Moreover, the magnitude of the relationship between the 
inflation rate and risk premium and Micex returns has also been adversely affected. The 
investor sentiment variable, FEARS, is statistically significant at the 5% level of significance 
and it shares a positive relationship with Micex returns. This implies that any increases in 
investor sentiment will be matched by increases in Micex returns; seeing that the FEARS index 
for Russia was constructed with predominantly positive economic words, this is expected as 
an increase in positive investor sentiment will have a positive impact on Micex returns. From 
(2) is appears that FEARS is a statistically and economically significant explanatory variable 
in the Russian macro-economy. 
The macroeconomic nature of the variables warranted a correlation analysis, to ascertain the 
presence of any correlation between variables (Table C2 in Appendix C). Correlations between 
variables were found to be relatively weak as many of the coefficients are closer to 0 than to 1. 
Inflation appears to be correlated with industrial production; this is quite expected as both 
variables are measures of the rising cost of goods. The term structure variable is negatively and 
statistically significantly correlated with both the real interest rate and risk premium variables. 
This is similar to what was uncovered in the Brazil correlation analysis; these variables are 
likely to be correlated due to their relationship with the government bond return. A step-wise 
regression procedure revealed that the industrial production and real interest variables are likely 
to be redundant. As such, the variation in Micex is best explained by the inflation rate, the risk 
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premium, and FEARS. As such, it would appear that (2) is a superior model for explaining 
Micex returns. 
The Russian market and its development is a function of the history and current state of the 
country; a better understanding of this is likely to yield insight into the results of the regression. 
The Russian stock market, as it is known today, began in the early 1990s amidst political and 
economic transformation. The first few years saw a rapid increase in stock turnover; however, 
this occurred with no market regulation or formalised trading platform. The lack of a 
supervisory body to oversee the capital market resulted in numerous scandals, including 
pyramid schemes. Although a regulatory body was eventually established, reforms were carried 
out to a relatively limited extent; this was caused by a lack of enforcement and limited penalties. 
The underlying cause, however, is the weakness of the Russian judicial system as a whole. The 
consequences of a lack of market supervision include insufficient trading security, corruption, 
and a lack of transparency in reporting standards (Marszk, 2013). 
Inflation is an important factor in the development of a stock market (Vasiliev, 2010) and a 
low inflation rate is indicative of macroeconomic stability (Yartey, 2008). Russia’s inflation 
rate, however, is extremely high which indicates a level of macroeconomic instability in the 
country. Their historically high inflation rates have been crippling to the economy and have 
not yet stabilised to the point where it encourages economic development. The positive 
relationship between inflation and Micex returns found is also inconsistent with what theory 
dictates in the short-term – high inflation reduces an individuals’ purchasing power which 
increases input prices, drives the demand for goods down resulting in lower revenues and 
ultimately a slowdown in the economy (Ammer, 1994). In the longer term, however, the 
additional costs are passed to consumers and hence stock prices will rise in line with increased 
inflation. The inconsistency could be pinned down to the underdeveloped nature of the Russian 
stock market. 
The explanatory power of the risk premium variable is likely driven by the fact that the most 
important factor affecting the cross-section of Russian returns is in fact the country’s risk 
(Goriaev, 2004). The description of the Russian stock market outlined above provides many 
reasons as to why investment in this market could be deemed risky for all investors, and hence 
why investors would demand a premium as an incentive to invest in the market. This can be 
confirmed by Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2015) who reported that Russia is seventh on a 
list of countries most likely to default on their sovereign debt. 
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The immaturity of regulation in the Russian stock market, coupled with the fact that the market 
is relatively underdeveloped has consequences for overall market performance. An immature 
regulation framework creates a level of distrust in the institution of a stock market; this drives 
investors to seek alternative methods or mediums of investing, such as through commodities. 
Moreover, the impact of investor sentiment on the market tends to be stronger in those markets 
which have less market integrity (Schmeling, 2008). An underdeveloped market also suffers 
from a lack of information, particularly good quality and complete information. When investors 
are forced to make decisions with incomplete or overly complex information, they tend to rely 
on simplified heuristics or rules of thumb (De Martino, Kumaram, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). 
This affects their ability to make an informed decision as this process becomes clouded by 
cognitive and behavioural biases. Further insight about the role culture plays in explaining the 
effects of investor sentiment can be gained from Hofstede (2001). Russia scores 39 on the 
Individualism dimension implying that Russian culture is more collective and inclusive. In 
instances of low individualism, investor sentiment is expected to have a larger impact on 
market returns (Schmeling, 2008). Given the nature of the Russian stock market as well as its 
collectivism culture, it is quite expected that investor sentiment plays a role in explaining 
market returns. 
The results of the regression as well as the overview provided of the Russian macro-economy 
and stock market show that the inflation rate, the risk premium and investor sentiment play a 
pivotal role in explaining movement in Micex returns. Furthermore, a link can be drawn 
between these results and how they can be used by traders and those making policy decisions. 
Investor sentiment, as measured by FEARS, was found to be statistically significant in 
explaining Micex returns. This can be explained by several characteristics of the Russian 
market which make it susceptible to the effects of investor sentiment. 
 
4.1.3 India 
The regression results in Table 5 above show the two regression models; (1) and (2). Model 
(1) is the macroeconomic APT without the FEARS variable. This model explains 27.3% of the 
variation in Nifty returns; the risk premium was found to be statistically significant at the 5% 
level of significance whereas the real interest rate variable was found to be statistically 
significant at the 10% level of significance. Both variables were found to share a positive 
relationship with Nifty returns. This implies that any increases in the real interest rate and/or 
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risk premium variables would result in an increase in Nifty returns. The lack of explanatory 
power of the industrial production variable is unexpected as there is evidence to suggest that 
industrial production has strong explanatory power for the Indian stock market (Patel, 2012; 
Naka, Mukherjee, & Tufte, 1998). Model (2) is the macroeconomic APT with the FEARS 
variable included. This model explains 27% of the variation in Nifty returns; this is lower than 
(1) indicating that the inclusion of the FEARS variable did not improve the explanatory power 
of the model. Nevertheless, both the risk premium and term structure variables were found to 
be statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. The inclusion of the FEARS variable 
has resulted in the real interest rate variable losing its statistical significance; however, the term 
structure variable appeared to have gained statistical significance. Both these variables were 
also found to share a positive relationship with Nifty returns, with the strength of the risk 
premium variable being reduced somewhat. 
A correlation analysis was also completed to ascertain any potential correlations between the 
macroeconomic variables (Table C3 in Appendix C). The term structure and real interest rate 
variables were found to be statistically significantly correlated at the 5% level of significance; 
Nifty returns and the risk premium variables were also found to be positively and statistically 
significantly correlated at the 5% level of significance. The relationship between Nifty returns 
and the risk premium is understandable as investors require additional compensation to take on 
any additional risk which would increase the overall rate of return on a specific asset, hence 
affecting the market positively. The relationship between the term structure and real interest 
rate variables is also understandable as both these variables are related to the government bond 
return; it is likely that one of these variables is redundant in the regression model. When the 
step-wise regression was completed, it was found that the real interest rate variable is likely 
redundant. As such, it would appear that (1) is a superior model for explaining the variation in 
Nifty returns. 
As an additional check, the correlation analysis between FEARS and the Nifty VIX (Volatility 
Index) revealed a statistically insignificant relationship (Output (1), Table C10 in Appendix C) 
between the two variables. Therefore, the regression and correlation results are congruent in 
that FEARS does not play an explanatory role in the market. 
India has emerged as a strong economy over the past years, characterised by high levels of 
investment and rapid growth across various sectors. Following India’s independence in 1947, 
the country’s economic growth can be described in phases with each phase characterised by 
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growth and investment in different sectors. Phase 1 (1950 – 1980) was characterised by 
substantial public investment in basic industries, infrastructure and the agricultural sector. 
Phase 2 (1981 – 1990) saw India implement industrial and trade reforms which facilitated 
capacity expansion, modernisation and productivity improvement in the industrial sector. The 
3rd phase (1991 – 2010) saw an economic liberalisation in the country, an expansion in the 
service industry and a rise in private consumption (Bhat, 2013). The 4th and final phase is still 
under way and is characterised by substantial investment in physical, agricultural and social 
infrastructure. In the midst of these periods of economic growth and investment, India’s 
monetary policy also went through an evolution. 
Historically, India has struggled with high inflation rates and hence interest rates are an 
important lever used to curb inflation. This coupled with the role interest rate de-regulation has 
played in developing key segments of India’s economy highlights the importance interest rates 
play in India’s macro-economy. The regression results highlighted a positive relationship 
between real interest rates and Nifty returns which can be explained as follows – when interest 
rates are increased this encourages consumers to save and invest instead of consume and hence 
there is an inflow of fund into capital markets which has a positive impact on market prices 
and their associated returns.  
The positive direction of the risk premium relationship can be explained by understanding that 
additional compensation offered to investors to invest in risky assets results in investors 
actually investing in such assets, which positively affects market returns. The magnitude of this 
relationship can be compared to the other countries examined so far; the relationship is stronger 
than that observed in Russia but slightly weaker than that observed in Brazil. According to the 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2015), India is less risky than both Brazil and Russia and so 
the regression results are consistent for Brazil and inconsistent for Russia. Further insight into 
India’s risk scores indicates that sovereign and currency risk are not necessarily as great of an 
issue as banking sector risk. The source of banking sector risk in India stems from a past lending 
spree which has burdened India’s banks with distressed assets. That being said, improved 
monetary policy has been passed recently which will assist with mitigating a degree of the 
banking sector risk (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016). India’s economy is characterised 
by rapid growth and substantial investment and hence being seen as a growth economy could 
also be a potential source of risk. The level of credit default risk (Bank of America Merril 
Lynch, 2015) and banking sector risk (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016) explain the 
positive relationship between the risk premium and Nifty returns. 
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The fact that FEARS did not contribute any explanatory power to the model does not 
necessarily imply that investor sentiment does not have an impact on returns in India. As seen 
in the literature section there are various ways to measure investor sentiment, with each 
measure capturing different information in a different way. Essentially, it is possible that the 
FEARS index does not capture investor sentiment adequately and in fact some other measure 
captures the investor sentiment in India more correctly. It is possible that this could also be 
driven by country-specific factors as well as the culture of the country. Investor sentiment can 
be influenced by a variety of factors which are likely to affect its measurement. Evidence on 
the influencing factors of Indian sentiment have shown that economic, market and regulatory 
factors have the ability to influence investor sentiment as well as its relationship with market 
performance (Sehgal, Sood, & Rajput, 2009). The FEARS index is based purely on 
macroeconomic search word information, with market and regulatory search words likely to 
have been overlooked. Given the strong level of distrust in the India stock market, especially 
its regulatory body, this is likely to have a large impact on investor sentiment and by extension 
its effect on market performance (Kavitha, 2015). Put simply, perhaps FEARS is not a suitable 
investor sentiment measure in India; with it being better captured using surveys (Chandra & 
Kumar, 2012; Bennett, Selvam, Vivek, & Shalin, 2012) and market variables (Sehgal, Sood, 
& Rajput, 2012; Dash & Mahakud, 2013). A cultural lens can also be applied to gain an 
understanding of the effect of investor sentiment; India has traits of both an individualistic and 
collectivistic nation as their score on Individualism in Hofstede’s (2001) culture index is an 
intermediate 48. As such, the effects of sentiment are likely to be moderate in a market like 
this. 
Insight into the Indian economy and drivers thereof are consistent with results of 
macroeconomic regression. Interest rates are an important lever used to manipulate other 
macroeconomic variables and hence have explanatory power for stock market returns. 
Moreover, any increases in the risk premium also have a positive impact on market returns as 
investors have more of an incentive to invest in risky assets. Investor sentiment, as measured 
by FEARS, was not found to have any statistically significant explanatory power in the 
regression. However, there is evidence which indicates that investor sentiment captured using 
surveys or market variables do have explanatory power for market returns. The prevalence of 
the effects of investor sentiment in a market can be influenced by economic, market and 
regulatory factors; given this, there are characteristics of the Indian market which imply that 
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investor sentiment could indeed play an explanatory role; however, it could be that investor 
sentiment is better captured using a different methodology. 
 
4.1.4 China 
The regression results in Table 5 above show the two regression models; (1) and (2). Model 
(1) is the macroeconomic APT without the FEARS variable. This model explains 4.7% of the 
variation in SSE returns; the oil price and intercept were the only variables found to be 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. Both variables were found to share a 
positive relationship with SSE returns implying that any increases in these variables would 
result in an increase in SSE returns. China is the only instance in this study where a relationship 
was found between the oil price and SSE returns. Model (2) is the macroeconomic APT with 
the FEARS variable included. This model explains only 1.9% of the variation in SSE returns; 
this is lower than (1) indicating that the addition of the investor sentiment variable does not 
have a positive effect on the explanatory power of the model. Moreover, the addition of the 
FEARS variable has caused the oil price variable to become statistically insignificant while 
only the intercept remains statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. This 
regression indicates that investor sentiment, as measured by FEARS, does not play an 
explanatory role in the Chinese market. 
A correlation analysis was also completed to determine any possible sources of correlation 
amongst the variables (Table C4 in Appendix C). The term structure and real interest rate 
variables were found to be negatively and statistically significantly correlated at the 5% level 
of significance. SSE returns were found to share a positive and statistically significant 
correlation with the oil price, which is consistent with the regression results. Inflation and 
industrial production were also found to be positively and statistically significantly correlated 
at the 10% level of significance – given that both variables are a measure of the increase in 
price of goods, this is expected. Through the step-wise regression procedure it was found that 
even removing correlated variables did not yield a stronger regression model. As such, (1) 
appears to be the superior model in explaining the variation in SSE returns. 
China is the only instance in this study where a relationship was found between the oil price 
and market returns. There is some evidence to indicate that oil price shocks do have an impact 
on market returns in China (Broadstock & Fillis, 2014; Yun & Yoon, 2015). The economic 
significance of this relationship, however, is interesting as it stems from the building blocks of 
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the Chinese economy. The oil sector plays an important role in China’s economy and has also 
been the focus of major structural reforms and high-level attention from the government. 
Despite the policy reforms towards more market-oriented oil sector, government ownership, 
limited foreign investment, and inefficient expansion strategies still characterise the industry. 
Since 1979, China’s demand for oil has surpassed its oil production which has resulted in China 
becoming one of the top importers of oil in the world. The magnitude of China’s demand for 
oil has dire implications, as their influence on and vulnerability to international oil market is 
significant. Moreover, this discrepancy between demand and domestic supply is only getting 
larger, leaving China with tough choices to conquer their energy crisis (Soligo & Jaffe, 2004). 
As such, the statistical relationship found in the regression also has economic significance. 
In terms of explaining the lack of explanatory power of FEARS it is worthwhile to consider 
the types of investors in China, as well as the nature of the stock market. Retail investors only 
participate in this market due to the lack of alternative investment opportunities. Moreover, the 
lack of sophistication of these investors causes them to rely quite heavily on rumours for 
information, with the market being largely momentum driven (Drew, Naughton, & 
Veeraraghavan, 2003). Given the relatively short period of trading, as well as the market 
characteristics it was expected that investor sentiment have a strong impact on returns (Chi, 
Zhuang, & Song, 2012). The results, however, show that investor sentiment as measured by 
FEARS does not have any driving force behind the stock market. There could be numerous 
reasons for this outcome; however, the primary reason is likely due to the fact that Google is 
banned in mainland China (excluding Hong Kong and Macau) as the Chinese government 
believes that some of the content contravenes Chinese law. This ban was put into effect in 
March 2009 and seeing that the sample period for China started after this, Google SVI data 
would not be useful in explaining investor sentiment in the country. This band also extends to 
various social media platforms and hence investor sentiment in China is likely to be captured 
more completely using surveys or market proxies (Chi, Zhuang, & Song, 2012). Based on 
Hofstede’s (2001) culture hypothesis, China is a highly collectivist nation as their 
Individualism score is 20. As such, it would be expected that the effects of investor sentiment 
in the market with such low individualism would be substantial. As such, it demonstrates that 
investor sentiment is likely to play a role in the Chinese stock market provided that investor 
sentiment is captured by the correct measure. 
The results of the regression as well an overview of the Chinese economy, its drivers and its 
investors indicate that these results are not only statistically significant, but economically 
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significant as well. The regression showed that investor sentiment, as measured by FEARS, 
did not have any explanatory power for SSE returns. There is evidence, however, that investor 
sentiment measured in an alternative way has explanatory power in the Chinese market. The 
primary reason for the lack of explanatory power of FEARS is likely because Google is banned 
in mainland China (excluding Hong Kong and Macau). Despite the fact that China is an 
anomaly in this study, the regression results have provided insight into the Chinese stock 
market and economy. 
Attention should also be paid to the fact that the sample size of the China analysis was limited 
compared to most of the other countries under examination. 
 
4.1.5 South Africa 
The regression results in Table 5 above show the two regression models; (1) and (2). Model 
(1) is the macroeconomic APT without the FEARS variable. This model explains 25.7% of the 
variation in ALSI returns; the real interest rate, risk premium, and term structure variables were 
found to be statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. Moreover, all three variables 
displayed a positive relationship with ALSI returns which implies that any increase in any of 
those variables would result in an increase in ALSI returns. This link between interest rate 
variables and the stock market has been found in numerous countries, and South Africa is no 
different. The link is explained by considering both the institutional and individual 
perspectives. Company valuations, using the discounted cash flow methodology, will be 
affected by changes in interest rates which will inevitably affect a firm’s stock price. When 
numerous companies are affected by these changes, the indices in the market will also be 
affected. For individuals, higher interest rates serve as an incentive for consumers to save rather 
than spend due to favourable interest rates on deposit accounts or investments. As such, there 
will be an inflow of funds into the stock market, where previously this money was flowing into 
the economy in the form of consumption. Model (2) is the macroeconomic APT with the 
inclusion of the FEARS variable. This model explains 41.3% of the variation in ALSI returns; 
this is higher than (1) which implies that the inclusion of the FEARS variable has improved the 
explanatory power of the overall regression model. The real interest rate, risk premium and 
term structure variables retain their statistical significance at the 5% level of significance; a 
positive relationship between these variables and ALSI return was found, however, the 
magnitude of the relationship has been adversely affected in (2). Investor sentiment, as 
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measured by FEARS, was found to be statistically significant at the 5% level of significance; 
a negative relationship between FEARS and ALSI returns was found. This implies that any 
increases in investor sentiment will have a negative impact on ALSI return; this can be 
explained by the construction of the FEARS index itself. During the index construction process, 
it was found that negative words have the largest impact on ALSI returns and hence these were 
the words that were included. Therefore, the FEARS index for South Africa could be thought 
of as ‘negative’; this would explain why an increase in ‘negative’ investor sentiment would 
result in a decrease in ALSI returns. 
A correlation analysis was completed (Table C5 in Appendix C) and a step-wise regression 
procedure carried out to determine the possibility of redundant variables. Inflation and 
industrial production were found to share a positive and statistically significant relationship at 
5% level of significance – this correlation is not uncommon as both variables capture the rising 
cost of goods. The real interest rate, risk premium and term structure variables were found to 
be positively and statistically significantly correlated at the 5% level of significance – this too 
is expected as the variables are all related to the government bond return in some way. Despite 
the results of the correlation analysis, the step-wise regression procedure indicated that there 
are no redundant variables. As such, it would appear that the real interest rate, risk premium, 
term structure and investor sentiment variables accurately capture the variation in ALSI 
returns; hence model (2) is the superior model in explaining ALSI returns. 
As an additional check, the correlation analysis between FEARS and the SAVI (Volatility 
Index) revealed a statistically significant relationship (Output (2), Table C10 in Appendix C) 
between the two variables. Thus, although FEARS was found to be statistically significant, the 
correlation analysis finds that this relationship could be driven by noise in the market rather 
than a true statistical relationship. 
SA’s history can be used to provide insight into the regression results. The discovery of gold 
and the formation of mining companies were the driving force behind the establishment of the 
JSE, which was primarily used to help mining companies with access to capital. The mining 
industry dominated the JSE and was responsible for the rapid growth in the number of listed 
companies, market capitalisation and liquidity (Vacu, 2007). Today, the JSE is still dominated 
by resource stocks which come with their own peculiarities (Auret & Sinclaire, 2006). 
Although mining formed the foundation of the JSE, according to Statistics South Africa it 
contributes a very small percentage to the country’s GDP; the financial services sector, on the 
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other hand, is the main contributor. The financial services sector operates in a challenging 
environment but has been measured to be resilient and strong despite this. Regulation and the 
country’s regulatory bodies play a critical role in this as many of the industries in the financial 
services sector are highly regulated and the South African Reserve Bank as well as industry 
regulatory bodies play a proactive supervisory role (International Monetary Fund, 2014). 
Interest rates appear to have strong explanatory power in the SA market; this is due to the fact 
that interest rates are the main policy instrument employed by the country’s reserve bank in 
achieving its mandate. Historically, interest rates were used as a means to curb inflation in the 
country; however, once inflation targeting was employed, movements in the interest rate have 
become more predictable as inflation targets are quite clear (Hanival & Maia, 2013). An 
increase in interest rates has an impact on both institutional and individual investors, as 
highlighted above. Interest rate changes will affect firms through the valuations channels, 
whereas individuals will be affected through the saving and consumption channels. 
The explanatory power of the risk premium is likely driven by the significant risks attached to 
investing in the SA market and hence investors require additional compensation to do so. 
Evidence from the Bank of America Merill Lynch (2015) indicates that SA is the eleventh 
riskiest country based on credit default risk, with a credit default swap spread of between 200 
and 500bps (there are only two countries with a CDS spread of greater than 500bps). According 
to The Institute of Risk Management South Africa (2015), the top 10 risks by likelihood (in 
descending order) include: corruption, unemployment, infrastructure, political and social 
instability, organised crime, cyber-attacks, financial mechanism, income disparity, 
urbanisation and data fraud. Those risks with the largest consequences, however, are 
corruption, failure in governance and unemployment. Any investor would be susceptible to 
those risks as well as the associated consequences; as such, investors require additional 
compensation for choosing to invest in SA. If this compensation is received, investors will 
choose to invest and this will drive positive movement in the stock market. 
Investor sentiment does have statistically significant explanatory power in this market, with 
the relationship with market returns being negative. This is expected as the SA FEARS index 
was constructed using mainly ‘negative’ economic words and hence the index captures 
negative sentiment. Thus any increases in negative sentiment towards the country will result in 
a negative impact on market returns. The strength of the financial services sector as well as its 
highly regulated nature implies that: 1) There should be good quality and complete information 
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available for investors to make informed decisions and 2) There should be an inherent level of 
investor trust in the regulations and repercussions for wrongdoing. As such, investor sentiment 
should not necessarily be a driver of financial performance. That being said, SA investors also 
appear to be strongly influenced by the country’s underlying political framework (Mlambo & 
Oshikoya, 2001), which has been somewhat compromised over the years. Therefore, the level 
of uncertainty or investor trust extends beyond one sector and is actually applicable to the entire 
economy, resulting in sentiment-driven financial performance. From a cultural perspective, 
South Africa is an individualist society as it scores 65 on the Individualism measure on 
Hofstede’s (2001) index; this implies that the market should be less affected by investor 
sentiment. Taken in conjunction with what has been outlined about the South African economy 
and stock market, it is likely that the effect of investor sentiment found is driven by economic 
uncertainty and not necessarily the culture of the country. 
Finally, the development of the SA stock market could be the reason behind the role of 
sentiment. Although there are strong characteristics present in the SA stock market, the factors 
used to define stock market development would indicate something different. Factors such as 
income level, gross domestic investment, banking sector development, market liquidity, 
political risk, law and order and bureaucratic quality are important determinants of a stock 
market’s development (Yartey, 2008). SA has one of the largest Gini coefficients indicating a 
large gap in income levels; the banking sector is highly developed which is seen to negatively 
impact stock market development as the one is seen as a substitute for the other as a mechanism 
for saving and investment; and as mentioned, there is significant political risk in the country. 
By these standards, it could be said that the SA stock market is relatively underdeveloped and 
hence is more susceptible to the effects of investor sentiment. 
The role interest rates plays in explaining ALSI returns has important implications for traders, 
particularly foreign exchange traders. A higher interest rate implies that there is more interest 
accrued on currency invested and therefore traders can earn larger profits. The regression 
results showed that there was a positive relationship between the interest rate variables and 
ALSI returns; hence, if traders were to apply the results of the model they would not only gain 
greater insight into the drivers of market returns but possibly predict the effects on the stock 
market following an interest rate announcement too. These regression results and trading 
implications would also be supported by monitoring other economic indicators such as the 
inflation rate and the unemployment rate. Traders are also able to use the explanatory power of 
investor sentiment in their predictions; the fact that investor sentiment plays a role in explaining 
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ALSI returns implies that there is a deviation from fundamentals. As such, traders need to 
model the deviations from fundamentals to exploit any possible arbitrage possibilities. For 
policymakers, these results highlight the important point that although interest rate changes are 
often used to curb inflation in an economy, there are secondary effects on the stock market 
which need to be monitored as well. The role that investor sentiment plays in explaining ALSI 
returns also affects policymakers in that the factors which make a country susceptible to the 
effects of investor sentiment could be addressed through various policy decisions. For South 
Africa specifically, policies to address the various risks which influence sentiment can be 
developed to lessen the effects of investor sentiment in the market. 
The insights into the South African market and the drivers thereof are broadly consistent with 
the regression results. The real interest rate, risk premium and term structure variables were 
found to be statistically significant and positively affect ALSI returns through the company 
valuation channel for institutions and the saving and consumption channels for individuals. The 
risk premium also the captures the unique risks of investing in South Africa and should 
investors receive this additional compensation they will choose to invest, hence there is a 
positive impact on ALSI returns. Investor sentiment, as measured by FEARS, was also found 
to be statistically significant and although there are aspects of the South African economy 
which make it ripe for the effects of investor sentiment, the analysis with the SAVI revealed 
that the result found could be indicative of noise trading and not necessarily a true statistical 
relationship. Traders are able to use the results of this regression to better understand and 
possibly predict the effects on the stock market following an interest rate announcement. 
Moreover, acknowledgement should be given to the role investor sentiment plays as it causes 
a deviation from fundamentals. Policymakers, on the other hand, will use this information to 
ensure their policy decisions have weighed the impact on the greater macro-economy. 
Furthermore, various factors which influence the magnitude of investor sentiment’s impact can 
also be addressed through policy reform which will have an impact on ALSI return as well. 
 
4.2 Selected G7 Nations 
4.2.1 Germany 
The regression results in Table 6 above show the two regression models; (1) and (2). Model 
(1) is the macroeconomic APT without the FEARS variable. This model explains about 49.4% 
of the variation in DAX returns; the real interest rate, risk premium, and term structure variables 
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were found to be statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. The constant, or 
intercept, was also found to be statistically significant albeit at the 10% level of significance. 
The risk premium and real interest rate were found to share a positive relationship with DAX 
returns; this implies that any increases in these variables would result in an increase in DAX 
returns. The link between these variables and DAX returns is similar to what has been seen in 
Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa. The term structure and intercept variables were found 
to share a negative relationship with DAX returns; this implies that any increases in these 
variables would result in a decrease in DAX returns. Model (2) is the macroeconomic APT 
with the FEARS variable included. This model explains 50.2% of the variation in DAX returns; 
this is higher than (1) implying that the inclusion of FEARS has improved the overall 
explanatory power of the model. The real interest rate, risk premium, and term structure 
variables were all found to be statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. Moreover, 
in (2) this relationship was found to be positive for all variables; however, the magnitude of 
the relationship for the real interest rate and risk premium variables appears to have been 
adversely affected. Surprisingly, the relationship between the term structure and DAX returns 
is now also positive, where it was negative in (1). Although the inclusion of the FEARS variable 
improved the explanatory power of the model, the variable itself was found to be statistically 
insignificant. 
As with all the countries, a correlation analysis was done to determine if there are any 
correlations amongst the variables (Table C6 in Appendix C). There appear to be a number of 
statistically significant correlations between variables; however, the magnitude of these 
correlations differ. FEARS is negatively and statistically significantly correlated at the 5% level 
of significance with DAX returns, industrial production, and the term structure variables. 
FEARS is also positively and statistically significantly correlated at the 5% level of 
significance with the real interest rate and risk premium variables. Moreover, the term structure 
variable is statistically significantly correlated at the 5% level of significance with both the real 
interest rate and the risk premium. It is likely that a number of the variables in this model are 
redundant. Through the step-wise regression analysis, it was revealed that the term structure 
variable is likely to be redundant. Therefore, it appears as though the real interest rate and risk 
premium variables capture the variation in DAX returns. As such, (2) is viewed as a superior 
model for explaining the variation in DAX returns. 
As an additional check, the correlation analysis between FEARS and the VDAX (Volatility 
Index) revealed a statistically significant relationship (Output (3), Table C10 in Appendix C) 
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between the two variables. Therefore, the regression and correlation results are congruent in 
that FEARS does not play an explanatory role in the market. 
In trying to reconcile the role interest rates play in Germany, it is important to understand that 
where other countries struggle with high inflation and hence use the interest rate as a tool to 
change this, Germany has very low inflation as well as very low interest rates. In an attempt to 
guard against possible deflation, action has actually been taken to decrease interest rates – 
essentially Germans are paying to keep their money in banks. This implies that: 1) The value 
of peoples’ savings is decreasing and 2) The value of life insurance policies are being adversely 
affected as they are achieving much lower yields. It is clear that there are dangers in having 
low interest rates; however, in Germany interest rates are also being used to influence its 
inflation. Given the role interest rates play and its impact on the banking and insurance sectors, 
it would naturally have a large impact on the country’s entire financial ecosystem. 
The risk premium of a country is based on the level of risk attached to conducting business or 
investing in that country. Given this, it seems unlikely that the risk premium variable would 
have statistically significant explanatory power in the German market. Using credit default risk 
as measure, the Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2015) found that Germany was the least likely 
to default on its debt. Similarly, the multiple bailouts given to its European neighbours during 
the Global Financial Crisis are an indicator of the strength and resilience of its stock market as 
well as its greater economy. Even though there is a small probability of default, the probability 
still exists and investors still require additional compensation for investing in risky assets – the 
risk premium variable likely explains this and hence is a statistically significant variable in the 
German market. 
There could be a number of reasons as to why investor sentiment did not explain DAX returns. 
The first could be that Germany as a country is less susceptible to the effects of investor 
sentiment, simply due to the nature and strong integrity of their stock market; countries with 
less market integrity appear to suffer the effects of investor sentiment that much more 
(Schmeling, 2008). With a strong market regulator, relatively sophisticated investors (Finter, 
Niessen-Ruenzi, & Ruenzi, 2011), and access to good quality and complete information it is 
possible that: 1) Investors are able to make informed and timeous decisions for themselves 
without the influence of others and 2) The strong presence of the regulatory body creates a 
level of trust inherent in investors. The second reason could be that FEARS simply does not 
capture investor sentiment in Germany accurately; perhaps an alternative measure of sentiment 
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would yield a different result. In fact, Finter, Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2011) construct an 
index using a variety of investor sentiment measures. Specifically, they employ a German 
consumer confidence index as a direct measure of sentiment as well as a number of market 
variables as proxies. The results show that their index had significant explanatory power in 
explaining the returns in a number of stocks, those that are both sensitive and insensitive to 
sentiment fluctuations. Finally, the lack of explanatory power of the FEARS could be driven 
by the culture of German people; Germans have been known to be quite methodical and logical 
in their thinking and planning which provides them with a much needed sense of security 
(Goethe Universitat, 2012). This could lend itself to a level of risk aversion in how they conduct 
business and invest in the stock market. Moreover, research has shown that many investors 
manage their investment portfolios themselves and spend at least 30 minutes a day reading 
financial magazines or watching financial news as a means to inform their investment decisions 
(De Bondt, Zurstassen, & Arzeni, 2001). This provides an indication of the level of 
sophistication of German investors and hence their likelihood of not behaving in an irrational 
manner. This implies that they do not behave as emotionally as perhaps other countries do. 
Moreover, the German culture is a highly individualistic one, scoring 67 on the Individualism 
dimension in Hofstede’s (2001) index. As such, the effect of investor sentiment on such a 
nation is expected to be small (Schmeling, 2008). The nature and participants in the German 
stock market, as well as the culture of the nation indicate that investor sentiment might not play 
as large an explanatory role in Germany as it does in other countries.  
The results of the regression as well as an overview of the Germany economy indicate that 
these results are both statistically and economically significant. The economic significance 
implies that understanding these results is critical for those participating in the capital market, 
such as traders, as well as those making policy decisions. The regression results showed that 
investor sentiment, as measured by FEARS, did not have statistically significant explanatory 
power for DAX returns. A number of different explanations were offered for this result, 
specifically the strength of the economy, the culture of the people or that investor sentiment 
may be better captured using an alternative methodology. Even though investor sentiment 
played no role in explaining DAX returns, the regression results do provide insight into the 
Germany stock market and economy. 
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4.2.2 Japan 
The regression results in Table 6 above show the two regression models; (1) and (2). Model 
(1) is the macroeconomic APT without the FEARS variable. Unfortunately, the Adjusted-R2 
for this model is negative indicating that it lacks explanatory power completely. Consistent 
with this, no statistically significant variables were found in this model. Model (2) is the 
macroeconomic APT with the FEARS variable included. This model explains 14.8% of the 
variation in Nikkei return; this is higher than (1) implying that the inclusion of the FEARS 
variable has improved the explanatory power of the model. Only the FEARS variable was 
found to have statistically significant explanatory power, at the 5% level of significance. 
Furthermore, this relationship was found to be positive which means that any increases in 
FEARS will result in increases in Nikkei returns. During the construction of the FEARS index 
it was found that positive economic words had the greatest impact on market returns and hence 
these were the words included in the index. Therefore, the FEARS index for Japan can be 
thought of as ‘positive’ in nature. This explains why an increase in investor sentiment – which 
is positive in nature – would result in an increase in Nikkei returns; investors are optimistic 
about their current circumstances which makes them willing to invest, which in turn has a 
positive impact on Nikkei returns. 
The results of the correlation analysis (Table C7 in Appendix C) revealed a number of 
statistically significant correlations. The term structure and real interest rate variables were 
found to be negatively and statistically significantly correlated at the 5% level of significance; 
this is result is similar to what has been observed in other countries. The FEARS index was 
also found to be positively and statistically significantly correlated with Nikkei returns and the 
term structure variables at the 5% level of significance. A negative and statistically significant 
correlation was also found between FEARS and the real interest rate. Although a number of 
statistically significant correlations were found, the step-wise regression procedure indicated 
that none of the variables were redundant. Although (2) only has one statistically significant 
variable, it can be said to be a superior model in explaining the variation in Nikkei returns. 
As an additional check, the correlation analysis between FEARS and the Nikkei VIX 
(Volatility Index) revealed a statistically insignificant relationship (Output (4), Table C10 in 
Appendix C) between the two variables. Thus, this confirms that FEARS plays an explanatory 
role in Japan and that the relationship found is true in statistical nature and not caused by noise 
in the market. 
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The FEARS index was the only variable which displayed statistically significant explanatory 
power in the Japanese market; moreover, this relationship is positive. This is expected as the 
FEARS index was constructed using those words that had the largest impact on returns, which 
in this case were mostly ‘positive’ economic words. This implies that when there is an increase 
in sentiment, largely positive, it translates into action with a positive effect on market returns 
being observed. In trying to understand why investor sentiment explains returns, it is useful to 
consider which other behavioural biases Japanese investors suffer from. Research has shown 
that Japanese investors suffer from overconfidence, short-term bias, and herding. Individual 
investors tend to suffer from overconfidence, similar to their Chinese peers, as they tend to 
hold risky stocks, trade too frequently, and buy previous winners making the market susceptible 
to momentum trading (Kim, Kim, & Nofsinger, 2003). There has been a link made between 
overconfidence and the level of financial literacy in Japan; the results showed that the higher 
the investors’ financial literacy, the lower their overconfidence bias (Takeda, Takemura, & 
Kozu, 2013). This provides a solid foundation to combat the overconfidence present in the 
Japanese stock market – improve investment literacy by enhancing social systems such as 
investment education. In addition to overconfidence, Japanese investors, similar to most 
investors, suffer from loss aversion; investors feel more pain from losses than they feel joy 
from the same amount of gains (Toshimo & Suto, 2004). Behavioural biases are not unique to 
individual investors; institutional investors tend to suffer from a short-term bias in investment 
forecasting, herding and evaluating performance relative to one another, and self-marketing to 
improve the appearance of their portfolio when under pressure (Suto & Toshimo, 2005). The 
extent of herding behaviour has also been linked to a country’s susceptibility to the effects of 
sentiment; with the effects of investor sentiment being greater in those countries where herding 
behaviour is common (Schmeling, 2008). 
Survey evidence from State Street (2014) provides corroboration for the points highlighted 
above, as well as provides some additional insights: 
 The financial literacy score in Japan is in the ‘Failing’ bracket and is lower when 
compared to their Asian peers. 
 Japanese investors define investment success as only making gains and no losses; 
inconsistent with this is that 57% of their portfolio is allocated to cash which has little 
risk attached to it. 
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 There is a high degree of risk aversion as Japanese investors become increasingly 
conservative following losses and will only invest additional savings if markets went 
up significantly. 
Japanese investors, as a whole, appear to suffer from a number of behavioural biases when it 
comes to financial and investment decision making. A possible explanation could be 
participation in the stock market which is driven by: 1) The perceived level of risk in the market 
and 2) Financial literacy. Research has shown that the Japanese market is of a lower quality 
with respect to both efficiency and fairness when compared to the US (Yano & Komatsubara, 
2014). This is clearly reflected if one considers the portfolio allocation of Japanese investors: 
57% of their portfolio is allocated to cash, with only 25% being allocated to the equity market 
in the form of shares (State Street, 2014). Moreover, those who have low financial literacy are 
significantly less likely to invest in stocks (van Rooij, Lusardi, & Alessie, 2011). Culturally, 
the Japanese are viewed to be a collectivist society, scoring 46 on the Individualism dimension 
on Hofstede’s (2001) culture index. A lower score on this dimension is often associated with 
larger effects of investor sentiment (Schmeling, 2008). Overall, Japan’s susceptibility to the 
effects of investor sentiment can be explained by a potential lack of investment literacy, the 
prevalence of several behavioural and psychological biases, and its collectivist culture. 
The results of the regression as well as some insight into Japanese investors indicate that these 
results are likely to be both statistically and economically significant. The regression results 
showed that investor sentiment, as measured by FEARS, was a statistically significant 
explanatory variable. There are a number of reasons offered as to why this could be the case – 
overconfidence, a possible lack of investment literacy, and a level of risk aversion. Logically, 
however, if an investor lacks investment literacy there will be a higher reliance on behavioural 
and psychological biases when making financial decisions; this could very well be the case for 
Japanese investors. The regression results and accompanying analysis about the Japanese 
market and its investors has yielded great insight. 
Attention should also be paid to the fact that the sample size of the Japan analysis was limited 
compared to most of the other countries under examination. 
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4.2.3 United Kingdom 
The regression results in Table 6 above show the two regression models; (1) and (2). Model 
(1) is the macroeconomic APT model without the FEARS variable. This model explains 0% of 
the variation in FTSE returns; moreover, no variables were found to be statistically significant. 
Model (2) is the macroeconomic APT model with the inclusion of the FEARS variable. This 
model explains 31.1% of the variation in FTSE returns; this is higher than (1) implying that 
that including the FEARS variable increases the explanatory power of the model. The industrial 
production and FEARS variables were found to be statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance. The relationship between industrial production and FTSE returns was found to be 
positive which indicates that any increases in industrial production will result in increases in 
FTSE returns. Conversely, the relationship between FEARS and FTSE returns was found to be 
negative, implying that any increases in FEARS will result in decreases in FTSE returns. This 
inverse relation is explained by the construction of the FEARS index for the UK; during the 
construction process is was found that negative words play the largest role in explaining FTSE 
returns and hence those were the words included in the index. As such, the FEARS variable 
can be said to be ‘negative’ in nature and hence any increases in negativity would result in an 
adverse effect on FTSE returns. 
The results of the correlation analysis (Table C8 in Appendix C) indicate that although there 
were a number of statistically significant correlations between variables, there are no redundant 
variables present. The industrial production variable was found to be correlated with all 
variables, barring the FEARS index, at the 5% level of significance; this could possibly 
reiterate the role industrial production plays in the UK economy. Its strongest correlation, 
however, was with the inflation variable which is expected due to both variables capturing the 
rising price of goods. The term structure and risk premium variables were found to be 
negatively and statistically significantly correlated at the 5% level of significance; this is likely 
due to the relationship both variables share with the government bond return. Given the 
analysis, it would appear that the variation in FTSE returns is best captured by (2). 
As an additional check, the correlation analysis between FEARS and the FTSE VIX (Volatility 
Index) revealed a statistically significant relationship (Output (5), Table C10 in Appendix C) 
between the two variables. Thus, although FEARS was found to be statistically significant, the 
correlation analysis finds that this relationship could be driven by noise in the market rather 
than a true statistical relationship. 
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The negative relationship found between FEARS and FTSE returns was small in magnitude, 
but the direction is logically explained; the FEARS index was constructed using words which, 
when tested, had a large negative impact on returns. As such, any increases in sentiment (which 
is essentially negative) will result in adverse effects on the stock market. When investors are 
pessimistic about the stock market, they turn to alternative investment or savings mechanisms 
which, in turn negatively affects the stock market and the associated returns. The UK market 
is seen as quite a sophisticated and mature stock market with strong regulatory oversight; this 
begs the question of why UK investors are behaving in an irrational manner? There is evidence 
that both answers and refutes that specific question. In answering why UK investors behave 
irrationally, research has shown that UK investors have a clear understanding of the risk-return 
relationship; however many were not clear about what those risks actually were and took a 
short-term view to investing as long-term investing meant they could not access their capital. 
There is also a low level of knowledge and understanding of investment products and many 
investors tend to be risk averse (Collard, 2009). A lack of understanding implies that instead 
of making logical and rational decisions, UK investors make irrational ones as they cannot 
process financial information and make an informed decision. As a result, they may be more 
driven by sentiment than logic and sound reasoning. Conversely, there is evidence to show that 
the UK investor is in fact a sophisticated one. Research has shown that UK investors are highly 
risk tolerant and patient investors (Hens, Rieger, & Wang, 2015) who manage their own 
investment portfolios and spend time gathering financial information from various sources to 
inform their investment decisions (De Bondt, Zurstassen, & Arzeni, 2001). This implies that 
they are willing to accept a level of risk provided it is a calculated one which has been informed 
by the processing of financial information. Culturally, the UK is even more individualistic than 
Germany. The UK scored 87 on the Individualism dimension of Hofstede’s (2001) culture 
index. In an instance such as this one, the effects of investor sentiment on market returns is 
expected to be small (Schmeling, 2008). The opposing hypotheses, taken in conjunction with 
the relationship found between FEARS and FTSE VIX as well as the cultural angle, indicate 
that perhaps noise trading is the reason behind the result. 
The regression results and insight provided into the UK market indicate that these results are 
both statistically and economically significant. The regression results showed that investor 
sentiment, as measured by FEARS, had explanatory power for FTSE returns. There is evidence 
that investors in the UK can behave both rationally and irrationally, and given the results of the 
FEARS and FTSE VIX correlation analysis it would appear that noise trading could be present. 
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Despite this, the regression results and discussion has provided keen insight into the UK stock 
market and economy. 
 
4.2.4 United States 
The regression results in Table 6 above show the two regression models; (1) and (2). Model 
(1) is the macroeconomic APT without the FEARS variable. This model explains 23.5% of the 
variation in S&P500 returns; unfortunately only the intercept was found to be statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significance. Model (2) is the macroeconomic APT with the 
inclusion of the FEARS variable. This model explains 33.6% of the variation in S&P500 
returns; this is higher than (1) implying that the inclusion of the FEARS variable has increased 
the explanatory power of the model. Similar to (1), the intercept was found to be statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significance. Moreover, investor sentiment, as measured by 
FEARS, was also found to be statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. This 
relationship was also found to be negative in nature – this is as a result of the index construction 
process. When determining the words to be included, the regression revealed that negative 
economic words had the greatest impact on market returns and hence those were the words that 
were included. As such, it could be said that the FEARS index for the United States measures 
‘negative’ sentiment. This explains why an increase in investor sentiment has a negative impact 
on S&P500 returns; investors are pessimistic about the current state which is captured in the 
search volume data for each word. 
The results of correlation analysis (Table C9 in Appendix C) show that there are a number of 
statistically significant correlations. Specifically, the term structure variable was found to be 
negatively and statistically significantly correlated to both the real interest rate and term 
structure variables at the 5% level of significance. This is similar to what has been observed in 
other countries as these variables are related to each other through the government bond return. 
FEARS and the risk premium variables were also found to be negatively and statistically 
correlated to the S&P500 return series at the 5% level of significance. The step-wise regression 
procedure indicated that the risk premium variable, although not statistically significant, is 
likely to be redundant. The analysis indicates that (2) is the superior model for explaining the 
variation in S&P500 returns and investor sentiment plays a statistically significant and 
explanatory role in this. 
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As an additional check, the correlation analysis between FEARS and the S&P500 VIX 
(Volatility Index) revealed a statistically significant relationship (Output (6), Table C10 in 
Appendix C) between the two variables. Thus, although FEARS was found to be statistically 
significant, the correlation analysis finds that this relationship could be driven by noise in the 
market rather than a true statistical relationship. 
The results of the US regression model can be broadly compared to the results found by Chen, 
Roll, and Ross (1986). The authors found that industrial production, changes in the risk 
premium and the term structure of rates have significant power in explaining stock returns. 
These results do no correlate with those found in regression model (2) as only the intercept was 
found to be statistically significant. The differences in result could be due to the difference 
between the data sources used, as well as the time period for each study. As surprising as this 
result is, this study is not the first to find no statistically significant relationship between 
numerous macroeconomic variables and the S&P 500 – Fitzpatrick (1994) had a similar 
outcome. In terms of the variables utilised, Fitzpatrick (1994) focused on growth in corporate 
earnings, gross national product, money supply, CPI, 3 month Treasury bill, and the treasury 
composite. Although there is some overlap in the variables used, the main outcome was similar 
– no significant relationship could be found between macroeconomic variables and the S&P 
500 index. 
The negative relationship between FEARS and market returns can be explained based on how 
the FEARS index was constructed. Although the initial word list included both positive and 
negative economic words, only those which have the largest impact on returns were included. 
For the US this happened to be words that had strong and negative relationships with market 
returns. Hence any increases in FEARS sentiment – largely negative – would have a negative 
impact on the market as investors would be averse to investing when sentiment is low. The 
effects of investor sentiment in the US have been widely studied and the literature has shown 
that investor sentiment, especially in the US, can be measured using a variety of measures. This 
indicates that investor sentiment research in the US is far more advanced than a number of the 
other countries examined in this study. This raises questions about the country’s susceptibility 
to the effects of investor sentiment. 
Hens, Rieger, and Wang (2015) conducted research into the psychology of investing in various 
countries around the world. US investors were found to be willing to pay more for equities than 
investors in European countries; implying that US investors are more risk tolerant than their 
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European counterparts. Interestingly, the US was found to have more “Ego-Traders” than 
elsewhere; the US was found to be more individualistic which drives a culture of seeking quick 
gains and having very little patience when it comes to making financial decisions. This implies 
that once information has been received, regardless of the source, very little time is given to 
properly analysing data to understand its financial implication. Instead, it appears as though 
decisions are made very quickly to avoid losing out on any potential financial gains. Stock 
market participation is also a function of trust in the market and its regulatory bodies, which 
American investors seem to lack (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008). Investors fear being 
cheated by other capital market participants, this is particularly so with wealthy investors which 
affects the inflow of capital into the economy. A lack of trust coupled with impatience in 
making financial decisions may result in a reliance on the so-called ‘rumour-mill’ to fuel 
investment decisions which results in a momentum-driven economy. Support for the presence 
of momentum in the market can be provided by understanding the link between a highly 
individualistic society, such as the US, and the magnitude of momentum profits. The US was 
found to be highly individualistic through Hofstede’s (2001) culture index, scoring 91 on the 
dimension. Moreover, individualism was found to be positively associated with magnitude of 
momentum profits (Chui, Titman, & John Wei, 2010). The individualistic nature of US 
investors causes them to be highly susceptible to multiple cognitive and psychological biases, 
making the country more susceptible to the effects of investor sentiment. 
The results of the regression as well as some insight into American investors indicate that these 
results are likely to be both statistically and economically significant. The regression results 
showed that investor sentiment, as measured by FEARS, was a statistically significant 
explanatory variable. There are a number of reasons offered as to why this could be the case – 
the level of risk aversion of US investors which drives irrational decisions, a lack of trust in the 
market, its participants and its regulatory bodies, and a possible reliance on the rumour-mill to 
inform financial decisions. Moreover, the relationship found between FEARS and S&P500 
returns could be as a result of noise trading and hence not indicative of a true statistical 
relationship. That being said, the regression analysis and information about the US market has 
definitely yielded insight into the market and the market participants. 
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4.3 Discussion of Results 
Upon considering the results of all the countries above, it becomes clear that there are several 
key outcomes and implications which emerge from this study’s results. 
The first of these being that different macroeconomic variables can be used to explain a 
country’s returns; this is based on what is driving that country’s stock market as well as its 
economy as a whole. There were some consistencies between countries – risk premium, term 
structure and real interest rate were found to have explanatory power in five out of the nine 
countries. Other variables such as inflation and industrial production also demonstrated 
explanatory power in certain countries. With regards to the number of variables found to be 
statistically significant, these results are consistent with those uncovered by Chen, Roll, and 
Ross (1986) – three strong explanatory variables and a fourth slightly weaker variable.  
Moreover, many of the relationships found are not only statistically significant but 
economically significant as well. The statistical relationship found between a specific variable 
and a country’s stock market can be explained using macroeconomic theory. In a number of 
countries, the term structure and real interest rate variables were found to be statistically 
significant. This has economic significance as this relationship can be explained by exploring 
both the institutional as well as individual effects. Company valuations, using the discounted 
cash flow methodology, will be affected by changes in interest rates which will in turn affect a 
firm’s stock price. Seeing that interest rates are a macroeconomic lever a country’s central bank 
will pull, it is likely that many companies’ valuations will be affected. As a result, the indices 
which represent a country’s stock market will also be affected. A change in interest rates will 
also serve to change consumer spending behaviour. For example, higher interest rates will 
encourage consumers to save rather than spend, as the interest rates on deposit accounts or 
investments will be higher. As such, there will be an inflow of money into financial instruments 
of various types, where previously the money was flowing into the economy in the form of 
consumption. 
The risk premium was also found to be a statistically significant explanatory variable in 
multiple countries. The reason for this lies in what exactly a risk premium captures; the risk 
premium is a form of compensation offered to investors for investing in risky assets. The 
positive relationship found between the risk premium and a country’s market return captures 
an investor’s behaviour when this risk premium is on offer; when an investor has the 
opportunity to receive additional compensation for investing in an asset, the investor will 
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choose to do so. Consequently, the investor opts to invest in the asset which has a positive 
impact on market returns. 
Russia was the only country where inflation appeared to have statistically significant 
explanatory power for the country’s market returns. Inflation is an important factor in the 
development of a stock market (Vasiliev, 2010) and a low inflation rate is indicative of 
macroeconomic stability (Yartey, 2008). Russia’s inflation rate, however, is extremely high 
which indicates a level of macroeconomic instability in the country. Their historically high 
inflation rates have been crippling to the economy and have not yet stabilised to the point where 
it encourages economic development. The positive relationship between inflation and Micex 
returns found is also inconsistent with what theory dictates in the short-term – high inflation 
rates reduce an individual’s purchasing power, this actually has a negative impact on stock 
prices as investors require a higher rate of return as part of the return is being eroded by the 
higher inflation rate. In the longer term, however, the additional costs are passed to consumers 
and hence stock prices will tend to increase in line with the inflation rate. A further explanation 
is that during periods of rising inflation, a country’s central bank will often increase interest 
rates to curb this increase. This also serves to attract investors to save their cash in fixed income 
instruments, so there is actually an inflow of capital into the stock market 
Furthermore, China was the only country where the oil price displayed statistically significant 
explanatory power for the country’s market returns. There is some evidence to indicate that oil 
price shocks do have an impact on market returns in China (Broadstock & Fillis, 2014; Yun & 
Yoon, 2015). The economic significance of this relationship, however, is interesting as it stems 
from the building blocks of the Chinese economy. The oil sector plays an important role in 
China’s economy and has also been the focus of major structural reforms and high-level 
attention from the government. Despite the policy reforms towards more market-oriented oil 
sector, government ownership, limited foreign investment, and inefficient expansion strategies 
still characterise the industry. Since 1979, China’s demand for oil has surpassed its oil 
production which has resulted in China becoming one of the top importers of oil in the world. 
The magnitude of China’s demand for oil has dire implications, as their influence on and 
vulnerability to the international oil market is significant. Moreover, this discrepancy between 
demand and domestic supply is only getting larger, leaving China with tough choices to 
conquer their energy crisis (Soligo & Jaffe, 2004). China’s history with oil as well as the 
challenges it will face going forward provides an explanation of why the oil price may affect 
the performance of the country’s stock market. 
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Finally, industrial production was found to play a statistically significant explanatory role in 
only one market, the UK. The explanation behind this result can be found in the history of the 
British economy. A major contributor to the development of the UK economy dates back to 
the Industrial Revolution, as well access to natural resources used for both domestic use as well 
as international trade. This resulted in industrial innovations that surpassed other countries; the 
UK became the first nation in the world to industrialise its economy (Lohia, 2013). As the first 
movers, the UK economy experienced substantial growth which has catapulted them into being 
considered one of the largest economies in the world. Its economy is primarily driven by the 
services industry; financial and professional services (76.9%), industrial sector (19.7%), 
agriculture (0.6%) (CIA World Fact Book, 2015). As such it is expected that, given its history 
and how that has been translated into revenue, that industrial production would have a positive 
impact on market returns in the UK.  
It has been shown that the results uncovered in this study are both statistically and economically 
significant. Their economic significance implies that these results can be used by various 
stakeholders to fuel their decisions. These results would be of particular significance to traders 
and policy decision makers. The regression results revealed that the term structure of rates, real 
interest rate, risk premium, inflation, industrial production and the oil price have statistically 
significant explanatory power in various countries. This implies that a trader, using this 
information, would be in a position to predict future market movements given changes in any 
of these variables. Ultimately, these results would allow a trader to maximise their potential 
trading profits. It is also critical to remember that these variables do not act in isolation in a 
country’s economy; it is the interconnections between these variables which also present 
traders with the opportunity to time the market. In addition to implications for traders, these 
results also have implications for those in policy decision making positions. These results 
provide insight to such individuals as to the key drivers of a particular country; although a 
number of similarities were found, some key differences were found too likely driven each 
individual country’s history and development. These results would provide policy decision 
makers with a holistic view of the aspects which could affect their country’s economy; which 
will allow them to plan and draft policy accordingly. It will ensure that policy is drafted with 
the country’s best interests in mind as these policy decisions could go beyond the stock market 
and could extend to the overall economy, the judicial system as well as regulatory bodies. 
Given the history and current state of some of the countries explored in this study, fair and 
well-thought out policy would encourage strong and sustainable economic growth. 
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Identification of these country-specific policy implications was made possible purely by the 
international nature of this study as it allowed for a greater understanding of various 
international markets. 
The second outcome is around the measurement of investor sentiment. The literature section 
outlined the numerous methodologies available for one to measure investor sentiment, with 
each measure capturing something different. Using Google data as a source for investor 
sentiment relies on a number of factors, including but not limited to: 1) High levels of Internet 
usage in the country; 2) User activities on the Internet; and 3) The use of Google as a search 
engine. To the first point, Internet usage has been on an increasing trend in most countries 
especially as accessibility improves and technology progresses. The specific activities of a user 
on the Internet will also affect the data compiled by Google Trends; if users in one country use 
the Internet more for transacting as opposed information gathering then this would influence 
the search volume data of the economic words chosen. Furthermore, the choice of search 
engine is entirely a personal preference for many; the only anomaly in this case was China as 
Google is one of the numerous websites banned in the country (this ban applies to mainland 
China only and excludes Hong Kong and Macau). As such, it may be the case that investor 
sentiment in China can be better explained using an alternative measure, perhaps market 
variables. Similarly, this could be case for any of the countries where FEARS was not found 
to have any statistical significance. Nevertheless, FEARS was found to have explanatory power 
in five out of the nine countries, specifically Russia, SA, Japan, UK, and the US. A final point 
regarding the measurement of investor sentiment relates to the fundamental construction of the 
FEARS index. In their study, Da, Engelberg and Gao (2015) found that, despite including both 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ economic words, the strongest relationship found between a search 
word and the market was found to be negative in nature. This provides support for literature 
which posits that negative words tend to be more effective in identifying sentiment (Tetlock, 
2007). The same result was uncovered in this study, albeit for six out of the nine countries. 
Contrary to what is expected, this relationship was found to be positive in nature for the 
remaining three countries (Russia, China and Japan). This finding highlights that each 
country’s stock market has its own unique drivers and that both positive and negative sentiment 
can be captured using search data. 
Finally, no clear link could be made between the classification of a country (developed versus 
developing) and the explanatory power of investor sentiment in that country. In the BRICS 
countries, Russia and SA were the only two countries where FEARS played an explanatory 
138 
 
role in the stock market. Similarly out of the G7 countries chosen, FEARS had explanatory 
power in three out of the four countries – specifically in Japan, UK and the US. Even though 
this distinction could not be made, there are other characteristics of a countries’ economy which 
could influence its susceptibility to the effects of investor sentiment such as, the country’s 
economic and political climate and stability, the level of trust investors have in the stock market 
and its regulatory bodies, the level of access and quality of information available, and 
individual investor behaviour. 
Overall, the results are a mix between whether investor sentiment, as measured by the FEARS 
index, as an APT factor is feasible in explaining returns. In five out of the nine countries 
examined, it can be concluded that there is statistically significant explanatory power of the 
investor sentiment factor. Unfortunately, for the remaining four countries this is not the case. 
Overall, it would be useful to increase the sample to include other countries to have a clear 
indication of investor sentiment’s explanatory power as an APT factor. Nevertheless, the 
results address both the problem as well as the objective outlined; the statistical testing 
demonstrated the explanatory power, or lack thereof, of various factors in the APT, including 
investor sentiment.  
China remains an anomaly as Google is one of the websites China has banned (this ban applied 
to the mainland only as it excludes Hong Kong and Macau). For the remaining countries, 
consideration must be given to the fact that investor sentiment could be better captured and 
measured using an alternative method or alternatively, the country itself is not as susceptible 
to the effects of investor sentiment as others are. These results have confirmed that a measure 
of macroeconomic investor sentiment has a role in explaining asset prices and their associated 
returns; this makes a valuable contribution to the existing literature on the APT and which 
factors can be used under this framework. The results have also confirmed that three to four 
factors is the optimal number when deciding on how many factors to include under the APT 
framework. The results also add to the existing literature on the individual countries, 
specifically with regards to the macroeconomic drivers of the country and its stock market. 
As an aside, these results have provided insight into the inner workings of a country’s economy 
and stock market as well as allowed for comparisons across countries. This was made possible 
by the individual APT models created for each country and would not have been possible if an 
IAPT was created for BRICS and the G7 countries as it would not have had the level of detail 
incorporated into each country’s APT models. 
139 
 
5 Conclusion 
Asset pricing can be broadly defined as a collection of theories whose aim is to determine the 
fair price of an asset. Moreover, there is a close relationship between the fundamental value of 
an asset and the appropriate return that asset should earn. It is important to note the difference 
between the fundamental value of an asset and the price of the asset as it is observed in the 
market. Generally, theories tend to be focused more on the fundamental value of an asset; 
whereas asset pricing theories, such as the APT, are widely used to explain observed or market 
prices. The understanding of asset prices and returns is fundamental to an economy as it affects 
asset allocation, the allocation of resources, the measurement and management of financial 
risks, and influences individuals’ decision making on a daily basis; as such, it is critical that, 
using asset pricing, a more thorough understanding of the risk-return relationship is gained. 
Traditional finance theory surrounding the risk-return relationship is underpinned by the 
CAPM which posits that a single risk factor, specifically market risk, is priced into asset 
returns. The CAPM has been widely criticised due to its unrealistic assumptions and the APT 
was developed to address the CAPM’s weaknesses. The most significant difference between 
the two models is that the APT allows for a multitude of risk factors to be priced into asset 
returns. This implies that the APT framework can be used to model returns using either 
macroeconomic or microeconomic factors. As such, the APT allows for non-traditional factors, 
such as investor sentiment, to be included. A macroeconomic APT framework was used as the 
base for this study; a framework was developed for nine countries – Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States – using the 
variables outlined by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986). Thereafter, an investor sentiment variable 
was included, specifically the FEARS index created by Da, Engelberg and Gao (2015) . The 
FEARS index is constructed for each country using the search volume data from Google Trends 
for a specific list of positive and negative economic words. As such, this index reflects the 
household economic sentiment of a specific country. Regression testing was employed to test 
the hypothesis of whether FEARS, or rather investor sentiment, is a statistically significant 
explanatory variable in the APT models for the respective countries. 
The results show that different macroeconomic variables explain the returns in different 
countries. The variables which had explanatory power in multiple countries include the real 
interest rate, risk premium, and term structure of rates. Variables such as inflation, industrial 
production, and the oil price had explanatory power, albeit in few countries. All the variables 
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found to be statistically significant throughout the analysis were also found to be economically 
significant as these variables play a critical role in a well-functioning economy. The inclusion 
of the FEARS index as an explanatory variable into the regression had mixed results. In some 
cases, it improved the explanatory power of the regression model and in some cases it did not. 
Moreover, the improvement on the model also varied in magnitude across the countries. The 
FEARS index had statistically significant explanatory power in five out of the nine countries 
under examination; specifically, Russia, South Africa, Japan, the UK, and the US. This implies 
that, in these countries, investor sentiment can be used as a factor in explaining market returns 
and hence the hypotheses outlined previously do hold in each of these five countries. 
Specifically, in Russia and Japan investor sentiment was found to have a positive relationship 
with stock market returns – potentially driven by the fact that each country’s FEARS index 
was ‘positive’ in nature. Whereas in South Africa, the UK and the US the relationship between 
investor sentiment and market returns was found to be negative – this could also be driven by 
the fact that each country’s FEARS index was ‘negative’ in nature. For the remaining countries 
– Brazil, India, China, and Germany – FEARS did not appear to have any statistical 
significance in explaining market returns. This implies that, in these countries, investor 
sentiment cannot be used to explain market returns and hence the hypotheses outlined 
previously do not hold in each of these four countries. Given that investor sentiment was found 
to be statistically significant in five out of the nine countries examined, the primary hypothesis 
can be declared valid for these five countries, based on the assessment criteria outlined 
previously. As such, it can be said that investor sentiment, as an APT factor, is feasible in 
explaining returns in five out of the nine countries examined. Unfortunately, no statistically 
significant relationship was found in the remaining four countries. Overall, it would be useful 
to increase the sample to include other countries to have a clear indication of investor 
sentiment’s explanatory power as an APT factor. Finally, no clear link could be established 
between the classification of a country as developed or developing and the explanatory power 
of investor sentiment. 
Despite a mix in the statistical significance of the results, it is clear that the study and its results 
addressed the problem and objectives outlined in Section 1.1. The problem facing many 
existing and traditional asset pricing models is that they are grounded in an assumption of a 
completely rational investor. Asset pricing models do not take into account the effect an 
irrational investor could have on explaining market returns. Considering investor sentiment, 
measured by the FEARS index, as a factor in an APT model will provide great insight into the 
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effect that investors’ thoughts and beliefs may have on determining market returns. Hence, the 
objective is to determine whether investor sentiment has explanatory power for market returns 
in various countries around the world. More generally, however, the objective is the feasibility 
of various APT factors, including investor sentiment, in explaining market returns and not the 
creation of an APT model. The results of the statistical testing demonstrated investor 
sentiment’s explanatory power, or lack thereof, in the countries under examination, thereby 
addressing the objective of this study. 
The results yielded in this study add to the body of literature on the APT as well as country-
specific literature. It was found that investor sentiment is a statistically significant in explaining 
asset prices and their associated returns, in various countries. Additionally, in alignment with 
previous literature, it was found that three to four factors are optimal when using the APT 
framework to explain asset prices and returns. As such, this study contributes to APT literature 
by confirming the explanatory power of investor sentiment in the market as well as support for 
research into the optimal number of factors under the APT framework. In seeking an 
explanation for these results, the individual nuances of the countries under examination were 
highlighted; this provided great insight into the countries themselves as well as provided an 
understanding of the individual drivers of a given country’s macro-economy and stock market. 
These results also have trading and policy implications. For traders, the ability to understand 
the effect that macroeconomic variables have on the stock market as well as the role investor 
sentiment may play in a country enables the trader to predict any possible changes and hence 
maximise profits. For example, the real interest rate, risk premium and term structure of rates 
variables were found to be statistically significant in numerous countries. The statistically 
significant relationship found between these variables and stock market returns could be 
exploited by traders in their trading activities. The policy implications would be different for 
each country; however these results could influence economic, stock market, judicial and 
regulatory decisions. Moreover, policy decision makers could use these results to ensure that 
they are developing policy which is holistic, considers all potential impacts, and is in the best 
interests of the country. For example, in countries that were found to be more susceptible to 
the effects of investor sentiment, policies can be drafted to improve the robustness of regulatory 
bodies such that it encourages a level of trust from investors that any wrong doing will be 
rectified correctly. A greater level of trust in the stock market and its operations implies that: 
1) Investors will feel more secure in investing on the stock market, which have a positive 
impact on the stock market and 2) The quality of investment decisions made by investors will 
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improve, theoretically weakening the effects of investor sentiment on the stock market. A 
further example is designing monetary policy such that it does not have a negative impact on 
the stock market, but is still in the best interest of the consumer. 
This study has yielded insight into the individual intricacies of the economies and stock markets 
of the countries examined; these insights have then further been applied to both the trading and 
policy making environments. Ultimately, this study was able to provide a greater understanding 
of the drivers of a country’s economy and stock market, which was made possible by the 
individual APT models constructed for each country. This level of insight would not have been 
achieved under the IAPT; the ambiguity of the empirical testing would have highlighted more 
questions to be answered as opposed to providing insight into the individual countries. 
An unfortunate delimitation to this study is the data sampling. This is regarded as a limitation 
for two reasons. Firstly, the sample size was relatively small due to the data availability; 
however, should alternative data sources be found – particularly the high yield bond index used 
to calculate the risk premium – then the sample size could be increased. Secondly, the sample 
periods were not consistent across countries; this makes direct comparability between countries 
an issue. Once again, this was driven by the availability of data sources and should be remedied 
with alternative data sources. A further delimitation lies in the international nature of this study; 
the oil price for each country was denominated in each country’s respective currency which 
opens the door for possible exchange rate risk. 
5.1 Considerations for Further Research 
An interesting extension to this study would be to conduct further research to consider the 
concept of volatility spill over or the contagion effect between countries. Volatility spill over, 
or the contagion effect, refers to the fact that the volatility experienced in a given market could 
be explained by events taking place in other countries (Bekaert & Harvey, 1997). Investor 
sentiment is not a factor that is often captured in return processes, whether the CAPM or APT, 
so its effects would likely be captured in the error term of the model, assuming sentiment to 
play a role in the returns generating process. Without the investor sentiment factor, the effects 
of good or bad news shocks in these models have to be modelled using volatility spill over 
models, such as the ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic) family of models. 
This could provide explanation into two important aspects of financial markets: 
143 
 
1. If an investor sentiment factor is included in the model from the outset it could negate 
the need to run specific volatility spill over models, as well as provide an indication of 
how news shocks in one country affects other countries. 
2. Much of the existing literature declares the US to be the economic powerhouse of the 
world, driving a large part of economic and financial movements. However, Asian 
markets such as China and Japan have been gaining traction at rapid rates. It would be 
interesting to see if there has been a shift in the economic and financial powerhouses of 
the world, from the US to either, China or Japan. 
The international nature of this study allows for a cultural lens to be applied in understanding 
why investor sentiment has explanatory power in some countries and not in others. The body 
of evidence to support this is relatively new; however, it has proven that culture can affect 
economics and finance in a number of ways and may provide further insight into why investor 
sentiment plays an explanatory role in some countries and not in others. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Description of Data Sets Used 
Country Variable Data Set Abbreviation Frequency Source 
All 
Investor Sentiment – 
FEARS 
Google SVI FEARS Weekly/Monthly Google Trends 
Brazil 
Market Index Bovespa IBOV Monthly Bloomberg 
Risk Free Rate 1 year government bond RF Monthly Bloomberg 
Long-term Government 
Bond 
10 year government bond LTB Monthly Bloomberg 
Inflation National Consumer Price Index INF Monthly Brazil Institute of 
Geography and Statistics Industrial Production Industrial Production IP Monthly 
Return on high yield 
bonds 
Bloomberg High Yield Emerging 
Market Corporate Bond Index 
BEAC Monthly Bloomberg 
Oil Price Oil price BOP Monthly World Bank 
Russia 
Market Index MICEX MICEX Monthly Bloomberg 
Risk Free Rate 1 year government bond RF Monthly Bloomberg 
Long-term Government 
Bond 
10 year government bond LTB Monthly Bloomberg 
Inflation Inflation INF Monthly 
Russian State Statistics 
Service 
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Industrial Production Domestic PPI IP Monthly 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
Return on high yield 
bonds 
Bloomberg High Yield Emerging 
Market Corporate Bond Index 
BEAC Monthly Bloomberg 
Oil Price Oil price ROP Monthly World Bank 
India 
Market Index Nifty Nifty Monthly Bloomberg 
Risk Free Rate 1 year government bond RF Monthly Bloomberg 
Long-term Government 
Bond 
10 year government bond LTB Monthly Bloomberg 
Inflation Inflation INF Monthly 
Bureau of Labour 
Statistics 
Industrial Production Producer Price Index IP Monthly 
Ministry of Statistics, 
Government of India 
Return on high yield 
bonds 
Bloomberg High Yield Emerging 
Market Corporate Bond Index 
BEAC Monthly Bloomberg 
Oil Price Oil price IOP Monthly World Bank 
China 
Market Index Shanghai SE Composite Index SSE Monthly Bloomberg 
Risk Free Rate 1 year government bond RF Monthly Bloomberg 
Long-term Government 
Bond 
10 year government bond LTB Monthly Bloomberg 
Inflation Consumer Price Index INF Monthly 
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Industrial Production Producer Price Index IP Monthly 
National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 
Return on high yield 
bonds 
Barclays Asia High Yield Bond 
Index 
AHYG Monthly Bloomberg 
Oil Price Oil price COP Monthly World Bank 
South Africa 
Market Index All Share Index  ALSI Monthly JSE 
Risk Free Rate 3 month government bond RF Monthly SA Reserve Bank 
Long-term Government 
Bond 
10 year government bond LTB Monthly Bloomberg 
Inflation Consumer Price Index INF Monthly StatsSA 
Industrial Production Producer Price Index IP Monthly 
Bureau of Economic 
Research 
Return on high yield 
bonds 
Bloomberg High Yield Emerging 
Market Corporate Bond Index 
BEAC Monthly Bloomberg 
Oil Price Oil price SOP Monthly World Bank 
Germany 
Market Index Deutscher Aktienindex DAX Monthly Bloomberg 
Risk Free Rate 1 year government bond RF Monthly Bloomberg 
Long-term Government 
Bond 
10 year government bond LTB Monthly Bloomberg 
Inflation Inflation IN Monthly 
German Statistics Office 
Industrial Production PPI IP Monthly 
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Return on high yield 
bonds 
Bloomberg Euro High Yield 
Corporate Bond Index 
BEUH Monthly Bloomberg 
Oil Price Oil price GOP Monthly World Bank 
Japan 
Market Index Nikkei 225 Nikkei Monthly Bloomberg 
Risk Free Rate 1 year government bond RF Monthly Bloomberg 
Long-term Government 
Bond 
10 year government bond LTB Monthly Bloomberg 
Inflation Consumer Price Index IN Monthly Japan Statistics Bureau 
Industrial Production Industrial Production IP Monthly 
Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry 
Return on high yield 
bonds 
Barclays Asia High Yield Bond 
Index 
AHYG Monthly Bloomberg 
Oil Price Oil price JOP Monthly World Bank 
United 
Kingdom 
Market Index FTSE 100 FTSE Monthly Bloomberg 
Risk Free Rate 1 year government bond RF Monthly Bloomberg 
Long-term Government 
Bond 
10 year government bond LTB Monthly Bloomberg 
Inflation Inflation IN Monthly 
Office for National 
Statistics 
Industrial Production Producer Price Index IP Monthly Eurostat 
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Return on high yield 
bonds 
Bloomberg Pound High Yield 
Corporate Bond Index 
BGBH Monthly Bloomberg 
Oil Price Oil price UKOP Monthly World Bank 
United States 
Market Index Standard & Poor’s 500 S&P 500 Monthly Bloomberg 
Risk Free Rate 1 year government bond RF Monthly Bloomberg 
Long-term Government 
Bond 
10 year government bond LTB Monthly Bloomberg 
Inflation Consumer Price Index INF Monthly 
US Bureau of Labour 
Statistics 
Industrial Production Industrial Production IP Monthly 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
Return on high yield 
bonds 
Bloomberg Dollar High Yield 
Corporate Bond Index 
BUHY Monthly Bloomberg 
Oil Price Oil price USOP Monthly World Bank 
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Appendix B 
This appendix outlines the top thirty search words that were used in the construction of the FEARS index per country. Given that the selection of 
words was informed by a regression analysis to test which words have the largest impact on market returns, the words differ across the various 
countries. 
Table B1: Top Thirty Words per Country used in FEARS Construction - BRICS 
Brazil Russia India China SA 
Luxury Allowance Laid Fine Steal 
Treasure Equity Community Tax Bonus 
Prosperity Inherit Business Cycle Private Equity Hustle 
Pension Skill Fire Price Gold Price 
Stock Fire Competitive Advantage Pension Inexpensive 
Ruin Contribution Colony Cheap Treasure 
Ghetto Radical Nobility Compensation Reward 
Bonus Hustler Waste Radical Broke 
Boom Legal Inflation Segregation Charity 
Radical Gamble Depression Inherit Donation 
Partner Patron Gold Price Bargain Partner 
Cost Gain Stagflation Security Riches 
Economise War Endowment Cooperative Allowance 
Colony Domination Reward Community Ghetto 
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Poor Money Backward Partner Colony 
Cheap Ruin Benevolent Contribution Expense 
Debt Cost Limited Partnership Worth Bum 
Apartheid Donation Gold Gift Savings 
Backward Cooperative Poverty Reduction Buy Lay 
Corrupt Buy Success Guide Inherit 
Crisis Debt Poor Foundation Rich 
Charity Depression Savings Stock Philanthropy 
Race Reward Unemployment Thrift Hole 
Private Equity Ghetto Cooperative Partnership Backward 
Capitalise Treasure Aristocrat Inheritance Competitive Advantage 
Default Luxury Hole Broke Blackmail 
Gold Price Tariff Apartheid Abundance Racism 
Inherit Compensation Partnership Default Deficit 
Waste Worth Broke Depreciation Bargain 
Hole Bargain Skill Laid Expensive 
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Table B2: Top Thirty Words per Country used in FEARS Construction - G7 Nations 
Germany Japan UK US 
Charity Recession Entrepreneurial Racial Segregation 
Bonus Inflation Bequeath Cheap 
Foundation Success Vagrant Accrue 
Recession Reward Abundance Affluence 
Community Skill Hustler Incentive 
Domination Tariff Invaluable Frugal 
Allowance Bargain Guide Government Budget Balance 
Deficit Spending Unemployment Apartheid Market Liquidity 
Skill Productivity Bonus Allowance 
Capitalise Rich Generosity Prosperous 
Prosperity Abundance Affluent Lobbying 
Hole Partner Accrue Profit 
Extravagant Gamble Hustle Public Private Partnership 
Waste Foundation Profitable Liquidate 
Great Depression Charity Liquidate Charitable 
Riches Laid Treasure Hyperinflation 
Savings Legal Worker Compensation Backer 
Success Bribery Segregation Race 
Nobility Beneficiary Benevolent European Debt Crisis 
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Vagabond Worth Expensive Bankruptcy 
Gamble Hustle Frugal Beggar 
Poverty Thrift Allowance Hustler 
Corrupt Afloat Luxury Productivity 
Liquidation Steal Partner Savings Loan Crisis 
Corruption Donate Fundraising Poverty 
Donation Equity Squander Savings 
Gold Price Expensive Deficit Luxury 
Race Prosperity War in Afghanistan Police Corruption 
Reward Expense Aristocrat Trustee in Bankruptcy 
Abundance Waste Great Depression Hole 
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Appendix C 
This appendix provides the details of various correlation analysis which were completed, both on a country-specific level and as a form of 
robustness check. 
 
Correlation
[Probability]
Bovespa Returns Inflation Industrial Production Real Interest Rate Risk Premium Term Structure Oil Price FEARS 
1
[--]
-0.078662 1
[0.5334] [--]
-0.146242 0.075863 1
[0.2451] [0.5481] [--]
-0.097511 0.030682 0.108126 1
[0.4397] [0.8083] [0.3913] [--]
0.471548 -0.104104 -0.017758 -0.13664 1
[0.0001]* [0.4092] [0.8883] [0.2778] [--]
-0.056144 0.016408 -0.084857 -0.693282 -0.532123 1
[0.6569] [0.8968] [0.5015] [0.0000]* [0.0000]* [--]
-0.031637 0.097692 0.086606 -0.032344 0.092386 -0.057246 1
[0.8025] [0.4388] [0.4927] [0.7981] [0.4642] [0.6506] [--]
-0.300384 0.076555 0.047907 -0.002815 -0.221963 0.062748 -0.119164 1
[0.015]* [0.5444] [0.7047] [0.9822] [0.0756]** [0.6195] [0.3444] [--]
Oil Price
FEARS 
Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance
**Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance
Term Structure
Bovespa Returns
Inflation
Industrial Production
Real Interest Rate
Risk Premium
   Table C1: Correlation Analysis - Brazil 
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Correlation
[Probability]
Micex Returns Inflation Industrial Production Real Interest Rate Risk Premium Term Structure Oil Price FEARS 
1
[--]
0.224285 1
[0.0725]** [--]
-0.010449 0.320771 1
[0.9342] [0.0092]* [--]
0.16681 0.007741 -0.142873 1
[0.1841] [0.9512] [0.2562] [--]
0.52813 0.086639 0.004641 -0.160209 1
[0.0000]* [0.4926] [0.9707] [0.2024] [--]
-0.415892 -0.078363 0.125912 -0.839568 -0.385748 1
[0.0006]* [0.5349] [0.3176] [0.0000]* [0.0015]* [--]
0.044294 0.242657 0.111088 -0.092629 0.079307 0.018989 1
[0.7261] [0.0515]** [0.3783] [0.463] [0.53] [0.8807] [--]
0.373214 0.154604 0.160392 0.007094 0.159131 -0.04067 0.098258 1
[0.0022]* [0.2188] [0.2018] [0.9553] [0.2055] [0.7477] [0.4362] [--]
Micex Returns
Inflation
FEARS 
Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance
**Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance
Industrial Production
Real Interest Rate
Risk Premium
Term Structure
Oil Price
Table C2: Correlation Analysis - Russia 
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Correlation
[Probability]
Nifty Returns Inflation Industrial Production Real Interest Rate Risk Premium Term Structure Oil Price FEARS 
1
[--]
-0.072292 1
[0.5671] [--]
0.102154 0.013409 1
[0.4181] [0.9156] [--]
-0.170368 -0.017708 0.129727 1
[0.1748] [0.8887] [0.303] [--]
0.488472 0.030647 0.021767 -0.179142 1
[0.0000]* [0.8085] [0.8634] [0.1533] [--]
0.09022 0.039592 -0.188398 -0.882288 -0.140873 1
[0.4748] [0.7542] [0.1329] [0.0000]* [0.263] [--]
-0.047213 0.013019 0.169862 0.026062 0.088013 -0.065487 1
[0.7088] [0.918] [0.1761] [0.8367] [0.4857] [0.6043] [--]
-0.186127 0.039133 0.01792 -0.098232 -0.128542 0.064566 -0.077488 1
[0.1377] [0.7569] [0.8873] [0.4363] [0.3075] [0.6094] [0.5395] [--]
Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance
**Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance
Oil Price
FEARS 
Nifty Returns
Inflation
Industrial Production
Real Interest Rate
Risk Premium
Term Structure
Table C3: Correlation Analysis - India 
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Correlation
[Probability]
SSE Returns Inflation Industrial Production Real Interest Rate Risk Premium Term Structure Oil Price FEARS 
1
[--]
-0.006205 1
[0.9689] [--]
0.033894 0.264905 1
[0.8313] [0.09]** [--]
0.081037 0.068846 0.227854 1
[0.6099] [0.6649] [0.1467] [--]
0.043292 -0.119988 -0.333239 0.033854 1
[0.7854] [0.4491] [0.031]* [0.8315] [--]
-0.080345 -0.084461 -0.087635 -0.92992 -0.367816 1
[0.613] [0.5949] [0.581] [0.0000]* [0.0166] [--]
0.35239 -0.000835 -0.228218 -0.3203 0.051975 0.258232 1
[0.0221]* [0.9958] [0.146] [0.0386] [0.7438] [0.0987]** [--]
0.059789 -0.255775 -0.011692 0.171937 -0.03006 -0.11096 0.024949 1
[0.7068] [0.1021] [0.9414] [0.2763] [0.8501] [0.4842] [0.8754] [--]
Real Interest Rate
Risk Premium
Term Structure
Oil Price
FEARS 
SSE Returns
Inflation
Industrial Production
Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance
**Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance
Table C4: Correlation Analysis - China 
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Table C5: Correlation Analysis - South Africa 
 
 
Correlation
[Probability]
Alsi Returns Inflation Industrial Production Real Interest Rate Risk Premium Term Structure Oil Price FEARS 
1
[--]
0.050144 1
[0.6916] [--]
-0.12802 0.390172 1
[0.3095] [0.0013]* [--]
-0.095286 0.023909 0.23038 1
[0.4502] [0.8501] [0.0649]** [--]
0.35164 0.16584 -0.146696 -0.111155 1
[0.0041]* [0.1867] [0.2436] [0.378] [--]
-0.08981 -0.135176 0.010562 -0.491483 -0.747947 1
[0.4768] [0.283] [0.9335] [0.0000]* [0.0000]* [--]
-0.023359 -0.169656 -0.164642 -0.20912 0.061276 0.066436 1
[0.8535] [0.1767] [0.19] [0.0946]** [0.6278] [0.599] [--]
-0.490638 0.036625 0.094453 0.033293 -0.041504 -0.051966 -0.013633 1
[0.0000]* [0.7721] [0.4542] [0.7923] [0.7427] [0.681] [0.9142] [--]
Alsi Returns
Inflation
Industrial Production
Real Interest Rate
Risk Premium
Term Structure
Oil Price
FEARS 
**Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance
Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance
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Table C6: Correlation Analysis - Germany 
 
 
 
Correlation
[Probability]
DAX Returns Inflation Industrial Production Real Interest Rate Risk Premium Term Structure Oil Price FEARS 
1
[--]
0.055053 1
[0.6632] [--]
0.218466 0.182831 1
[0.0804]** [0.1449] [--]
0.014977 -0.071953 0.099128 1
[0.9057] [0.569] [0.4321] [--]
0.082396 -0.078784 -0.207978 0.048185 1
[0.5141] [0.5327] [0.0964]** [0.7031] [--]
-0.015784 0.083686 -0.050439 -0.979559 -0.246931 1
[0.9007] [0.5075] [0.6899] [0.0000]* [0.0474]* [--]
0.079948 -0.18042 -0.160352 0.103586 0.064564 -0.115054 1
[0.5267] [0.1504] [0.202] [0.4116] [0.6094] [0.3614] [--]
-0.386245 -0.019408 -0.250194 0.263501 0.228764 -0.30979 -0.043405 1
[0.0015]* [0.878] [0.0444]* [0.0339]* [0.0668]** [0.012]* [0.7314] [--]
FEARS 
DAX Returns
Inflation
Industrial Production
Real Interest Rate
Risk Premium
Term Structure
Oil Price
Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance
**Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance
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Table C7: Correlation Analysis - Japan 
 
Correlation
[Probability]
Nikkei Returns Inflation Industrial Production Real Interest Rate Risk Premium Term Structure Oil Price FEARS 
1
[--]
-0.03285 1
[0.8364] [--]
0.019121 -0.134217 1
[0.9043] [0.3968] [--]
-0.203789 0.09075 0.235097 1
[0.1955] [0.5676] [0.1339] [--]
-0.25021 -0.062128 0.022329 -0.090014 1
[0.11] [0.6959] [0.8884] [0.5708] [--]
0.267368 -0.083014 -0.254228 -0.967318 -0.162164 1
[0.0869]** [0.6012] [0.1042] [0.0000]* [0.3049] [--]
0.006437 -0.266391 0.008591 -0.029983 -0.050549 0.043803 1
[0.9677] [0.0881]** [0.9569] [0.8505] [0.7506] [0.783] [--]
0.47118 0.132403 -0.021014 -0.348651 -0.068878 0.365015 -0.245211 1
[0.0016]* [0.4032] [0.8949] [0.0236]* [0.6647] [0.0175]* [0.1175] [--]
Nikkei Returns
Inflation
Industrial Production
Real Interest Rate
Risk Premium
Term Structure
Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance
**Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance
Oil Price
FEARS 
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Table C8: Correlation Analysis - United Kingdom 
 
Correlation
[Probability]
FTSE 100 Returns Inflation Industrial Production Real Interest Rate Risk Premium Term Structure Oil Price FEARS 
1
[--]
0.0145 1
[0.9095] [--]
0.209646 0.507589 1
[0.0964]** [0.0000]* [--]
-0.043445 -0.965227 -0.476441 1
[0.7332] [0.0000]* [0.0001]* [--]
-0.212208 -0.135892 -0.288757 0.19052 1
[0.0923]** [0.2843] [0.0207]* [0.1316] [--]
0.198921 0.136625 0.307177 -0.204444 -0.969057 1
[0.1151] [0.2817] [0.0135]* [0.1051] [0.0000]* [--]
-0.028111 -0.307856 -0.329867 0.348932 0.021027 -0.039742 1
[0.8255] [0.0133] [0.0078]* [0.0047]* [0.869] [0.7552] [--]
-0.557048 0.040948 0.020829 -0.029779 0.120371 -0.115951 -0.062562 1
[0.0000]* [0.748] [0.8702] [0.8153] [0.3434] [0.3616] [0.6233] [--]
Risk Premium
Term Structure
Oil Price
FEARS 
Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance
**Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance
Real Interest Rate
FTSE 100 Returns
Inflation
Industrial Production
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Table C9: Correlation Analysis - United States 
 
 
  
Correlation
[Probability]
S&P500 Returns Inflation Industrial Production Real Interest Rate Risk Premium Term Structure Oil Price FEARS 
1
[--]
0.058061 1
[0.6459] [--]
-0.099243 -0.103066 1
[0.4316] [0.4139] [--]
0.054826 -0.091445 -0.04042 1
[0.6645] [0.4688] [0.7492] [--]
-0.531978 -0.173833 0.142753 0.09705 1
[0.0000]* [0.1661] [0.2566] [0.4418] [--]
0.175322 0.160391 -0.021203 -0.906707 -0.502887 1
[0.1624] [0.2018] [0.8669] [0.0000]* [0.0000]* [--]
-0.06795 -0.212884 -0.162325 0.194104 -0.003214 -0.172891 1
[0.5907] [0.0886]** [0.1964] [0.1213] [0.9797] [0.1684] [--]
-0.391776 0.042429 0.061072 -0.16305 0.123116 0.08263 -0.078972 1
[0.0012]* [0.7372] [0.6289] [0.1944] [0.3285] [0.5129] [0.5318] [--]
Oil Price
FEARS 
S&P500 Returns
Inflation
Industrial Production
Real Interest Rate
Risk Premium
Term Structure
**Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance
Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance
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Table C10: Correlation Analysis - VIX and FEARS 
Correlation
[Probability]
Nifty VIX FEARS
Correlation
[Probability]
SAVI FEARS
1 1
[--] [--]
0.051435 1 0.23683 1
[0.6841] [--] [0.0575]** [--]
Correlation
[Probability]
VDAX FEARS
Correlation
[Probability]
Nikkei VIX FEARS
1 1
[--] [--]
0.335216 1 -0.212668 1
[0.0063]* [--] [0.1763] [--]
Correlation
[Probability]
FTSE VIX FEARS
Correlation
[Probability]
S&P500 VIX FEARS
1 1
[--] [--]
0.334866 1 0.361418 1
[0.0068]* [--] [0.0031]* [--]
FEARS
FTSE VIX
FEARS
S&P500 VIX
FEARS
Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance
**Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance
(1) India (2) South Africa
(4) Japan(3) Germany
(5) United Kingdom (6) United States
VDAX
FEARS
SAVI
FEARS
Nikkei VIX
FEARS
Nifty VIX
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Appendix D 
This appendix provides details of the robustness checks performed for each country, specific 
to the regression model which was deemed to be superior based on the Adjusted-R2. 
Endogeneity is tested through a correlation analysis between the residual of the specific model 
and each individual variable. The error term is tested for both stationarity and normality. 
Finally, the regression model is tested for ARCH effects or serial correlation. 
Leverage plots provide a graphical indication of how well the explanatory variables explain the 
model – the closer the blue dots are to the red fit line the better the model in terms of fit. 
Influence statistics provides an indication of the outliers in the overall model as well as per 
explanatory variable. 
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The results from the robustness checks on each country are provided in Table D1 below. 
Table D1: Robustness Checks 
 Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
Germany Japan UK US 
Model No. (1) (2) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
Stationarity – 
ADF Test 
-6.713164 
[0.0000]* 
-7.006464 
[0.0000]* 
7.213064 
[0.0000]* 
-6.125111 
[0.0000]* 
-5.89381 
[0.0000]* 
-9.268394 
[ 0.0000]* 
-5.058719 
[0.0010]* 
-8.509349 
[0.0000]* 
-7.778723 
[0.0000]* 
Normality – 
JB Test 
0.410599 
[0.814403] 
0.097921 
[0.952219] 
0.865233 
[0.648809] 
0.54434 
[0.761725] 
0.170339 
[0.918357] 
9.741223 
[0.007669]* 
4.957676 
[0.083841]** 
4.423193 
[0.109526] 
1.043247 
[0.593556] 
ARCH Effects 
- Lagrange 
Multiplier 
2.717244 
[0.0993]** 
2.088637 
[0.1484] 
0.182285 
[0.6694] 
1.022831 
[0.3118] 
1.211815 
[0.2710] 
0.117477 
[0.7318] 
0.665767 
[0.4145] 
0.143616 
[0.7047] 
0.194468 
[0.6592] 
ARCH Effects 
- Lagrange 
Multiplier 
0.656078 
[0.4179] 
1.034204 
[0.3092] 
0.323208 
[0.5697] 
0.00849 
[0.9266] 
0.762349 
[0.3826] 
1.58605 
[0.2079] 
1.960747 
[0.1614] 
1.542787 
[0.2142] 
0.036847 
[0.8478] 
Note: p-values for coefficients provided in the square brackets below the coefficient 
*Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance; **Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance 
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1. Brazil 
Endogeneity tests were conducted on regression models (1) and (2) and all variables were 
found to be exogenous. The robustness checks on (1) can also be found in Table D1 above. 
The residual of (1) was found to be stationary and normally distributed. ARCH effects were 
found to be present under the LM test which can occur if the disturbance terms are serially 
correlated. Using the more robust Breusch-Godfrey test revealed that there were no ARCH 
effects present. The leverage plots and influence statistics (Figure D1 and Table D2 below) 
indicate the presence of outliers. Overall, (1) possibly lacks some explanatory power due to 
redundant variables, serially correlated residuals and the presence of outliers. 
Leverage plots and influence statistics were completed for model (1) – a macroeconomic APT 
model without the FEARS variable. 
Figure D1: Leverage Plots - Brazil 
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Table D2: Influence Statistics - Brazil 
      
      Obs. Resid. RStudent DFFITS   COVRATIO Hat Matrix 
      
      2010M02 0.024999 0.622964 -0.196004 1.183692 0.090076 
2010M03 0.020000 0.501989 -0.172139 1.223896 0.105218 
2010M04 -0.039674 -0.977748 0.248063 1.070039 0.060475 
2010M05 -0.007637 -0.206104 0.112272 1.457000 0.228834 
2010M06 -0.060710 -1.603425 0.697593 0.986365 0.159156 
2010M07 0.054845 1.462140 -0.686783 1.065420 0.180750 
2010M08 -0.063442 -1.687664 0.756510 0.964179 0.167316 
2010M09 0.057555 1.471033 -0.512563 0.975799 0.108264 
2010M10 0.011583 0.286347 -0.084675 1.215930 0.080412 
2010M11 -0.005326 -0.134147 0.048409 1.273729 0.115220 
2010M12 0.031033 0.765599 -0.207490 1.128631 0.068424 
2011M01 -0.035566 -0.872269 0.209485 1.088715 0.054532 
2011M02 0.024021 0.585931 -0.135945 1.141268 0.051082 
2011M03 0.011365 0.272754 -0.043049 1.147078 0.024305 
2011M04 -0.058958 -1.476805 0.409244 0.935092 0.071316 
2011M05 -0.009171 -0.225782 0.063506 1.211216 0.073314 
2011M06 -0.028061 -0.690500 0.182646 1.140036 0.065391 
2011M07 -0.065148 -1.659160 0.531134 0.895071 0.092953 
2011M08 0.009680 0.257629 -0.131513 1.412231 0.206716 
2011M09 0.053197 1.624633 -1.246168 1.306803 0.370419 
2011M10 0.007160 0.186896 -0.086339 1.364636 0.175875 
2011M11 0.018946 0.462154 -0.109659 1.162223 0.053300 
2011M12 0.005605 0.140984 -0.050263 1.269920 0.112771 
2012M01 0.034679 0.924255 -0.459342 1.269153 0.198072 
2012M02 -0.000624 -0.015280 0.003974 1.205844 0.063369 
2012M03 -0.026839 -0.654488 0.148849 1.127231 0.049180 
2012M04 -0.038939 -0.963856 0.262663 1.083512 0.069130 
2012M05 -0.070078 -1.828419 0.698201 0.868395 0.127261 
2012M06 -0.017740 -0.437963 0.125674 1.194052 0.076077 
2012M07 -0.001585 -0.039099 0.011312 1.223769 0.077235 
2012M08 0.005959 0.145995 -0.038436 1.204590 0.064818 
2012M09 0.019957 0.483247 -0.097299 1.142091 0.038960 
2012M10 -0.053898 -1.344201 0.366284 0.975226 0.069120 
2012M11 -0.002580 -0.062899 0.015287 1.195595 0.055772 
2012M12 0.040589 0.998041 -0.242097 1.059342 0.055571 
2013M01 -0.021235 -0.524443 0.149801 1.181137 0.075434 
2013M02 -0.045881 -1.130615 0.273000 1.023431 0.055092 
2013M03 0.009003 0.224816 -0.074596 1.246060 0.099179 
2013M04 0.003560 0.087047 -0.022192 1.201752 0.061027 
2013M05 -0.008359 -0.209966 0.073764 1.262014 0.109862 
2013M06 -0.024084 -0.654899 0.363258 1.401460 0.235280 
2013M07 -0.006959 -0.189365 0.106860 1.482589 0.241529 
2013M08 0.068533 1.805726 -0.744694 0.895313 0.145357 
2013M09 0.029587 0.756413 -0.295936 1.214401 0.132746 
2013M10 0.003382 0.082407 -0.019785 1.193574 0.054503 
2013M11 0.001888 0.048126 -0.019101 1.307013 0.136090 
2013M12 -0.027864 -0.698339 0.231350 1.180858 0.098896 
2014M01 -0.048691 -1.207325 0.315336 1.011037 0.063861 
2014M02 -0.032481 -0.846121 0.372819 1.235903 0.162582 
2014M03 0.069853 1.770597 -0.516642 0.842540 0.078461 
2014M04 0.022458 0.550008 -0.138180 1.157076 0.059371 
2014M05 -0.044423 -1.096757 0.276775 1.038000 0.059871 
2014M06 0.014433 0.356234 -0.102728 1.204490 0.076774 
2014M07 0.069065 1.761863 -0.556332 0.856921 0.090666 
2014M08 0.098759 2.600494 -0.840403 0.569085 0.094563 
2014M09 -0.084536 -2.218031 0.797255 0.714441 0.114417 
2014M10 0.014108 0.345649 -0.089740 1.188055 0.063150 
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2014M11 0.039470 0.970089 -0.235416 1.066453 0.055616 
2014M12 -0.003254 -0.088050 0.048591 1.472031 0.233448 
2015M01 -0.004535 -0.123672 0.070488 1.493563 0.245198 
2015M02 0.062045 1.605968 -0.605417 0.946337 0.124430 
2015M03 -0.004634 -0.121069 0.056234 1.370664 0.177456 
2015M04 0.040461 1.004983 -0.284507 1.078842 0.074197 
2015M05 -0.071686 -1.820931 0.535630 0.826073 0.079635 
2015M06 0.036817 0.896735 -0.184522 1.067318 0.040622 
      
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
        
        
Obs. C INFLATION 
INDUSTRIAL_
PRODUCTION 
REAL_INTE
REST_RATE 
RISK_PREMI
UM 
TERM_STR
UCTURE OIL_PRICE 
        
        2010M02 0.090076 0.121180 0.025733 -0.001719 -0.043376 -0.012141 -0.001961 
2010M03 0.105218 0.090729 0.030067 0.033508 0.095620 0.094716 0.080319 
2010M04 0.060475 -0.145890 -0.052929 -0.089152 -0.014474 -0.033803 -0.023083 
2010M05 0.228834 -0.064024 0.021168 0.020273 0.004137 0.041111 0.040247 
2010M06 0.159156 -0.631794 0.465374 -0.013174 -0.114105 -0.150617 -0.155058 
2010M07 0.180750 0.539850 -0.378535 -0.099423 0.010086 0.165040 0.051114 
2010M08 0.167316 -0.610940 0.451990 0.010629 0.075698 -0.093755 -0.037003 
2010M09 0.108264 0.403085 -0.041476 0.015044 0.223890 0.139229 0.246903 
2010M10 0.080412 0.040906 0.039046 -0.005237 0.012411 0.015286 0.010431 
2010M11 0.115220 -0.017330 -0.021716 -0.001814 -0.001216 0.006953 -0.006118 
2010M12 0.068424 0.120903 0.001087 0.047314 0.046252 0.013488 -0.003188 
2011M01 0.054532 -0.061395 -0.126052 0.005521 -0.024560 -0.017810 -0.012545 
2011M02 0.051082 0.073473 -0.013626 0.082379 0.029338 0.010691 0.015794 
2011M03 0.024305 0.012872 0.011716 0.008668 0.013321 0.013347 0.009644 
2011M04 0.071316 -0.005424 -0.133388 0.307491 -0.008248 -0.066303 -0.055169 
2011M05 0.073314 -0.019820 0.002841 -0.052606 -0.010200 -0.006364 -0.010196 
2011M06 0.065391 -0.112901 0.091535 0.113717 0.020689 0.038009 0.031385 
2011M07 0.092953 -0.367813 0.387420 -0.111329 -0.208240 -0.110458 -0.199896 
2011M08 0.206716 0.025162 -0.016665 -0.049606 -0.098472 -0.080541 -0.109558 
2011M09 0.370419 0.138763 -0.168798 -0.088543 -1.073217 -1.011778 -0.851725 
2011M10 0.175875 0.009608 -0.008451 -0.004947 0.034484 0.064973 0.056294 
2011M11 0.053300 0.006694 -0.002542 0.023326 -0.085895 -0.076432 -0.088093 
2011M12 0.112771 0.005096 -0.003730 0.037616 -0.008983 0.002167 0.004138 
2012M01 0.198072 0.021777 0.033652 -0.389171 0.183901 0.193256 0.184969 
2012M02 0.063369 -0.000358 0.000674 -0.001242 -0.002265 -0.002787 -0.002888 
2012M03 0.049180 -0.009447 0.086052 -0.007989 0.028185 0.000144 0.006719 
2012M04 0.069130 0.093723 -0.048098 -0.082755 0.140565 0.040795 0.109830 
2012M05 0.127261 0.089387 0.017304 -0.085292 0.587091 0.442676 0.438625 
2012M06 0.076077 -0.022823 0.045552 -0.038194 0.049884 -0.004452 0.025621 
2012M07 0.077235 0.000594 0.001039 -0.005010 0.001501 -0.003670 -0.000698 
2012M08 0.064818 -0.004191 -0.004656 0.025425 0.006268 0.011501 0.013243 
2012M09 0.038960 -0.026360 0.023784 -0.021470 0.054116 0.040224 0.047423 
2012M10 0.069120 0.147635 -0.118576 -0.056006 0.099645 -0.038340 0.096963 
2012M11 0.055772 0.002288 -0.000910 0.005587 -0.000113 -0.001654 -0.003934 
2012M12 0.055571 -0.107320 0.094549 0.099315 0.001218 0.069773 0.008551 
2013M01 0.075434 0.057580 -0.081061 -0.057247 -0.037098 -0.037881 -0.060032 
2013M02 0.055092 0.056130 -0.012274 0.194647 0.011057 0.015419 0.036503 
2013M03 0.099179 0.002916 0.000525 0.027653 0.035816 0.003146 0.023303 
2013M04 0.061027 -0.001202 0.001490 0.006256 -0.005801 -0.003886 -0.010633 
2013M05 0.109862 -0.021217 0.021401 0.001243 -0.018276 0.009956 -0.022636 
2013M06 0.235280 -0.065637 0.117887 -0.209167 0.008010 0.148816 0.065354 
2013M07 0.241529 -0.016040 0.050572 0.061473 -0.024817 -0.005243 0.001127 
2013M08 0.145357 0.027877 -0.307932 0.094650 0.092564 -0.094757 0.181505 
2013M09 0.132746 -0.032240 -0.075031 0.086317 0.102058 0.066485 0.020482 
2013M10 0.054503 -0.007241 0.004673 -0.008225 0.004149 0.007862 0.006930 
2013M11 0.136090 -0.001280 -0.000852 0.001964 0.008347 -0.000596 0.006433 
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2013M12 0.098896 0.105854 -0.071058 0.154453 -0.021966 -0.008102 -0.019543 
2014M01 0.063861 0.147793 -0.038941 -0.158027 0.058938 0.077085 0.052989 
2014M02 0.162582 0.141740 -0.058130 -0.038956 -0.067700 -0.065513 0.038669 
2014M03 0.078461 -0.284460 0.227318 0.001511 -0.128770 -0.016774 -0.004954 
2014M04 0.059371 -0.077151 0.061147 -0.005385 -0.014877 -0.002004 -0.034780 
2014M05 0.059871 0.133107 -0.063762 0.069501 -0.019337 -0.102929 -0.037526 
2014M06 0.076774 -0.019802 -0.029648 -0.048764 0.008633 0.015455 0.018640 
2014M07 0.090666 -3.23E-05 -0.302255 0.335897 -0.132080 -0.104454 -0.119006 
2014M08 0.094563 -0.048654 -0.352323 0.133492 -0.378773 -0.197081 -0.444531 
2014M09 0.114417 -0.026653 0.086205 0.051660 -0.172758 0.138260 -0.209914 
2014M10 0.063150 0.003287 -0.021353 -0.000450 0.011747 -0.003603 -0.017431 
2014M11 0.055616 0.013066 -0.013365 -0.081509 -0.118495 -0.150174 -0.166294 
2014M12 0.233448 -0.012605 0.000354 0.031934 0.014519 0.029733 0.018678 
2015M01 0.245198 -0.004520 -0.045519 -0.013141 0.022799 0.022064 0.029385 
2015M02 0.124430 -0.024424 0.425171 -0.143890 0.240890 0.267643 0.319686 
2015M03 0.177456 0.014927 -0.049707 0.012638 -0.012668 -0.007175 -0.012895 
2015M04 0.074197 -0.016893 0.097004 -0.115537 0.154949 0.183729 0.122651 
2015M05 0.079635 0.236468 -0.352501 -0.064870 0.071041 -0.044943 0.113207 
2015M06 0.040622 -0.030529 0.073237 -0.050459 -0.025225 -0.070371 -0.027493 
        
        
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
The influence statistics indicate the presence of outliers. 
1. RStudent: 2 outliers 
2. DFFITS: 8 outliers 
3. COVRATIO: 9 outliers 
4. Hat Matrix: 29 outliers 
5. DFBETAS 
 Intercept: 1 outliers 
 Inflation: 6 outliers 
 Industrial Production: 9 outliers 
 Real Interest Rate: 3 outliers 
 Risk Premium: 3 outliers 
 Term Structure: 3 outliers 
 Oil Price: 4 outliers 
The results from the leverage plots and influence statistics indicate that model (1) possibly 
lacks some explanatory power due to redundant variables, serially correlated residuals and the 
presence of outliers. 
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2. Russia 
Endogeneity tests were conducted on both regression models (1) and (2) and all variables were 
found to be exogenous. The robustness checks on (2) can also be found in Table D1 above. 
The residual of (2) was found to be stationary, normally distributed and no ARCH effects were 
found to be present. The leverage plots and influence statistics (Figure D2 and Table D3 below) 
indicate that outliers are not an issue in this model. Overall, (2) suffers from redundant 
variables, serially correlated residuals but not necessarily from the presence of outliers. 
Leverage plots and influence statistics were completed for model (2) – a macroeconomic APT 
model with the FEARS variable included. 
Figure D2: Leverage Plots - Russia 
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Table D3: Influence Statistics - Russia 
      
      Obs. Resid. RStudent DFFITS   COVRATIO Hat Matrix 
      
      2010M02 -0.044194 -1.093314 0.459740 1.145050 0.150253 
2010M03 0.026735 0.637808 -0.211208 1.206526 0.098822 
2010M04 0.024297 0.576683 -0.182137 1.208419 0.090704 
2010M05 -0.033510 -0.814660 0.312463 1.202726 0.128245 
2010M06 -0.028600 -0.713315 0.327413 1.297476 0.174020 
2010M07 0.059039 1.417138 -0.430637 0.949375 0.084536 
2010M08 -0.008188 -0.196672 0.071488 1.297150 0.116706 
2010M09 0.043701 1.043682 -0.328014 1.085104 0.089896 
2010M10 0.046392 1.095897 -0.295894 1.043110 0.067948 
2010M11 0.032169 0.776153 -0.280951 1.196170 0.115849 
2010M12 0.040438 0.943070 -0.213831 1.067877 0.048897 
2011M01 0.065544 1.571385 -0.447586 0.881976 0.075043 
2011M02 0.006005 0.148535 -0.066612 1.379463 0.167439 
2011M03 -0.015218 -0.363392 0.124392 1.263085 0.104885 
2011M04 0.001764 0.044659 -0.022713 1.449710 0.205508 
2011M05 -0.060120 -1.434255 0.400830 0.930716 0.072445 
2011M06 -0.043021 -1.089340 0.525876 1.201213 0.189000 
2011M07 -0.009165 -0.220413 0.080953 1.298486 0.118861 
2011M08 -0.032857 -0.803524 0.322501 1.220483 0.138739 
2011M09 -0.021191 -0.555280 0.324295 1.478672 0.254332 
2011M10 0.012968 0.350722 -0.230891 1.622700 0.302357 
2011M11 0.035244 0.864319 -0.351667 1.207763 0.142032 
2011M12 -0.059128 -1.440166 0.506034 0.967606 0.109894 
2012M01 0.032835 0.777742 -0.233369 1.152414 0.082599 
2012M02 0.029477 0.692681 -0.190015 1.157079 0.069984 
2012M03 -0.061475 -1.467888 0.410558 0.918399 0.072552 
2012M04 -0.026113 -0.599208 0.099415 1.124818 0.026789 
2012M05 -0.067498 -1.649269 0.566988 0.881493 0.105694 
2012M06 0.041946 0.975959 -0.207845 1.052350 0.043386 
2012M07 -0.018243 -0.426755 0.113841 1.202454 0.066433 
2012M08 0.005615 0.136068 -0.053219 1.324849 0.132679 
2012M09 -0.003336 -0.085648 0.046444 1.489335 0.227235 
2012M10 -0.015027 -0.369809 0.159691 1.340530 0.157163 
2012M11 -0.054849 -1.301166 0.351025 0.973918 0.067842 
2012M12 0.043214 1.015309 -0.257830 1.059888 0.060580 
2013M01 0.031861 0.734338 -0.133979 1.102604 0.032215 
2013M02 -0.057528 -1.363854 0.356519 0.947703 0.063962 
2013M03 -0.015126 -0.347439 0.063974 1.170830 0.032793 
2013M04 -0.046041 -1.088909 0.299694 1.048114 0.070414 
2013M05 0.016115 0.381909 -0.120823 1.241323 0.090982 
2013M06 0.004731 0.115259 -0.046901 1.340335 0.142060 
2013M07 0.032270 0.748770 -0.162040 1.113681 0.044738 
2013M08 -0.003965 -0.093382 0.027864 1.253126 0.081754 
2013M09 0.051220 1.203760 -0.288299 0.993023 0.054248 
2013M10 0.020214 0.468484 -0.105576 1.173325 0.048331 
2013M11 -0.006216 -0.146880 0.045541 1.258985 0.087704 
2013M12 -0.005307 -0.122068 0.023986 1.194052 0.037175 
2014M01 0.028725 0.683930 -0.220675 1.190161 0.094291 
2014M02 -0.025535 -0.648503 0.328892 1.364291 0.204586 
2014M03 -0.033924 -0.797984 0.217664 1.130778 0.069250 
2014M04 -0.081970 -2.047955 0.767500 0.737296 0.123152 
2014M05 0.027862 0.662411 -0.210961 1.192155 0.092086 
2014M06 0.017646 0.408150 -0.089026 1.178584 0.045416 
2014M07 -0.020307 -0.484471 0.162918 1.240198 0.101595 
2014M08 0.001817 0.041875 -0.008737 1.201964 0.041716 
2014M09 0.030679 0.730702 -0.235105 1.178440 0.093812 
2014M10 0.086729 2.093321 -0.517290 0.669085 0.057551 
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2014M11 0.035625 0.839936 -0.234694 1.123691 0.072421 
2014M12 0.011259 0.307066 -0.207848 1.657518 0.314210 
2015M01 0.107187 3.504565 -2.977385 0.406001 0.419204 
2015M02 -0.017047 -0.517854 0.464273 2.000219 0.445606 
2015M03 -0.106521 -3.051857 1.886623 0.465066 0.276493 
2015M04 -0.017504 -0.461332 0.276407 1.518899 0.264155 
2015M05 -0.053250 -1.376538 0.714468 1.120664 0.212223 
2015M06 0.040651 0.990045 -0.376780 1.148020 0.126510 
      
      
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
         
         
Obs. C INFLATION 
INDUSTRIAL_
PRODUCTION 
REAL_INTE
REST_RATE 
RISK_PREMI
UM 
TERM_STR
UCTURE OIL_PRICE FEARS 
         
         2010M02 0.150253 -0.065089 -0.242036 -0.057112 -0.134680 -0.147970 -0.143910 -0.073215 
2010M03 0.098822 -0.005859 -0.026140 0.024852 -0.070506 -0.036971 -0.064785 -0.009841 
2010M04 0.090704 0.012805 -0.015847 0.091478 0.041807 0.050138 0.055382 0.011187 
2010M05 0.128245 -0.173501 0.146931 -0.155213 0.031556 0.065475 0.047264 -0.167450 
2010M06 0.174020 -0.064593 -0.015948 0.244698 0.062880 0.029951 0.039928 -0.058021 
2010M07 0.084536 0.274698 -0.072714 0.005390 0.255924 0.280262 0.266930 0.267326 
2010M08 0.116706 -0.044583 0.026716 -0.037300 -0.028634 -0.027923 -0.029857 -0.043454 
2010M09 0.089896 0.131833 -0.021469 -0.194907 -0.053668 -0.035889 -0.033407 0.123411 
2010M10 0.067948 0.113172 0.016670 0.104205 0.209037 0.187757 0.202841 0.111290 
2010M11 0.115849 0.047348 -0.126809 0.230113 -0.043376 -0.056603 -0.058439 0.042419 
2010M12 0.048897 -0.047783 -0.015103 0.015966 -0.079455 -0.078661 -0.094298 -0.053111 
2011M01 0.075043 -0.008175 0.145248 0.083655 0.086358 0.058543 0.116394 -0.007481 
2011M02 0.167439 -0.009571 0.050757 0.009252 0.020037 0.015837 0.020383 -0.008002 
2011M03 0.104885 0.046799 0.004357 -0.025400 0.044200 0.028221 0.047933 0.048507 
2011M04 0.205508 -0.009690 0.000760 0.002175 -0.005226 -0.002764 -0.002885 -0.009915 
2011M05 0.072445 -0.040082 0.089734 -0.039520 -0.134929 -0.091051 -0.118078 -0.029376 
2011M06 0.189000 -0.067149 -0.016365 0.175655 -0.157662 -0.119088 -0.105603 -0.059856 
2011M07 0.118861 0.019415 0.016366 0.044306 0.035326 0.029196 0.033184 0.022266 
2011M08 0.138739 -0.075775 0.179695 -0.204359 0.065095 0.081593 0.070418 -0.068530 
2011M09 0.254332 0.014884 0.129292 -0.048340 0.162751 0.192623 0.172997 0.022315 
2011M10 0.302357 0.023462 -0.045209 0.030549 0.169848 0.167037 0.159874 0.019812 
2011M11 0.142032 -0.132931 -0.056128 0.026272 -0.251789 -0.224638 -0.241836 -0.139695 
2011M12 0.109894 0.079340 -0.042152 -0.030415 -0.306756 -0.292708 -0.287735 0.084052 
2012M01 0.082599 -0.101175 0.006930 -0.052625 0.089275 0.105228 0.091676 -0.106786 
2012M02 0.069984 -0.096808 -0.000839 0.015425 0.053562 0.075663 0.062029 -0.100853 
2012M03 0.072552 0.247604 0.141383 -0.183311 0.144964 0.126643 0.150750 0.259972 
2012M04 0.026789 0.050166 -0.004833 0.001687 -0.018445 -0.016594 -0.019695 0.053230 
2012M05 0.105694 0.054166 -0.018929 0.358223 0.111215 0.161659 0.101057 0.067669 
2012M06 0.043386 0.070326 -0.012294 -0.089756 0.033148 0.041255 0.024915 0.064463 
2012M07 0.066433 0.035709 -0.037605 0.066082 0.013907 -0.000912 0.010841 0.037444 
2012M08 0.132679 -0.017606 0.008960 0.038924 0.011118 0.013757 0.012403 -0.017324 
2012M09 0.227235 0.000759 0.025414 -0.027980 0.010134 0.009870 0.010726 0.001933 
2012M10 0.157163 -0.033212 -0.024024 0.051941 -0.051603 -0.063155 -0.053244 -0.032178 
2012M11 0.067842 -0.048255 0.073771 0.165952 0.113511 0.090492 0.125791 -0.036204 
2012M12 0.060580 0.104786 -0.017485 -0.110807 0.120753 0.133629 0.124143 0.098372 
2013M01 0.032215 0.009062 -0.016537 -0.059431 -0.034710 -0.020255 -0.033330 0.004042 
2013M02 0.063962 0.073948 -0.046270 0.076608 0.127398 0.129951 0.115918 0.080925 
2013M03 0.032793 -0.014680 0.009580 0.012801 0.010060 0.011268 0.005794 -0.012516 
2013M04 0.070414 -0.083406 0.069964 0.108574 0.074505 0.056027 0.084544 -0.074471 
2013M05 0.090982 0.032756 0.014543 -0.048300 0.050667 0.033862 0.052260 0.030991 
2013M06 0.142060 -0.008657 -0.007968 -0.005686 -0.038223 -0.041352 -0.038771 -0.009771 
2013M07 0.044738 -0.073312 -0.061074 0.084869 -0.046554 -0.039904 -0.048948 -0.078649 
2013M08 0.081754 0.014468 0.002287 -0.011042 0.012357 0.013237 0.012088 0.014974 
2013M09 0.054248 -0.066001 -0.157756 0.111473 -0.021972 0.006672 -0.027699 -0.077313 
2013M10 0.048331 0.009378 -0.020985 -0.053044 0.026805 0.035895 0.029510 0.005390 
2013M11 0.087704 0.001714 -0.005019 0.028339 -0.000353 0.004428 -0.001359 0.002774 
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2013M12 0.037175 0.009008 0.005675 -0.002838 0.006507 0.006345 0.007343 0.009889 
2014M01 0.094291 -0.038363 0.015121 -0.030096 -0.002263 -0.006489 0.018230 -0.041706 
2014M02 0.204586 0.070002 -0.062907 0.005018 -0.188482 -0.184395 -0.169712 0.070882 
2014M03 0.069250 0.129933 -0.020165 -0.080053 -0.041569 -0.029334 -0.046451 0.132682 
2014M04 0.123152 0.339711 -0.172906 0.078375 -0.064930 0.004344 -0.039941 0.348053 
2014M05 0.092086 -0.090705 0.024966 -0.007721 -0.026604 -0.006963 -0.038678 -0.093648 
2014M06 0.045416 -0.055222 0.028011 -0.000900 -0.003515 0.004775 -0.002208 -0.056281 
2014M07 0.101595 0.006656 -0.018637 -0.027712 -0.089731 -0.069454 -0.094216 0.007815 
2014M08 0.041716 -0.000351 -0.001015 -0.001350 0.001978 0.001080 0.001321 -0.000627 
2014M09 0.093812 -0.051542 -0.057911 -0.052144 -0.146810 -0.133128 -0.145667 -0.058538 
2014M10 0.057551 0.065417 0.102490 -0.050107 0.260979 0.234425 0.275992 0.060494 
2014M11 0.072421 -0.032646 0.023019 -0.085066 -0.094593 -0.125474 -0.105400 -0.037488 
2014M12 0.314210 0.021578 0.054061 -0.026439 -1.41E-05 -0.039586 0.002489 0.021987 
2015M01 0.419204 0.604177 1.205370 -0.092288 -0.678916 -0.886510 -0.937796 0.643978 
2015M02 0.445606 0.098210 -0.422222 0.097144 0.003131 -0.011013 -0.008060 0.085024 
2015M03 0.276493 -0.794532 -0.495109 -0.878478 0.167449 0.043955 0.176134 -0.826312 
2015M04 0.264155 -0.212528 0.022265 -0.039062 -0.003749 -0.030468 -0.008006 -0.211746 
2015M05 0.212223 -0.571176 0.120275 0.273610 -0.022110 -0.033946 -0.047696 -0.558611 
2015M06 0.126510 0.303596 -0.148223 -0.013750 -0.040396 -0.061315 -0.040360 0.294356 
         
         
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
The influence statistics indicate the presence of outliers. 
1. RStudent: 4 outliers 
2. DFFITS: 4 outliers 
3. COVRATIO: 10 outliers 
4. Hat Matrix: 30 outliers 
5. DFBETAS 
 Intercept: 7 outliers 
 Inflation: 6 outliers 
 Industrial Production: 3 outliers 
 Real Interest Rate: 3 outliers 
 Risk Premium: 5 outliers 
 Term Structure: 3 outliers 
 Oil Price: 4 outliers 
 FEARS: 7 outliers 
The results from the leverage plots and influence statistics indicate that model (2) possibly 
lacks some explanatory power more due to redundant variables, serially correlated residuals 
and less due to the presence of outliers. 
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3. India 
Endogeneity tests were conducted on regression models (1) and (2) and all variables were 
found to be exogenous. The robustness checks on (1) can also be found in Table D1 above. 
The residual of (1) was found to be stationary, normally distributed and no ARCH effects were 
found to be present. The leverage plots and influence statistics (Figure D3 and Table D4 below) 
indicate outliers or serially correlated residuals could explain the lack of explanatory power of 
(1). Overall, (1) suffers from a redundant variables, serially correlated residuals as well as the 
presence of outliers. Finally, output (1) in Table C10 in Appendix C shows the result of a 
correlation analysis between FEARS and a volatility index for the VIX. The analysis showed 
that there was no statistically significant correlation between the two variables; this implies 
that there is no evidence for the noise trader theory, even if FEARS was found to be statistically 
significant. 
Leverage plots and influence statistics were completed for model (1) – a macroeconomic APT 
model without the FEARS variable. 
Figure D3: Leverage Plots - India 
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Table D4: Influence Statistics - India 
      
      Obs. Resid. RStudent DFFITS   COVRATIO Hat Matrix 
      
      2010M02 0.009029 0.239177 -0.113148 1.372563 0.182872 
2010M03 0.023320 0.603642 -0.243145 1.255444 0.139596 
2010M04 0.021778 0.550628 -0.182716 1.208124 0.099191 
2010M05 -0.033660 -0.886970 0.392343 1.226900 0.163645 
2010M06 0.020725 0.513316 -0.131862 1.165745 0.061903 
2010M07 -0.006665 -0.167708 0.054245 1.243325 0.094710 
2010M08 0.019787 0.532219 -0.269654 1.370993 0.204268 
2010M09 0.085164 2.173956 -0.488208 0.679333 0.048011 
2010M10 -0.005164 -0.128602 0.036899 1.219966 0.076063 
2010M11 -0.007031 -0.174916 0.049401 1.214982 0.073872 
2010M12 0.024111 0.605671 -0.186235 1.181964 0.086380 
2011M01 -0.093923 -2.435300 0.611361 0.600483 0.059286 
2011M02 -0.033354 -0.830778 0.219952 1.110975 0.065503 
2011M03 0.071069 1.971123 -0.999615 0.894963 0.204569 
2011M04 0.000214 0.005501 -0.002177 1.306439 0.135468 
2011M05 -0.033245 -0.823876 0.200923 1.101475 0.056136 
2011M06 0.026604 0.652698 -0.135231 1.118121 0.041160 
2011M07 -0.040515 -0.993515 0.177465 1.033518 0.030920 
2011M08 -0.048258 -1.231202 0.402507 1.040353 0.096558 
2011M09 0.078988 2.313547 -1.405544 0.824994 0.269588 
2011M10 0.011209 0.303217 -0.159129 1.424375 0.215942 
2011M11 -0.091465 -2.373326 0.626420 0.624650 0.065128 
2011M12 -0.087422 -2.272608 0.649581 0.665722 0.075529 
2012M01 0.052468 1.364788 -0.517563 1.031507 0.125731 
2012M02 -0.004657 -0.115188 0.029998 1.204100 0.063513 
2012M03 0.000903 0.023237 -0.009210 1.306807 0.135765 
2012M04 -0.005943 -0.151315 0.054829 1.274173 0.116060 
2012M05 -0.058405 -1.488024 0.448362 0.943529 0.083233 
2012M06 0.042288 1.042754 -0.212684 1.030688 0.039940 
2012M07 -0.060759 -1.535943 0.409920 0.910889 0.066491 
2012M08 -0.011057 -0.272728 0.067138 1.187025 0.057139 
2012M09 0.057433 1.437808 -0.339664 0.929291 0.052858 
2012M10 -0.047188 -1.171313 0.262769 1.004361 0.047916 
2012M11 0.017301 0.434083 -0.133996 1.208836 0.086998 
2012M12 -0.050138 -1.278636 0.411763 1.022716 0.093961 
2013M01 -0.008217 -0.200403 0.038848 1.166142 0.036217 
2013M02 -0.054911 -1.411415 0.477405 0.989656 0.102664 
2013M03 -0.006758 -0.167283 0.043987 1.203415 0.064671 
2013M04 0.038384 1.002238 -0.412710 1.168938 0.144985 
2013M05 -0.001932 -0.047836 0.012683 1.208524 0.065682 
2013M06 0.015622 0.397585 -0.142032 1.249151 0.113175 
2013M07 0.001879 0.052529 -0.031704 1.540371 0.267008 
2013M08 0.017564 0.601483 -0.611746 2.198251 0.508458 
2013M09 0.016113 0.404045 -0.124270 1.211802 0.086421 
2013M10 0.036906 0.936419 -0.306093 1.123436 0.096534 
2013M11 -0.013932 -0.377916 0.200464 1.422131 0.219587 
2013M12 -0.018570 -0.469653 0.157366 1.222759 0.100938 
2014M01 -0.029161 -0.717479 0.156063 1.110751 0.045176 
2014M02 0.014353 0.354517 -0.088715 1.181829 0.058931 
2014M03 0.046748 1.207227 -0.443824 1.074426 0.119066 
2014M04 -0.002444 -0.061090 0.018410 1.231470 0.083254 
2014M05 0.033469 0.835757 -0.229438 1.115323 0.070083 
2014M06 0.030867 0.762368 -0.177368 1.108981 0.051348 
2014M07 0.009296 0.227246 -0.046751 1.169827 0.040605 
2014M08 0.016968 0.419913 -0.107763 1.178100 0.061790 
2014M09 0.004668 0.113964 -0.022904 1.173211 0.038823 
2014M10 0.019778 0.490743 -0.130099 1.173687 0.065666 
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2014M11 0.019586 0.496351 -0.169244 1.223286 0.104156 
2014M12 -0.009914 -0.266690 0.136401 1.412534 0.207349 
2015M01 0.068816 1.892271 -0.930737 0.915700 0.194801 
2015M02 -0.019342 -0.495791 0.186891 1.251677 0.124416 
2015M03 -0.047643 -1.254945 0.530417 1.100013 0.151566 
2015M04 -0.056931 -1.496431 0.599567 1.000883 0.138326 
2015M05 0.022115 0.546382 -0.133866 1.154273 0.056628 
2015M06 0.013085 0.324302 -0.086048 1.193478 0.065771 
      
      
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
        
        
Obs. C INFLATION 
INDUSTRIAL_
PRODUCTION 
REAL_INTE
REST_RATE 
RISK_PREMI
UM 
TERM_STR
UCTURE OIL_PRICE 
        
        2010M02 0.182872 0.052419 -0.016400 -0.010890 0.011025 -0.014059 0.041601 
2010M03 0.139596 0.089963 0.053335 0.132393 0.088880 0.113311 0.067936 
2010M04 0.099191 0.093207 0.004586 -0.134518 0.046546 -0.007397 0.036773 
2010M05 0.163645 -0.148082 0.003802 0.078863 0.328848 0.146328 0.299841 
2010M06 0.061903 0.078778 -0.053873 -0.015604 0.050980 0.055239 0.036832 
2010M07 0.094710 -0.028175 0.011693 -0.008114 -0.039121 -0.020753 -0.034238 
2010M08 0.204268 0.086276 -0.000786 -0.083550 0.103275 0.037945 0.017480 
2010M09 0.048011 0.324142 -0.090779 0.049298 0.068124 0.178213 0.051884 
2010M10 0.076063 -0.021534 0.003112 -0.009483 -0.020097 -0.003538 -0.020840 
2010M11 0.073872 -0.023371 0.005077 0.029140 0.007659 0.012367 0.018033 
2010M12 0.086380 0.051028 0.004942 0.111246 -0.001334 0.027182 -0.025577 
2011M01 0.059286 -0.295599 -0.300763 0.035482 -0.181320 0.093043 -0.165219 
2011M02 0.065503 -0.050982 -0.119501 0.110573 0.081566 0.010420 0.096811 
2011M03 0.204569 0.036531 0.674354 0.633101 -0.059573 0.019338 0.005002 
2011M04 0.135468 7.87E-05 0.001132 -0.001670 3.89E-05 -0.000107 -2.54E-07 
2011M05 0.056136 -0.007462 -0.101800 0.004732 -0.074493 0.035148 -0.054247 
2011M06 0.041160 0.014693 -0.060848 0.020920 -0.007490 -0.010974 -0.034252 
2011M07 0.030920 -0.029403 0.030046 0.034386 -0.050681 -0.019411 -0.080455 
2011M08 0.096558 -0.052289 -0.097228 0.161435 0.266111 0.297900 0.311388 
2011M09 0.269588 0.100727 0.094514 0.021022 -0.763237 -1.334131 -0.682787 
2011M10 0.215942 -0.005364 -0.059349 -0.001910 0.134004 0.110588 0.141330 
2011M11 0.065128 0.148842 0.182870 -0.215357 0.212514 0.241303 0.308543 
2011M12 0.075529 0.113410 0.369633 -0.379603 -0.017872 -0.205268 -0.055716 
2012M01 0.125731 -0.073927 0.146712 -0.031650 -0.051194 0.302003 -0.001048 
2012M02 0.063513 0.006727 -0.012153 0.003159 -0.007448 -0.019356 -0.005601 
2012M03 0.135765 -0.001422 0.005647 0.003775 0.002705 -0.001602 0.002420 
2012M04 0.116060 0.009656 -0.009847 0.035156 0.009609 0.007964 0.000766 
2012M05 0.083233 0.121308 0.124747 -0.070846 0.298804 0.209636 0.328992 
2012M06 0.039940 -0.007852 -0.127217 -0.008772 0.045329 0.068918 0.075552 
2012M07 0.066491 0.093018 0.202108 -0.000815 -0.090724 -0.269204 -0.090255 
2012M08 0.057139 0.031209 -0.043264 0.006137 -0.000449 -0.013596 0.001474 
2012M09 0.052858 -0.170710 0.167201 -0.022498 -0.029228 0.092835 -0.039219 
2012M10 0.047916 0.072523 0.099032 -0.154354 -0.103917 -0.098651 -0.126308 
2012M11 0.086998 -0.024446 -0.108445 -0.025180 0.025944 0.035508 0.021507 
2012M12 0.093961 0.080912 0.228480 -0.234266 -0.093580 -0.203302 -0.098821 
2013M01 0.036217 0.010815 -0.011009 -0.005901 0.006515 -0.013854 0.004864 
2013M02 0.102664 0.088780 -0.388862 0.099546 0.163915 0.084326 0.132849 
2013M03 0.064671 0.002889 -0.006798 -0.035392 -0.002818 0.007366 -0.004766 
2013M04 0.144985 -0.011108 -0.087252 -0.337894 -0.118565 -0.001561 -0.151979 
2013M05 0.065682 0.003376 -0.001215 0.000943 0.009626 0.003112 0.008631 
2013M06 0.113175 -0.032818 0.023526 -0.005232 -0.088850 -0.115955 -0.073245 
2013M07 0.267008 -0.005884 -0.003724 0.009346 0.017615 -0.003692 0.019465 
2013M08 0.508458 -0.141800 0.009352 -0.108075 0.175232 -0.105567 -0.019464 
2013M09 0.086421 -0.078309 -0.010141 0.037237 0.031254 0.026486 0.053393 
2013M10 0.096534 -0.153542 -0.161518 0.061724 0.050147 0.156990 0.071216 
2013M11 0.219587 0.046600 0.061179 -0.007023 -0.023271 0.045961 -0.070463 
192 
 
2013M12 0.100938 0.080251 0.029161 -0.095805 0.010396 -0.035942 0.022137 
2014M01 0.045176 0.072384 -0.069134 -0.029471 0.050653 0.054719 0.063796 
2014M02 0.058931 -0.044510 0.029705 -0.035425 0.010005 0.018595 0.013740 
2014M03 0.119066 -0.142939 0.239025 0.309797 -0.048710 -0.002103 -0.034357 
2014M04 0.083254 0.005451 -0.004699 0.012455 0.003286 0.001316 0.001933 
2014M05 0.070083 -0.115836 0.062812 0.031420 -0.002090 0.114105 -0.009536 
2014M06 0.051348 -0.097913 0.006263 0.003280 0.022591 0.025348 0.054744 
2014M07 0.040605 -0.027213 -0.015045 0.003584 -0.004786 -0.007428 -0.008904 
2014M08 0.061790 -0.047331 -0.047885 -0.035457 -0.023502 6.10E-05 -0.033627 
2014M09 0.038823 -0.009858 -0.002190 0.007515 -0.009025 -0.010667 -0.009096 
2014M10 0.065666 -0.019351 -0.073781 -0.044836 -0.034062 0.018837 -0.038690 
2014M11 0.104156 0.017705 -0.133486 0.039323 -0.054368 -0.037225 -0.040579 
2014M12 0.207349 -0.058521 0.075340 -0.030116 0.064311 0.073473 0.061016 
2015M01 0.194801 0.745885 -0.482633 -0.074268 -0.188648 -0.186199 -0.179194 
2015M02 0.124416 -0.132622 -0.049499 0.055727 -0.026605 -0.055663 -0.049675 
2015M03 0.151566 -0.370395 -0.218494 -0.188552 -0.005598 -0.006269 -0.027716 
2015M04 0.138326 -0.376124 -0.009058 0.354280 -0.209783 -0.224056 -0.225838 
2015M05 0.056628 0.078678 0.075765 -0.008775 -0.010004 0.012218 -0.010789 
2015M06 0.065771 0.057791 0.027272 -0.011223 -0.026434 -0.041879 -0.018007 
        
        
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
The influence statistics indicate the presence of outliers. 
1. RStudent: 5 outliers 
2. DFFITS: 3 outliers 
3. COVRATIO: 10 outliers 
4. Hat Matrix: 27 outliers 
5. DFBETAS 
 Intercept: 3 outliers 
 Inflation: 5 outliers 
 Industrial Production: 5 outliers 
 Real Interest Rate: 5 outliers 
 Risk Premium: 4 outliers 
 Term Structure: 4 outliers 
 Oil Price: 5 outliers 
The results from the leverage plots and influence statistics indicate that model (1) lacks 
explanatory power, possibly due to the number of outliers as the risk premium variable which 
is consistently statistically significant has the fewest number of outliers or due to the fact that 
the residuals are serially correlated. 
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4. China 
Endogeneity tests were conducted on regression models (1) and (2) and all variables were 
found to be exogenous. The robustness checks on (1) can also be found in Table D1 above. 
The residual of (1) was found to be stationary, normally distributed and no ARCH effects were 
found to be present. The leverage plots and influence statistics (Figure D4 and Table D5 below) 
are consistent with the regression results and indicate that outliers are not necessarily the reason 
behind (1)’s poor explanatory power. Overall, (1) suffers from serially correlated residuals, but 
not redundant variables or outliers. 
Leverage plots and influence statistics were completed for model (1) – a macroeconomic APT 
model without the FEARS variable. 
Figure D4: Leverage Plots - China 
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Table D5: Influence Statistics - China 
      
      Obs. Resid. RStudent DFFITS   COVRATIO Hat Matrix 
      
      2012M01 0.040272 0.706930 -0.398482 1.457447 0.241122 
2012M02 0.051699 0.938763 -0.589691 1.428150 0.282939 
2012M03 -0.062975 -1.020402 0.331285 1.096335 0.095354 
2012M04 0.068537 1.097495 -0.299756 1.031658 0.069420 
2012M05 0.003873 0.062848 -0.023745 1.398684 0.124913 
2012M06 -0.055255 -0.926190 0.402825 1.223531 0.159071 
2012M07 -0.063597 -1.062116 0.439709 1.141816 0.146314 
2012M08 -0.026049 -0.435189 0.196752 1.419083 0.169711 
2012M09 0.007279 0.115681 -0.035767 1.338375 0.087255 
2012M10 -0.035469 -0.594683 0.270722 1.375499 0.171665 
2012M11 -0.067912 -1.117433 0.407781 1.078385 0.117521 
2012M12 0.137279 2.364293 -0.767408 0.466539 0.095312 
2013M01 0.035291 0.564489 -0.178402 1.262151 0.090812 
2013M02 -0.000670 -0.011463 0.005976 1.557812 0.213684 
2013M03 -0.052962 -0.905101 0.441053 1.283142 0.191892 
2013M04 -0.019942 -0.323571 0.120577 1.365364 0.121931 
2013M05 0.041300 0.656120 -0.187259 1.213059 0.075320 
2013M06 -0.131192 -3.077038 2.865306 0.409683 0.464414 
2013M07 -0.031292 -0.515071 0.210191 1.353291 0.142758 
2013M08 0.038904 0.690294 -0.406772 1.497130 0.257743 
2013M09 0.030719 0.487003 -0.140355 1.263699 0.076690 
2013M10 -0.013106 -0.206866 0.058397 1.310988 0.073807 
2013M11 0.011653 0.184216 -0.053170 1.317778 0.076900 
2013M12 -0.061470 -1.013074 0.384533 1.138070 0.125931 
2014M01 -0.043213 -0.673164 0.133205 1.160258 0.037681 
2014M02 0.022187 0.358951 -0.130163 1.349824 0.116212 
2014M03 0.005172 0.082773 -0.027585 1.359097 0.099962 
2014M04 -0.005037 -0.086123 0.044595 1.551039 0.211434 
2014M05 -0.035242 -0.638430 0.407382 1.585781 0.289354 
2014M06 0.012488 0.203600 -0.079361 1.399099 0.131897 
2014M07 0.056475 0.914743 -0.304846 1.148023 0.099960 
2014M08 -0.016321 -0.257231 0.070811 1.299980 0.070442 
2014M09 0.065593 1.112988 -0.504431 1.149393 0.170407 
2014M10 0.004294 0.068378 -0.021624 1.346173 0.090914 
2014M11 0.080615 1.333438 -0.477426 0.967259 0.113628 
2014M12 0.148832 2.825563 -1.458830 0.354430 0.210461 
2015M01 -0.106531 -2.190409 1.707402 0.781625 0.377956 
2015M02 -0.042854 -0.752254 0.422336 1.435273 0.239659 
2015M03 0.036544 0.655865 -0.404425 1.548300 0.275484 
2015M04 0.086768 1.544285 -0.823571 0.978902 0.221433 
2015M05 -0.023684 -0.397118 0.183858 1.440124 0.176515 
2015M06 -0.091001 -1.863191 1.502725 1.023728 0.394121 
      
      
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
        
        
Obs. C INFLATION 
INDUSTRIAL_
PRODUCTION 
REAL_INTE
REST_RATE 
RISK_PREMI
UM 
TERM_STR
UCTURE OIL_PRICE 
        
        2012M01 0.241122 -0.089369 0.241163 -0.260386 0.157253 0.186370 0.151189 
2012M02 0.282939 -0.091588 -0.256032 -0.231955 0.229464 0.114626 0.209521 
2012M03 0.095354 0.139224 -0.168725 0.151252 -0.020612 0.004199 -0.005577 
2012M04 0.069420 -0.163846 0.038042 -0.112284 0.094257 0.107379 0.108002 
2012M05 0.124913 -0.007784 -0.009437 -0.011228 -0.013047 -0.014884 -0.013552 
2012M06 0.159071 0.083287 0.190117 0.045158 0.096490 0.019475 0.060912 
2012M07 0.146314 0.076197 -0.079189 0.242546 -0.266824 -0.285562 -0.276416 
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2012M08 0.169711 0.049559 -0.112261 0.134609 -0.125253 -0.092079 -0.123926 
2012M09 0.087255 -0.004236 -0.005547 -0.004953 -0.004121 -0.009993 -0.008116 
2012M10 0.171665 -0.023592 0.038564 -0.206203 -0.083567 -0.099122 -0.086269 
2012M11 0.117521 -0.033203 -0.097834 -0.282957 -0.083446 -0.144530 -0.085356 
2012M12 0.095312 -0.111899 0.178504 0.312841 -0.372459 -0.314554 -0.347062 
2013M01 0.090812 -0.009221 -0.083008 0.108715 0.025577 0.041795 0.028369 
2013M02 0.213684 0.001356 -0.005090 0.000825 -0.000484 -0.000774 -0.000633 
2013M03 0.191892 0.078874 0.369075 -0.102549 0.198562 0.126139 0.189510 
2013M04 0.121931 0.031966 -0.068249 0.092267 -0.029946 -0.014498 -0.032216 
2013M05 0.075320 -0.004085 -0.079487 -0.029457 -0.071394 -0.083609 -0.088623 
2013M06 0.464414 0.247906 0.284110 -0.107158 2.097942 2.556824 2.130834 
2013M07 0.142758 -0.035859 -0.016764 -0.082368 -0.087630 -0.092867 -0.071128 
2013M08 0.257743 0.006484 -0.035102 0.109248 0.085974 -0.032439 0.085754 
2013M09 0.076690 -0.023606 0.062562 0.053860 -0.014468 -0.001073 -0.013151 
2013M10 0.073807 0.015714 -0.022710 0.020850 -0.022521 -0.011541 -0.024993 
2013M11 0.076900 0.007192 -0.007107 0.002067 0.017246 0.002540 0.012891 
2013M12 0.125931 -0.002580 0.185768 0.013973 0.029241 0.147990 0.054517 
2014M01 0.037681 0.029772 0.009637 0.001824 0.063370 0.048093 0.063185 
2014M02 0.116212 -0.045696 -0.030819 0.003022 -0.001541 0.030582 0.011717 
2014M03 0.099962 -0.010491 0.013631 -0.008763 -0.002342 -0.002598 -0.000120 
2014M04 0.211434 0.006279 0.017632 -0.028330 0.003989 -0.009206 0.000214 
2014M05 0.289354 -0.064597 -0.107971 -0.160464 0.007256 -0.035322 0.040698 
2014M06 0.131897 -0.018994 -0.030543 0.051469 -0.042011 -0.022426 -0.036152 
2014M07 0.099960 -0.005971 0.082124 0.025780 0.204112 0.150458 0.208632 
2014M08 0.070442 -0.006606 0.018269 0.014642 -0.002633 0.002809 0.005092 
2014M09 0.170407 -0.051730 -0.257237 -0.071665 -0.396418 -0.359107 -0.410359 
2014M10 0.090914 0.003193 -0.001843 0.000486 -0.010786 -0.005065 -0.010954 
2014M11 0.113628 0.111240 -0.087713 0.034621 -0.191255 -0.042989 -0.168131 
2014M12 0.210461 0.719456 0.010547 -0.484535 -0.439332 -0.723055 -0.434363 
2015M01 0.377956 -1.290295 0.445603 0.474102 -0.059187 0.058651 0.070553 
2015M02 0.239659 -0.286222 -0.232305 0.067446 -0.109707 -0.149071 -0.105638 
2015M03 0.275484 0.335067 0.009597 0.070516 0.105567 0.020351 0.096500 
2015M04 0.221433 0.651804 -0.007018 0.301085 -0.065421 0.071317 -0.098895 
2015M05 0.176515 -0.123058 0.005054 -0.030853 -0.082205 -0.062245 -0.088158 
2015M06 0.394121 -0.301512 -0.241895 -0.206205 0.085049 -0.088974 -0.109168 
        
        
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
The influence statistics indicate the presence of outliers. 
1. RStudent: 4 outliers 
2. DFFITS: 5 outliers 
3. COVRATIO: 7 outliers 
4. Hat Matrix: 19 outliers 
5. DFBETAS 
 Intercept: 3 outliers 
 Inflation: 4 outliers 
 Industrial Production: 2 outliers 
 Real Interest Rate: 3 outliers 
 Risk Premium: 4 outliers 
 Term Structure: 4 outliers 
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 Oil Price: 4 outliers 
The results from the leverage plots and influence statistics indicate that model (1) lacks 
explanatory power. However, outliers do not appear to be the reason behind this as there are 
very few outliers for each variable.  
 
5. South Africa 
Endogeneity tests were conducted on regression models (1) and (2) and all variables were 
found to be exogenous. The robustness checks on (2) can also be found in Table D1 above. 
The residual of (2) was found to be stationary, normally distributed and no ARCH effects were 
found to be present. The leverage plots and influence statistics (Figure D5 and Table D6 below) 
are consistent with the regression results and show that the number of outliers is not necessarily 
related to those variables found to be statistically significant. Overall, (2) suffers from serially 
correlated residuals, but not from redundant variables of the presence of outliers. Finally, 
output (2) in Table C10 in Appendix C shows the result of a correlation analysis between 
FEARS and the SAVI. This relationship is found to be positively and statistically significantly 
correlated at the 5% level of significance; this implies that the regression result could provide 
support for the noise trader hypothesis (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990) and 
is not necessarily a true explanatory relationship. 
Leverage plots and influence statistics were completed for model (2) – a macroeconomic APT 
model with the FEARS variable included. 
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Figure D5: Leverage Plots - South Africa 
 
 
Table D6: Influence Statistics - South Africa 
      
      Obs. Resid. RStudent DFFITS   COVRATIO Hat Matrix 
      
      2010M02 -0.002069 -0.080722 0.018921 1.214279 0.052080 
2010M03 0.010654 0.444011 -0.198450 1.343942 0.166503 
2010M04 -0.017107 -0.733330 0.375166 1.346650 0.207435 
2010M05 -0.032369 -1.303153 0.391887 0.989235 0.082934 
2010M06 -0.048061 -2.045194 0.838371 0.756267 0.143862 
2010M07 0.031764 1.320432 -0.530964 1.047283 0.139189 
2010M08 -0.035091 -1.492959 0.678766 1.017393 0.171295 
2010M09 0.052153 2.162046 -0.682139 0.667060 0.090532 
2010M10 0.005891 0.234885 -0.074556 1.258237 0.091530 
2010M11 0.016677 0.676308 -0.244517 1.220635 0.115605 
2010M12 0.048053 1.945352 -0.492774 0.726616 0.060296 
2011M01 -0.064524 -3.116163 1.915468 0.441694 0.274227 
2011M02 0.003566 0.150444 -0.072697 1.416542 0.189298 
2011M03 -0.004730 -0.193637 0.077731 1.330622 0.138780 
2011M04 0.012668 0.506963 -0.164375 1.227435 0.095128 
2011M05 -0.021174 -0.823596 0.156639 1.084166 0.034909 
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2011M06 -0.021205 -0.827215 0.169968 1.089572 0.040508 
2011M07 -0.020761 -0.817908 0.205540 1.113861 0.059400 
2011M08 -0.003914 -0.161406 0.068201 1.352769 0.151493 
2011M09 0.021048 0.931166 -0.539798 1.361244 0.251527 
2011M10 0.021501 0.891109 -0.371718 1.208496 0.148216 
2011M11 0.014726 0.591946 -0.199041 1.219952 0.101579 
2011M12 -0.007001 -0.292127 0.132316 1.371660 0.170230 
2012M01 -0.004480 -0.198395 0.118824 1.556614 0.264009 
2012M02 -0.026416 -1.055181 0.306704 1.067378 0.077904 
2012M03 -0.017289 -0.698105 0.242346 1.204497 0.107551 
2012M04 0.013184 0.510101 -0.092477 1.146655 0.031821 
2012M05 -0.015349 -0.609793 0.179766 1.187662 0.079957 
2012M06 -0.014062 -0.559760 0.170048 1.203499 0.084490 
2012M07 -0.000590 -0.023350 0.006878 1.251967 0.079830 
2012M08 -0.009229 -0.367884 0.115674 1.241804 0.089971 
2012M09 -0.005839 -0.228587 0.056574 1.213594 0.057718 
2012M10 0.012831 0.499228 -0.105639 1.161689 0.042858 
2012M11 -0.003008 -0.117269 0.027016 1.210875 0.050397 
2012M12 0.005982 0.234417 -0.059039 1.215614 0.059646 
2013M01 0.017649 0.714032 -0.251781 1.204769 0.110589 
2013M02 -0.014135 -0.562834 0.171600 1.203645 0.085049 
2013M03 0.000940 0.037617 -0.012417 1.277396 0.098260 
2013M04 -0.031366 -1.256184 0.358260 0.997488 0.075219 
2013M05 0.059317 2.925500 -1.989761 0.540123 0.316284 
2013M06 -0.019124 -0.776829 0.281814 1.196603 0.116300 
2013M07 0.036559 1.480302 -0.453128 0.926901 0.085673 
2013M08 0.024181 0.956673 -0.248639 1.080335 0.063274 
2013M09 0.017552 0.699746 -0.212443 1.173653 0.084394 
2013M10 0.009026 0.355217 -0.094839 1.212213 0.066539 
2013M11 -0.026049 -1.071145 0.412860 1.125083 0.129346 
2013M12 -0.012949 -0.527113 0.199269 1.265645 0.125042 
2014M01 -0.018990 -0.811131 0.405517 1.311603 0.199962 
2014M02 0.039716 1.737780 -0.884766 0.953046 0.205857 
2014M03 -0.000812 -0.032932 0.012371 1.314489 0.123665 
2014M04 0.026297 1.051760 -0.310904 1.071309 0.080360 
2014M05 0.006975 0.287031 -0.119149 1.334846 0.146987 
2014M06 -0.009705 -0.383121 0.106632 1.215634 0.071895 
2014M07 0.005339 0.211489 -0.062322 1.244185 0.079898 
2014M08 -0.010369 -0.408512 0.110191 1.206864 0.067824 
2014M09 -0.032491 -1.336161 0.492896 1.018280 0.119780 
2014M10 0.017374 0.692456 -0.209822 1.174956 0.084095 
2014M11 -0.000804 -0.031976 0.009983 1.264224 0.088814 
2014M12 0.023337 0.985220 -0.456243 1.219462 0.176582 
2015M01 0.033782 1.578539 -1.057801 1.178484 0.309894 
2015M02 0.027930 1.250002 -0.740334 1.248722 0.259687 
2015M03 0.000929 0.042071 -0.027277 1.636014 0.295959 
2015M04 -0.008416 -0.359365 0.183599 1.426305 0.206989 
2015M05 -0.057431 -2.362515 0.610134 0.574697 0.062526 
2015M06 -0.000693 -0.027151 0.006893 1.226238 0.060549 
      
      
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
         
         
Obs. INFLATION 
INDUSTRIAL_P
RODUCTION 
REAL_INTE
REST_RATE 
RISK_PREMI
UM 
TERM_STR
UCTURE OIL_PRICE FEARS C 
         
         2010M02 0.052080 -0.006528 -0.002720 0.005772 0.004719 0.006581 -0.011627 0.000790 
2010M03 0.166503 0.037858 0.052464 -0.015738 0.024766 0.008559 0.057313 -0.143721 
2010M04 0.207435 0.196300 -0.301901 0.103500 -0.032603 -0.005155 -0.042992 0.029063 
2010M05 0.082934 0.062865 -0.110894 0.164359 0.237588 0.190494 -0.204292 0.024277 
2010M06 0.143862 0.461005 -0.483574 -0.341193 -0.360431 -0.313678 -0.371705 -0.095088 
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2010M07 0.139189 0.192001 -0.199524 0.090924 0.064255 -0.009084 0.259573 -0.200870 
2010M08 0.171295 0.158875 0.161938 -0.177132 -0.250156 -0.201732 -0.222059 -0.492142 
2010M09 0.090532 -0.235906 0.187093 -0.026598 0.153163 0.146117 0.346294 -0.127341 
2010M10 0.091530 -0.013723 0.007865 -0.020106 0.006734 0.004172 0.028099 -0.016005 
2010M11 0.115605 -0.032311 -0.035327 0.071942 0.030050 0.071164 0.099915 0.160026 
2010M12 0.060296 -0.033718 -0.180102 -0.114057 0.007681 0.001831 0.125697 0.085780 
2011M01 0.274227 -0.770443 1.512561 -0.274004 -0.025366 -0.370434 -0.160006 0.589025 
2011M02 0.189298 -0.002723 0.040854 0.009872 -0.004534 -0.007809 0.017532 -0.038035 
2011M03 0.138780 -0.033782 -0.037795 0.024057 0.006778 0.006311 -0.003938 -0.004227 
2011M04 0.095128 -0.083805 0.130507 -0.010931 0.036857 0.008841 -0.016060 0.036881 
2011M05 0.034909 0.033552 -0.075936 0.070500 0.012260 0.029140 0.002628 0.021249 
2011M06 0.040508 -0.048906 0.095319 -0.040733 0.022796 0.001460 -0.043677 -0.038066 
2011M07 0.059400 -0.131999 0.070512 -0.001932 -0.004297 -0.001149 -0.034530 -0.103711 
2011M08 0.151493 0.013039 -0.013443 0.044157 0.050004 0.056140 -0.008805 0.036583 
2011M09 0.251527 0.088711 -0.062197 -0.336268 -0.475259 -0.376266 0.021645 0.046433 
2011M10 0.148216 -0.052403 -0.006835 0.233333 0.313744 0.240054 -0.028627 -0.010057 
2011M11 0.101579 -0.033243 0.038816 -0.001156 -0.078254 -0.075950 -0.009711 -0.073705 
2011M12 0.170230 0.041836 0.000132 -0.059711 -0.048052 -0.045093 0.014556 -0.106355 
2012M01 0.264009 -0.046701 0.097432 -0.019739 -0.029261 -0.030392 0.026765 0.016362 
2012M02 0.077904 0.023077 -0.067010 -0.212744 -0.201501 -0.191902 0.044070 0.072903 
2012M03 0.107551 -0.169870 0.051839 0.052843 0.031869 0.015615 0.053575 -0.085023 
2012M04 0.031821 -0.024604 0.025713 -0.035478 -0.013781 -0.028008 -0.047053 -0.010163 
2012M05 0.079957 0.107503 -0.072364 0.073332 0.089130 0.084662 0.031316 -0.021848 
2012M06 0.084490 0.020490 0.027384 0.081760 0.016892 0.050607 0.015590 0.053289 
2012M07 0.079830 0.001370 0.001390 -0.001440 -0.002490 -0.000516 0.000453 -0.001298 
2012M08 0.089971 0.050356 -0.046763 0.016464 -0.027247 -0.025621 0.038744 0.033569 
2012M09 0.057718 -0.037359 0.020463 0.007798 -0.000860 0.002389 0.013507 -0.006719 
2012M10 0.042858 0.013271 0.021442 0.047181 0.031434 0.036227 -0.017891 -0.039517 
2012M11 0.050397 0.008949 -0.006793 -0.005857 -0.003324 -0.001435 0.005627 0.015241 
2012M12 0.059646 -0.015457 -0.024424 0.015217 0.022980 0.012762 -0.018032 0.013646 
2013M01 0.110589 -0.060244 0.040097 -0.041568 0.057848 0.068673 -0.102761 0.059163 
2013M02 0.085049 -0.097560 0.026674 0.059143 0.035527 0.036854 0.054811 -0.063228 
2013M03 0.098260 0.009418 -0.000923 -0.003992 -0.004542 -0.003225 -0.002005 -0.001790 
2013M04 0.075219 0.077705 -0.044092 0.197423 0.098657 0.193919 0.099613 -0.052417 
2013M05 0.316284 -0.554673 -0.115053 0.647742 0.233327 0.789043 -0.295056 -0.571272 
2013M06 0.116300 0.025649 -0.003987 0.052466 0.148023 0.097592 0.071832 -0.096022 
2013M07 0.085673 0.332547 -0.133054 0.040302 -0.025393 0.042617 -0.153275 0.043898 
2013M08 0.063274 -0.062987 0.026193 0.021530 -0.037796 -0.002906 -0.145022 -0.001342 
2013M09 0.084394 -0.030800 -0.000291 -0.029589 0.012420 -0.045063 -0.121392 -0.011263 
2013M10 0.066539 -0.043398 0.006361 0.041572 0.055069 0.049691 -0.053317 0.020000 
2013M11 0.129346 0.070822 0.114886 -0.177773 -0.003268 -0.056814 0.112816 0.098125 
2013M12 0.125042 0.050807 -0.033862 0.065653 0.024789 0.035289 0.106018 0.138443 
2014M01 0.199962 -0.049157 -0.057620 0.082466 0.034698 -0.058377 0.160397 -0.034390 
2014M02 0.205857 0.309416 0.009058 0.326145 0.100618 0.018578 -0.146101 0.125637 
2014M03 0.123665 -0.007628 -0.001983 0.004027 0.003655 0.004130 0.003499 0.002631 
2014M04 0.080360 -0.072125 0.117714 -0.053512 0.034910 0.028081 -0.163779 0.148099 
2014M05 0.146987 -0.029573 -0.025513 0.069228 0.062788 0.053985 -0.038783 0.072698 
2014M06 0.071895 0.028123 0.005736 -5.77E-05 -0.013499 -0.009456 0.071661 0.051426 
2014M07 0.079898 0.029197 -0.018306 0.000656 -0.019060 -0.018840 -0.019473 -0.006007 
2014M08 0.067824 0.010612 0.026630 0.054713 0.027075 0.039752 0.058791 -0.027365 
2014M09 0.119780 0.117681 0.158239 -0.205981 0.011498 -0.054020 0.097839 -0.007087 
2014M10 0.084095 -0.078681 0.002470 -0.031763 0.006053 -0.031741 -0.037897 0.138588 
2014M11 0.088814 0.003901 0.000425 0.004981 0.005499 0.006691 -0.000780 0.003819 
2014M12 0.176582 -0.079727 -0.088980 -0.137808 -0.272148 -0.180641 0.181402 -0.071802 
2015M01 0.309894 -0.172344 -0.310404 -0.431730 -0.360168 -0.525330 0.495697 0.020638 
2015M02 0.259687 0.214236 -0.141474 0.388789 0.342233 0.496516 0.357163 0.256158 
2015M03 0.295959 0.014990 0.005186 0.004111 0.000474 0.001918 0.016990 0.009638 
2015M04 0.206989 -0.065921 -0.002353 -0.092403 -0.056343 -0.060706 -0.106983 0.080205 
2015M05 0.062526 0.145318 -0.196571 -0.249415 -0.206286 -0.240002 -0.387426 0.046386 
2015M06 0.060549 -0.001634 0.001503 -0.000431 0.001970 0.001140 -0.004757 -0.000824 
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Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
The influence statistics indicate the presence of outliers. 
1. RStudent: 5 outliers 
2. DFFITS: 6 outliers 
3. COVRATIO: 8 outliers 
4. Hat Matrix: 26 outliers 
5. DFBETAS 
 Intercept: 4 outliers 
 Inflation: 7 outliers 
 Industrial Production: 5 outliers 
 Real Interest Rate: 4 outliers 
 Risk Premium: 8 outliers 
 Term Structure: 7 outliers 
 Oil Price: 6 outliers 
 FEARS: 7 outliers 
The results from the leverage plots and influence statistics indicate that model (2) has strong 
explanatory power. The number of outliers does not appear to be correlated to explanatory 
power as those variables found to explain Alsi returns do not necessarily have the least amount 
of outliers. 
 
6. Germany 
Endogeneity tests were conducted on regression models (1) and (2) and all variables were 
found to be exogenous. The robustness checks on (2) can also be found in Table D1 above. 
The residual of (2) was found to be stationary, non-normal and no ARCH effects were found 
to be present. The leverage plots and influence statistics (Figure D6 and Table D7 below) 
demonstrate a similar picture as the regression results and indicate that outliers are not a source 
of concern in this instance. Overall, (2) suffers from serially correlated residuals but does not 
necessarily lack explanatory power. 
Leverage plots and influence statistics were completed for model (2) – a macroeconomic 
APT model with the FEARS variable included. 
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Figure D6: Leverage Plots - Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D7: Influence Statistics - Germany 
      
      Obs. Resid. RStudent DFFITS   COVRATIO Hat Matrix 
      
      2010M02 -0.005771 -0.172580 0.046498 1.230500 0.067679 
2010M03 0.018164 0.556803 -0.193992 1.236139 0.108245 
2010M04 -0.029252 -0.919101 0.375610 1.192756 0.143111 
2010M05 0.021744 0.691743 -0.312538 1.296010 0.169528 
2010M06 -0.024428 -0.743519 0.236039 1.172374 0.091555 
2010M07 -0.037749 -1.145354 0.322727 1.033295 0.073555 
2010M08 -0.055846 -1.710288 0.451244 0.820018 0.065082 
2010M09 0.007984 0.237771 -0.059730 1.214970 0.059360 
2010M10 0.027495 0.819066 -0.187352 1.102220 0.049720 
2010M11 0.045708 1.389518 -0.372916 0.941739 0.067187 
2010M12 -0.002051 -0.061640 0.017854 1.248093 0.077403 
2011M01 -0.033523 -1.117273 0.615874 1.259294 0.233043 
2011M02 -0.007844 -0.238602 0.078836 1.267542 0.098425 
2011M03 -0.015494 -0.471265 0.153234 1.234213 0.095616 
2011M04 0.037275 1.155826 -0.411752 1.075157 0.112616 
2011M05 -0.032547 -0.958785 0.150160 1.036211 0.023941 
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2011M06 0.030113 0.893945 -0.184681 1.072546 0.040933 
2011M07 -0.028962 -0.874925 0.247982 1.116558 0.074360 
2011M08 -0.120345 -4.373983 1.863526 0.129674 0.153630 
2011M09 0.019381 0.603145 -0.237233 1.263191 0.133978 
2011M10 -0.008653 -0.279813 0.140795 1.427762 0.202034 
2011M11 0.080329 2.676480 -1.138953 0.519455 0.153321 
2011M12 -0.043166 -1.465280 0.843847 1.135453 0.249054 
2012M01 -0.001207 -0.037763 0.015812 1.353821 0.149166 
2012M02 -0.002635 -0.080468 0.027721 1.287655 0.106091 
2012M03 0.004897 0.149454 -0.051199 1.283220 0.105031 
2012M04 -0.020008 -0.601734 0.168440 1.179954 0.072664 
2012M05 -0.031579 -0.979243 0.359074 1.141021 0.118522 
2012M06 0.007289 0.227697 -0.093837 1.337840 0.145179 
2012M07 0.021160 0.645018 -0.210842 1.201894 0.096535 
2012M08 -0.001254 -0.037103 0.008382 1.210672 0.048557 
2012M09 0.014805 0.437918 -0.094253 1.172959 0.044272 
2012M10 -0.028169 -0.838486 0.187581 1.094854 0.047663 
2012M11 -0.001339 -0.039451 0.008096 1.200366 0.040413 
2012M12 0.006366 0.189342 -0.046676 1.215885 0.057289 
2013M01 0.023221 0.730704 -0.307406 1.256890 0.150373 
2013M02 -0.009771 -0.321432 0.174929 1.471479 0.228499 
2013M03 0.008197 0.258630 -0.113652 1.361527 0.161852 
2013M04 -0.001599 -0.049729 0.019973 1.337496 0.138910 
2013M05 0.059002 2.071665 -1.267072 0.876890 0.272240 
2013M06 -0.010834 -0.371761 0.237894 1.592177 0.290522 
2013M07 0.024289 0.757124 -0.297303 1.225714 0.133594 
2013M08 -0.027499 -0.874500 0.388316 1.237446 0.164700 
2013M09 0.045200 1.357275 -0.295979 0.931573 0.045395 
2013M10 0.034521 1.054590 -0.330321 1.080974 0.089343 
2013M11 0.037764 1.122305 -0.214445 0.999512 0.035224 
2013M12 0.015345 0.458238 -0.117755 1.191964 0.061945 
2014M01 -0.023350 -0.719863 0.259653 1.209511 0.115125 
2014M02 0.025779 0.771690 -0.195257 1.126403 0.060169 
2014M03 -0.029922 -0.931732 0.355759 1.167220 0.127240 
2014M04 -0.014069 -0.427133 0.136723 1.237534 0.092938 
2014M05 0.041991 1.265759 -0.310133 0.974561 0.056633 
2014M06 -0.021547 -0.646860 0.175307 1.165230 0.068422 
2014M07 -0.030049 -0.900425 0.224460 1.090778 0.058506 
2014M08 0.000898 0.026749 -0.006763 1.225637 0.060085 
2014M09 0.022845 0.673797 -0.126973 1.118396 0.034293 
2014M10 -0.016733 -0.508756 0.164204 1.226054 0.094343 
2014M11 0.049572 1.497065 -0.342367 0.885718 0.049701 
2014M12 -0.029160 -0.956811 0.498245 1.286344 0.213320 
2015M01 0.048098 1.942015 -1.772289 1.253649 0.454400 
2015M02 0.006998 0.232422 -0.131974 1.511870 0.243811 
2015M03 0.028486 0.974954 -0.602751 1.391848 0.276523 
2015M04 -0.045316 -1.644382 1.171237 1.190869 0.336572 
2015M05 -0.013915 -0.424736 0.143691 1.251357 0.102698 
2015M06 -0.009329 -0.302847 0.155137 1.435525 0.207867 
      
      
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
 
         
         
Obs. 
INDUSTRIAL_P
RODUCTION INFLATION OIL_PRICE 
REAL_INTE
REST_RATE 
RISK_PREMI
UM 
TERM_STRUC
TURE FEARS C 
         
         2010M02 0.067679 0.008475 -0.025476 -0.030661 -0.000650 -0.000389 -0.000817 -0.010861 
2010M03 0.108245 0.068832 0.096834 0.097033 0.101200 0.104160 0.101741 0.021929 
2010M04 0.143111 -0.336352 0.047749 -0.110732 -0.033098 -0.039062 -0.034619 -0.163068 
2010M05 0.169528 0.167978 -0.106375 0.049483 -0.245364 -0.239380 -0.244299 -0.061704 
2010M06 0.091555 -0.184323 0.054609 -0.097464 -0.027647 -0.032409 -0.030032 -0.094706 
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2010M07 0.073555 -0.080032 -0.067060 -0.168272 -0.157662 -0.155933 -0.156153 0.037650 
2010M08 0.065082 0.018530 -0.057862 -0.213063 -0.140689 -0.160129 -0.141210 -0.218356 
2010M09 0.059360 0.018401 -0.018144 0.032286 0.017033 0.016231 0.017293 -0.003516 
2010M10 0.049720 0.057982 0.005839 0.117535 0.064331 0.057427 0.064078 0.052416 
2010M11 0.067187 0.076327 -0.037887 0.092606 -0.275957 -0.285759 -0.276521 -0.081512 
2010M12 0.077403 -0.007943 -0.010297 -0.003663 -0.000501 -0.000369 -0.000531 0.002256 
2011M01 0.233043 -0.391294 0.236954 0.004999 0.095149 0.086847 0.094803 0.298662 
2011M02 0.098425 -0.035097 -0.038832 -0.001942 0.012924 0.011962 0.013363 0.029876 
2011M03 0.095616 -0.080784 -0.063877 0.012884 0.043331 0.045104 0.043003 -0.045923 
2011M04 0.112616 0.313947 -0.134392 -0.111654 -0.061337 -0.051422 -0.061440 -0.076005 
2011M05 0.023941 0.026266 0.046612 0.062817 -0.001688 -0.003167 -0.001341 -0.015872 
2011M06 0.040933 -0.006451 -0.028298 -0.050633 -0.132921 -0.134222 -0.133106 -0.091213 
2011M07 0.074360 -0.183860 0.013435 0.024135 0.079533 0.067557 0.078860 -0.034322 
2011M08 0.153630 0.043774 0.185153 0.078346 1.486828 1.477655 1.478872 -0.184970 
2011M09 0.133978 0.083988 -0.014010 -0.006971 -0.156443 -0.151337 -0.154559 0.072807 
2011M10 0.202034 0.022519 0.004333 0.006332 -0.082608 -0.083587 -0.082487 0.061803 
2011M11 0.153321 -0.153169 -0.051791 -0.291011 -0.911500 -0.952948 -0.910949 -0.130210 
2011M12 0.249054 0.190214 -0.076227 0.057279 -0.308631 -0.335720 -0.321340 -0.427997 
2012M01 0.149166 -0.003702 0.003526 0.003703 -0.011738 -0.011969 -0.011737 -0.002205 
2012M02 0.106091 -0.000430 -0.017620 0.008047 -0.011837 -0.012116 -0.011755 0.003249 
2012M03 0.105031 0.023634 0.019958 -0.016485 0.005686 0.006009 0.005854 0.023203 
2012M04 0.072664 -0.017067 0.096815 0.115331 0.049905 0.047754 0.050689 0.041389 
2012M05 0.118522 0.041019 0.065401 0.119253 0.111977 0.094214 0.108996 -0.107310 
2012M06 0.145179 -0.043221 -0.023078 -0.001873 0.041826 0.036666 0.042415 0.024719 
2012M07 0.096535 -0.065494 0.077643 -0.072903 -0.016300 -0.007181 -0.018350 -0.128974 
2012M08 0.048557 -0.001523 -0.002857 0.004143 -0.001686 -0.001659 -0.001667 0.000999 
2012M09 0.044272 0.021701 -0.013514 -0.038331 0.039532 0.037263 0.039679 0.040293 
2012M10 0.047663 0.040218 0.043657 0.084741 -0.034721 -0.035128 -0.034379 0.096592 
2012M11 0.040413 0.002901 -2.03E-05 0.003808 -0.001641 -0.001633 -0.001536 0.001703 
2012M12 0.057289 -0.029761 0.017870 -0.010068 0.020900 0.021003 0.020913 0.008013 
2013M01 0.150373 0.132711 -0.228188 -0.063751 -0.032417 -0.044491 -0.031567 0.005798 
2013M02 0.228499 0.066008 -0.078464 0.043741 -0.008680 -0.007391 -0.005684 0.005164 
2013M03 0.161852 -0.030328 0.035974 -0.012902 -0.007305 -0.003425 -0.005546 -0.003702 
2013M04 0.138910 0.000710 0.011286 0.002713 -0.009775 -0.009617 -0.009782 -0.011751 
2013M05 0.272240 -0.425595 0.187779 -0.115078 -0.274542 -0.290123 -0.259078 -0.515975 
2013M06 0.290522 0.064801 -0.003733 0.051823 0.049017 0.060658 0.053430 0.021781 
2013M07 0.133594 -0.097755 0.134109 -0.068924 0.100190 0.094005 0.096412 0.094823 
2013M08 0.164700 0.138692 0.064041 0.156676 0.135783 0.138881 0.135935 0.317477 
2013M09 0.045395 0.050744 -0.093713 -0.170064 -0.030799 -0.028842 -0.033693 -0.084223 
2013M10 0.089343 -0.071232 -0.111006 -0.063996 0.180684 0.179344 0.181733 0.201903 
2013M11 0.035224 -0.068648 0.031887 -0.039112 0.052352 0.049584 0.054190 0.088810 
2013M12 0.061945 -0.017091 0.046420 -0.015903 0.025856 0.018878 0.025137 0.051989 
2014M01 0.115125 -0.003642 0.198093 0.056581 -0.040203 -0.043682 -0.040369 -0.094669 
2014M02 0.060169 -0.029673 0.110987 -0.009073 0.074862 0.075052 0.076228 0.098679 
2014M03 0.127240 0.220669 -0.086236 0.103933 0.075405 0.075740 0.079009 0.271736 
2014M04 0.092938 0.049217 0.050756 0.053725 0.026677 0.025082 0.027643 0.102631 
2014M05 0.056633 -0.078892 -0.099901 -0.088584 0.071789 0.071971 0.073049 0.173593 
2014M06 0.068422 0.052418 -0.033113 0.077784 0.058413 0.053407 0.058510 0.125042 
2014M07 0.058506 0.045275 -0.040471 0.057529 0.063595 0.058422 0.060621 0.004574 
2014M08 0.060085 -0.000802 -0.000886 -0.001702 0.000853 0.001217 0.000827 0.001972 
2014M09 0.034293 -0.016898 -0.041725 -0.034587 -0.046309 -0.051948 -0.046200 0.016599 
2014M10 0.094343 0.055024 0.064833 0.020012 0.014464 0.015315 0.016980 0.033957 
2014M11 0.049701 0.036712 -0.025951 0.181924 0.092768 0.106117 0.093856 0.157207 
2014M12 0.213320 0.242185 -0.039007 -0.242741 0.099522 0.084015 0.098855 0.221802 
2015M01 0.454400 -0.245504 -0.851431 0.823939 0.058141 0.130872 0.052811 -0.259298 
2015M02 0.243811 -0.012575 0.094961 0.092054 0.025651 0.024510 0.025154 -0.005926 
2015M03 0.276523 0.124149 0.213749 0.359616 -0.068231 -0.027527 -0.067413 0.053709 
2015M04 0.336572 0.062005 0.039121 -0.526700 -0.236097 -0.131426 -0.236850 -0.356157 
2015M05 0.102698 0.027455 -0.008269 -0.080512 -0.001513 0.008642 -0.001323 0.014310 
2015M06 0.207867 0.020683 0.022399 -0.067505 0.017938 0.030861 0.017722 -0.025956 
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Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
The influence statistics indicate the presence of outliers. 
1. RStudent: 3 outliers 
2. DFFITS: 6 outliers 
3. COVRATIO: 8 outliers 
4. Hat Matrix: 26 outliers 
5. DFBETAS 
 Intercept: 7 outliers 
 Inflation: 4 outliers 
 Industrial Production: 6 outliers 
 Real Interest Rate: 4 outliers 
 Risk Premium: 5 outliers 
 Term Structure: 5 outliers 
 Oil Price: 1 outlier 
 FEARS: 5 outliers 
The results from the leverage plots and influence statistics indicate that model (2) contains 
explanatory power. Outliers do not appear to have had an impact on the model as variables that 
have few outliers were not necessarily found to be statistically significant. 
 
7. Japan 
Endogeneity tests were conducted on regression models (1) and (2) and all variables were 
found to be exogenous. The robustness checks on (2) can also be found in Table D1 above. 
The residual of (2) was found to be stationary, normally distributed and no ARCH effects were 
found to be present. The leverage plots and influence statistics (Figure D7 and Table D8 below) 
are consistent with the regression results as only the observation of FEARS plot closely to the 
fit line, whereas the observations of other variables are widely dispersed. Moreover, the 
presence of outliers does not appear to be an issue as the number of outliers for each variable 
is quite low. Finally, output (4) in Table C10 in Appendix C shows the result of a correlation 
analysis between FEARS and the Nikkei VIX. This relationship, although negative in direction, 
was found to be statistically insignificant. Thus, it can be said that the relationship found 
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between FEARS and Nikkei returns is a true statistical relationship and it not caused by noise 
trading. Overall, (2) suffers from serially correlated residuals but not from redundant variables, 
the presence of outliers, or the effects of noise trading. 
Leverage plots and influence statistics were completed for model (2) – a macroeconomic APT 
model with the FEARS variable included. 
Figure D7: Leverage Plots - Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D8: Influence Statistics - Japan 
      
      Obs. Resid. RStudent DFFITS   COVRATIO Hat Matrix 
      
      2012M01 0.023819 0.554040 -0.127642 1.241685 0.050402 
2012M02 0.047476 1.187402 -0.501683 1.070767 0.151471 
2012M03 0.011208 0.261447 -0.067518 1.332200 0.062522 
2012M04 -0.016517 -0.418824 0.212116 1.529193 0.204137 
2012M05 -0.105454 -2.807019 0.987038 0.257293 0.110039 
2012M06 0.003746 0.098112 -0.057804 1.706521 0.257674 
2012M07 -0.051459 -1.229090 0.329020 0.951179 0.066868 
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2012M08 -0.026082 -0.632876 0.239148 1.317561 0.124949 
2012M09 0.000815 0.019245 -0.005911 1.389425 0.086212 
2012M10 0.035534 0.911211 -0.464702 1.311544 0.206401 
2012M11 0.055387 1.358221 -0.468118 0.919345 0.106175 
2012M12 0.041818 1.023317 -0.383174 1.127630 0.122967 
2013M01 0.049626 1.197189 -0.370356 0.990142 0.087341 
2013M02 0.039470 0.974855 -0.395781 1.178528 0.141504 
2013M03 0.065058 1.601403 -0.517572 0.770633 0.094578 
2013M04 0.047578 1.164637 -0.420986 1.040173 0.115564 
2013M05 -0.021111 -0.657727 0.617804 2.153552 0.468731 
2013M06 -0.003998 -0.099526 0.046369 1.541658 0.178346 
2013M07 -0.014250 -0.445215 0.423803 2.307092 0.475376 
2013M08 -0.031004 -0.749748 0.269868 1.252984 0.114700 
2013M09 0.065652 1.621023 -0.536029 0.763122 0.098567 
2013M10 -0.034426 -0.819282 0.246414 1.178611 0.082957 
2013M11 0.048216 1.143500 -0.286636 0.988951 0.059119 
2013M12 -0.013124 -0.319230 0.127169 1.435408 0.136958 
2014M01 -0.114993 -3.309934 1.559286 0.156588 0.181622 
2014M02 0.013312 0.328319 -0.143522 1.473451 0.160436 
2014M03 -0.038251 -0.918802 0.297974 1.146539 0.095166 
2014M04 -0.036106 -1.522464 2.290583 2.407513 0.693589 
2014M05 -0.013195 -0.318709 0.120340 1.415551 0.124781 
2014M06 0.012524 0.303428 -0.117493 1.427954 0.130388 
2014M07 0.004906 0.114722 -0.031154 1.359053 0.068682 
2014M08 -0.037418 -0.882109 0.227655 1.123962 0.062446 
2014M09 0.002872 0.068143 -0.022179 1.402689 0.095789 
2014M10 0.011167 0.268067 -0.096492 1.409532 0.114706 
2014M11 -0.009103 -0.241885 0.150009 1.733371 0.277773 
2014M12 0.020841 0.542805 -0.307433 1.561956 0.242874 
2015M01 0.002710 0.081603 -0.072083 2.256890 0.438295 
2015M02 0.014082 0.389410 -0.274058 1.830293 0.331240 
2015M03 0.001638 0.042507 -0.024128 1.678114 0.243676 
2015M04 0.006835 0.183598 -0.118391 1.783119 0.293695 
2015M05 -0.017349 -0.722090 1.106984 3.752496 0.701508 
2015M06 -0.042452 -1.049776 0.423164 1.134954 0.139777 
      
      
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
         
         
Obs. C INFLATION 
INDUSTRIAL_
PRODUCTION 
REAL_INTE
REST_RATE 
RISK_PREMI
UM 
TERM_STR
UCTURE OIL_PRICE FEARS 
         
         2012M01 0.050402 0.076873 0.054400 0.028345 0.011061 0.010956 0.010387 0.074038 
2012M02 0.151471 0.160752 0.105688 0.094735 0.308116 0.310170 0.301926 0.155122 
2012M03 0.062522 -0.001183 0.042971 0.020809 0.039198 0.037903 0.039516 -0.002178 
2012M04 0.204137 0.042773 -0.023196 -0.003942 -0.022320 -0.028362 -0.024483 0.045066 
2012M05 0.110039 -0.097707 0.376192 0.500282 -0.091038 -0.121117 -0.083339 -0.077268 
2012M06 0.257674 0.022634 -0.036976 -0.029094 -0.031740 -0.032704 -0.032447 0.021511 
2012M07 0.066868 -0.152937 0.148672 0.093173 0.007877 0.001814 0.011269 -0.143989 
2012M08 0.124949 -0.074910 -0.013348 0.044299 -0.124190 -0.124373 -0.120630 -0.071395 
2012M09 0.086212 0.000606 0.000485 -0.003393 0.001055 0.001132 0.001014 0.000499 
2012M10 0.206401 -0.055479 0.036230 0.085203 0.043404 0.036860 0.049516 -0.061543 
2012M11 0.106175 -0.009023 -0.185132 -0.083789 0.175869 0.191385 0.172346 -0.018717 
2012M12 0.122967 0.060375 0.058273 0.223150 0.201289 0.175442 0.200042 0.054032 
2013M01 0.087341 -0.065784 -0.144972 -0.222817 -0.264847 -0.258712 -0.268490 -0.074036 
2013M02 0.141504 -0.185664 -0.040715 0.172669 0.184453 0.203656 0.188475 -0.190602 
2013M03 0.094578 -0.147386 0.083550 0.128652 0.047552 0.099716 0.056325 -0.152280 
2013M04 0.115564 -0.016052 0.062248 0.083862 -0.020137 -0.042416 -0.019352 -0.022169 
2013M05 0.468731 0.151341 0.016933 -0.166571 -0.098491 -0.028137 -0.091534 0.160973 
2013M06 0.178346 0.014766 0.017935 0.037680 0.021498 0.021645 0.021702 0.015578 
2013M07 0.475376 0.082099 0.074639 0.002964 0.357662 0.358895 0.355617 0.086422 
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2013M08 0.114700 0.099600 -0.070518 -0.045477 -0.171252 -0.184644 -0.170645 0.102312 
2013M09 0.098567 -0.228194 0.151836 0.216423 -0.130260 -0.126273 -0.126430 -0.235520 
2013M10 0.082957 0.055228 0.026814 -0.035660 -0.002053 -0.021186 -0.000487 0.059108 
2013M11 0.059119 -0.096291 -0.105857 0.000746 -0.028022 -0.040305 -0.030406 -0.104081 
2013M12 0.136958 0.051153 0.023289 -0.014649 -0.000437 0.012912 -0.000211 0.053706 
2014M01 0.181622 0.308865 0.313280 -0.961922 0.008219 -0.071511 0.007349 0.328151 
2014M02 0.160436 -0.063838 -0.033583 -0.087681 -0.046298 -0.044473 -0.046317 -0.066137 
2014M03 0.095166 0.109255 -0.082284 -0.142558 -0.136443 -0.119073 -0.140931 0.113597 
2014M04 0.693589 -0.167018 -1.749594 0.534263 0.474331 0.448238 0.481200 -0.171184 
2014M05 0.124781 0.018890 -0.038786 -0.029583 -0.053228 -0.057124 -0.051776 0.020065 
2014M06 0.130388 -0.061547 -0.051209 -0.062455 0.006751 0.005850 0.005268 -0.063815 
2014M07 0.068682 -0.017963 -0.013718 -0.006929 -0.011043 -0.010450 -0.011084 -0.018682 
2014M08 0.062446 0.085191 -0.024235 0.035723 -0.042384 -0.053970 -0.042667 0.088821 
2014M09 0.095789 -0.005262 0.004206 0.012695 0.007831 0.006820 0.007746 -0.005632 
2014M10 0.114706 -0.017114 -0.065490 -0.025968 -0.055972 -0.052154 -0.056739 -0.019349 
2014M11 0.277773 -0.005801 0.048411 0.009375 0.024038 0.017985 0.020799 -0.004658 
2014M12 0.242874 0.109228 0.083014 0.066328 0.052797 0.083446 0.057289 0.107986 
2015M01 0.438295 0.047834 0.002210 0.033859 -0.012440 -0.010454 -0.012160 0.047193 
2015M02 0.331240 0.141432 -0.078806 -0.181796 -0.076674 -0.092405 -0.079746 0.136949 
2015M03 0.243676 0.016307 0.009720 -0.000873 0.005980 0.004477 0.005723 0.016009 
2015M04 0.293695 0.079171 0.033375 0.008487 -0.008756 -0.002557 -0.011204 0.078194 
2015M05 0.701508 -0.152508 -0.241324 -0.031223 0.012732 0.031874 -0.026111 -0.151731 
2015M06 0.139777 -0.103138 0.048596 -0.175290 -0.128768 -0.094162 -0.130901 -0.094441 
         
         
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
The influence statistics indicate the presence of outliers. 
1. RStudent: 2 outliers 
2. DFFITS: 4 outliers 
3. COVRATIO: 12 outliers 
4. Hat Matrix: 15 outliers 
5. DFBETAS 
 Intercept: 6 outliers 
 Inflation: 1 outliers 
 Industrial Production: 3 outliers 
 Real Interest Rate: 3 outliers 
 Risk Premium: 2 outliers 
 Term Structure: 3 outliers 
 Oil Price: 2 outliers 
 FEARS: 1 outliers 
The results from the leverage plots and influence statistics indicate that model (2) lacks 
explanatory power. The number of outliers for each variable is low and hence this cannot be 
said to be the reason behind the result. 
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8. United Kingdom 
Endogeneity tests were conducted on regression models (1) and (2) and all variables were found to be exogenous. The 
found to be exogenous. The robustness checks on (2) can also be found in Table D1 above. The residual of (2) was 
The residual of (2) was found to be stationary, normally distributed and no ARCH effects were found to be present. 
found to be present. The leverage plots and influence statistics (Figure D8 and  
 
 
 
Table D9 below) are in alignment with the regression results and indicate that outliers are not 
an issue in this model. Finally, output (5) in Table C10 in Appendix C shows the result of a 
correlation analysis between FEARS and the FTSE VIX. This relationship was found to be 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. This could indicate that the 
relationship found between FEARS and FTSE returns may not be a true one and is instead 
driven by noise (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990). Overall, (2) suffers from 
serially correlated residuals but not from redundant variables or the presence of outliers. 
Moreover, noise could be the driving force behind the relationship found. 
Leverage plots and influence statistics were completed for model (2) – a macroeconomic APT 
model with the FEARS variable included. 
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Figure D8: Leverage Plots - United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D9: Influence Statistics - United Kingdom 
      
      Obs. Resid. RStudent DFFITS   COVRATIO Hat Matrix 
      
      2010M03 0.024701 0.871841 -0.302538 1.159565 0.107475 
2010M04 -0.010780 -0.377270 0.127304 1.260243 0.102222 
2010M05 -0.038099 -1.324334 0.344495 0.959348 0.063378 
2010M06 -0.025359 -0.910129 0.360645 1.185790 0.135711 
2010M07 0.031347 1.113518 -0.393953 1.087336 0.111244 
2010M08 0.005782 0.208062 -0.088166 1.353913 0.152229 
2010M09 0.020927 0.742123 -0.272930 1.210816 0.119140 
2010M10 0.021765 0.751503 -0.207118 1.145260 0.070596 
2010M11 -0.025806 -0.883784 0.206221 1.088013 0.051636 
2010M12 0.007475 0.305010 -0.219026 1.727158 0.340220 
2011M01 0.040666 1.591541 -0.921336 1.075693 0.251004 
2011M02 -0.003897 -0.135942 0.044924 1.277758 0.098456 
2011M03 -0.035912 -1.327745 0.605095 1.083785 0.171974 
2011M04 0.015659 0.567964 -0.249203 1.314464 0.161436 
2011M05 0.009502 0.336024 -0.124848 1.293115 0.121301 
2011M06 -0.010261 -0.360095 0.124868 1.269798 0.107339 
2011M07 0.007260 0.258884 -0.102906 1.324591 0.136445 
2011M08 -0.060805 -2.216372 0.742212 0.647942 0.100835 
2011M09 -0.054902 -2.113252 1.055484 0.772834 0.199654 
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2011M10 0.043216 1.550191 -0.546087 0.922199 0.110395 
2011M11 0.012854 0.450986 -0.155045 1.253992 0.105699 
2011M12 0.011320 0.406310 -0.168119 1.320757 0.146179 
2012M01 0.007076 0.254819 -0.108444 1.351432 0.153340 
2012M02 0.014588 0.523837 -0.215922 1.298558 0.145228 
2012M03 -0.013654 -0.473563 0.143874 1.221258 0.084502 
2012M04 -0.012105 -0.421837 0.135816 1.242269 0.093925 
2012M05 -0.045930 -1.705117 0.750189 0.913014 0.162176 
2012M06 0.027093 1.000161 -0.469554 1.220353 0.180603 
2012M07 0.008598 0.300603 -0.100921 1.268476 0.101296 
2012M08 -0.019823 -0.709253 0.280713 1.242142 0.135432 
2012M09 0.029335 1.066770 -0.454288 1.158319 0.153512 
2012M10 -0.015638 -0.548412 0.186197 1.233210 0.103359 
2012M11 -0.008969 -0.313835 0.106151 1.268906 0.102660 
2012M12 0.004232 0.148509 -0.051900 1.291976 0.108841 
2013M01 0.013497 0.498103 -0.242148 1.377527 0.191156 
2013M02 0.028463 1.040444 -0.459229 1.180822 0.163050 
2013M03 0.015452 0.526874 -0.123254 1.170174 0.051886 
2013M04 0.032094 1.117691 -0.318678 1.043555 0.075182 
2013M05 -0.024473 -0.893942 0.398953 1.234143 0.166090 
2013M06 -0.059856 -2.225954 0.881458 0.670147 0.135553 
2013M07 0.029506 1.073514 -0.458187 1.156736 0.154096 
2013M08 -0.031201 -1.094952 0.344467 1.068234 0.090057 
2013M09 0.013195 0.455349 -0.130195 1.212432 0.075574 
2013M10 0.047642 1.659128 -0.382294 0.822986 0.050416 
2013M11 -0.006303 -0.213486 0.045449 1.199430 0.043357 
2013M12 0.022318 0.774043 -0.225650 1.149166 0.078328 
2014M01 -0.044758 -1.658389 0.727034 0.932008 0.161210 
2014M02 0.034280 1.175788 -0.253268 0.990941 0.044341 
2014M03 -0.037010 -1.256272 0.183252 0.940706 0.020835 
2014M04 0.029404 0.998243 -0.179113 1.032712 0.031190 
2014M05 0.003322 0.112113 -0.021899 1.196936 0.036753 
2014M06 -0.049281 -1.745807 0.506652 0.813456 0.077680 
2014M07 0.003136 0.107314 -0.027892 1.231017 0.063277 
2014M08 0.022599 0.769868 -0.166689 1.109836 0.044780 
2014M09 -0.017837 -0.603360 0.115119 1.135561 0.035125 
2014M10 0.015352 0.537253 -0.178907 1.230518 0.099821 
2014M11 0.034129 1.194032 -0.353884 1.023888 0.080747 
2014M12 0.016249 0.606860 -0.311411 1.383346 0.208437 
2015M01 0.010448 0.445249 -0.358999 1.851880 0.393977 
2015M02 0.021580 0.866125 -0.580411 1.501836 0.309900 
2015M03 -0.028838 -1.107859 0.623081 1.274333 0.240303 
2015M04 0.016398 0.589549 -0.243947 1.286334 0.146188 
2015M05 -0.008773 -0.307872 0.107080 1.277068 0.107915 
2015M06 -0.062192 -2.317923 0.909173 0.632302 0.133336 
      
      
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
         
         
Obs. 
INDUSTRIAL_P
RODUCTION INFLATION OIL_PRICE 
REAL_INTERE
ST_RATE 
RISK_PREMIU
M 
TERM_STRU
CTURE FEARS C 
         
         2010M03 0.107475 0.192621 0.036340 0.076966 0.025752 -0.032403 -0.054381 -0.126852 
2010M04 0.102222 -0.008071 -0.067769 -0.008595 -0.057833 -0.086166 -0.084228 -0.020008 
2010M05 0.063378 0.079755 -0.184288 -0.001837 -0.180218 -0.078051 -0.068263 -0.183643 
2010M06 0.135711 0.024373 -0.066565 -0.001957 -0.076485 0.242304 0.230803 -0.194467 
2010M07 0.111244 0.032993 0.133414 -0.009628 0.184272 0.024948 0.033435 -0.257714 
2010M08 0.152229 -0.008689 0.028556 0.022558 0.019155 0.060309 0.048278 -0.009117 
2010M09 0.119140 0.000655 0.118452 0.004250 0.137030 0.065179 0.078919 -0.192272 
2010M10 0.070596 0.079067 0.105034 0.038109 0.114156 0.073145 0.083429 0.031208 
2010M11 0.051636 -0.004399 -0.140403 -0.020531 -0.133011 -0.058532 -0.078263 -0.018281 
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2010M12 0.340220 0.050915 0.005655 0.020361 -0.014295 -0.156640 -0.152302 -0.082289 
2011M01 0.251004 0.256430 0.192382 -0.046105 0.278215 -0.045485 0.027295 0.736662 
2011M02 0.098456 -0.001198 -0.023320 0.002730 -0.018366 -0.014677 -0.014350 0.024531 
2011M03 0.171974 -0.427306 -0.173228 0.089539 -0.240272 -0.118398 -0.099664 0.055670 
2011M04 0.161436 0.012064 0.156863 -0.059561 0.126296 -0.003882 -0.011229 -0.057207 
2011M05 0.121301 -0.063085 0.098696 -0.063670 0.099463 0.027241 0.033674 0.017344 
2011M06 0.107339 0.006284 -0.073865 0.062636 -0.092857 0.006899 -0.006130 0.001274 
2011M07 0.136445 0.030467 0.018089 -0.029025 0.029998 -0.015802 -0.025350 0.051195 
2011M08 0.100835 0.504935 -0.359654 0.131384 -0.224024 0.024971 0.038975 0.032693 
2011M09 0.199654 -0.260926 0.093180 -0.006069 0.143362 0.898877 0.929724 -0.152616 
2011M10 0.110395 -0.064451 0.140278 -0.182760 0.166195 -0.295704 -0.261122 -0.311504 
2011M11 0.105699 0.005060 0.052180 -0.038669 0.058378 0.119279 0.112368 0.041192 
2011M12 0.146179 -0.020305 -0.022569 -0.035060 -0.033776 -0.123944 -0.138097 -0.005979 
2012M01 0.153340 0.041759 -0.064112 -0.032225 -0.041179 -0.004973 -0.007638 0.008390 
2012M02 0.145228 0.023788 0.013837 -0.031278 0.001854 0.162600 0.164207 -0.047544 
2012M03 0.084502 -0.035858 -0.016849 0.057228 -0.024479 -0.087961 -0.087863 -0.030120 
2012M04 0.093925 0.080313 -0.054385 0.057868 -0.033240 -0.022488 -0.021971 0.052021 
2012M05 0.162176 0.208710 0.044439 0.208120 0.031252 -0.066869 0.066593 -0.091281 
2012M06 0.180603 -0.247788 0.002629 -0.142667 0.040470 -0.164380 -0.095511 -0.117152 
2012M07 0.101296 0.051326 -0.041801 0.007551 -0.036293 0.034341 0.012651 -0.002983 
2012M08 0.135432 -0.162480 0.171497 -0.038886 0.180569 -0.051881 -0.022082 0.075731 
2012M09 0.153512 -0.048803 -0.167743 -0.003076 -0.192148 0.033984 0.081440 0.285057 
2012M10 0.103359 0.044133 0.066416 -0.003772 0.091224 -0.061043 -0.064402 0.067874 
2012M11 0.102660 0.006937 0.065691 -0.001532 0.071406 -0.026148 -0.015969 0.045887 
2012M12 0.108841 -0.017751 -0.026569 0.004168 -0.034797 0.005131 0.005198 0.001605 
2013M01 0.191156 0.076937 -0.051246 -0.063459 -0.001086 0.018487 0.036155 -0.097272 
2013M02 0.163050 0.185648 -0.242627 0.064249 -0.282476 -0.010034 -0.060272 0.204523 
2013M03 0.051886 0.002933 -0.051641 -0.022050 -0.058679 0.002246 -0.018050 0.021150 
2013M04 0.075182 -0.230808 0.028607 -0.098696 0.004365 0.019795 0.026763 0.140217 
2013M05 0.166090 0.143602 -0.025008 0.098567 -0.017267 -0.045023 -0.100681 0.257898 
2013M06 0.135553 0.095310 0.123409 0.244178 0.014178 0.209840 0.033372 -0.246790 
2013M07 0.154096 0.300571 -0.233237 -0.054367 -0.176526 -0.265135 -0.292703 -0.068777 
2013M08 0.090057 0.114246 0.043343 0.092076 0.065658 -0.040310 -0.098966 -0.080143 
2013M09 0.075574 -0.018416 -0.079032 -0.014718 -0.092565 -0.028828 -0.034135 0.032953 
2013M10 0.050416 -0.265457 -0.017973 -0.167068 -0.030782 0.034094 0.039497 0.002441 
2013M11 0.043357 0.016497 0.011435 0.011278 0.010832 -0.009281 -0.013963 -0.013509 
2013M12 0.078328 -0.011041 -0.102659 0.003939 -0.118972 -0.064209 -0.043870 0.110206 
2014M01 0.161210 -0.300616 0.460763 0.055619 0.314612 0.028916 0.106762 -0.019491 
2014M02 0.044341 -0.096581 -0.027688 -0.013780 -0.074342 -0.006225 -0.005496 -0.078787 
2014M03 0.020835 0.066144 0.004636 0.047812 0.010139 -0.013526 -0.022048 0.032931 
2014M04 0.031190 -0.099352 0.056197 -0.037852 0.029028 0.005231 0.007247 -0.011965 
2014M05 0.036753 0.005955 -0.010315 -0.004602 -0.006669 -0.001122 -0.002492 -2.60E-05 
2014M06 0.077680 0.064856 0.242896 0.068481 0.259596 0.078924 0.071430 0.306539 
2014M07 0.063277 -0.003152 0.004289 -0.011151 0.009913 -0.000558 0.000887 0.004239 
2014M08 0.044780 -0.064855 0.010373 0.000144 -0.015011 -0.036907 -0.052600 0.015081 
2014M09 0.035125 0.033776 -0.014801 0.019667 -0.024788 0.000440 -0.012983 -0.054254 
2014M10 0.099821 -0.119112 0.072167 -0.010940 0.063716 -0.059365 -0.051127 0.052877 
2014M11 0.080747 0.067496 -0.102112 0.126605 -0.059839 -0.014501 -0.065987 0.039667 
2014M12 0.208437 -0.197151 0.036180 0.142433 0.007568 0.024062 0.025622 0.082616 
2015M01 0.393977 -0.006461 -0.061630 0.179465 -0.033500 0.031522 -0.010913 -0.123996 
2015M02 0.309900 0.108448 -0.082341 0.406312 -0.099202 -0.036975 0.041713 0.145074 
2015M03 0.240303 -0.286107 0.185779 -0.554619 0.205590 -0.031404 0.047215 -0.028376 
2015M04 0.146188 0.000105 0.038862 0.174073 0.030419 -0.005567 0.026152 0.001330 
2015M05 0.107915 -0.046355 0.012274 -0.093772 0.014062 0.012099 0.016678 0.004543 
2015M06 0.133336 0.106820 -0.249702 -0.538592 -0.261315 0.001958 -0.127782 -0.202668 
         
         
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
The influence statistics indicate the presence of outliers. 
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1. RStudent: 4 outliers 
2. DFFITS: 7 outliers 
3. COVRATIO: 5 outliers 
4. Hat Matrix: 31 outliers 
5. DFBETAS 
 Intercept: 6 outliers 
 Inflation: 8 outliers 
 Industrial Production: 4 outliers 
 Real Interest Rate: 5 outliers 
 Risk Premium: 5 outliers 
 Term Structure: 3 outliers 
 Oil Price: 2 outliers 
 FEARS: 3 outliers 
The results from the leverage plots and influence statistics indicate that model (2) has very little 
explanatory power. Outliers are not necessarily the cause of this as even variables with few 
outliers did not turn out to be statistically significant. 
 
9. United States 
Endogeneity tests were conducted on regression models (1) and (2) and all variables were 
found to be exogenous. The robustness checks on (2) can also be found in Table D1 above. 
The residual of (2) was found to be stationary, normally distributed and no ARCH effects were 
found to be present. The leverage plots and influence statistics (Figure D9 and Table D10 
below) are consistent with the regression results and indicate that outlier could be a reason 
behind the poor explanatory power of the model, as the number of outliers observed in this 
model is relatively higher than those observed in other countries’ models. Finally, output (6) 
in Table C10 in Appendix C shows the result of correlation analysis between FEARS and the 
S&P500 VIX. This relationship was found to be positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level of significance. This could indicate that the relationship found between FEARS and 
S&P500 returns is as a result of noise trading (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 
1990) and not necessarily indicative of a true statistical relationship. Overall, (2) suffers from 
213 
 
serially correlated residuals, a redundant variable and to a lesser degree the presence of outliers. 
Moreover, noise trading could be the driving force behind the relationship found. 
Leverage plots and influence statistics were completed for model (2) – a macroeconomic APT 
model with the FEARS variable included. 
Figure D9: Leverage Plots - United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D10: Influence Statistics - United States 
      
      Obs. Resid. RStudent DFFITS   COVRATIO Hat Matrix 
      
      2010M02 0.005701 0.206539 -0.089074 1.358101 0.156826 
2010M03 0.036624 1.294066 -0.401583 0.997820 0.087843 
2010M04 0.004479 0.156488 -0.050274 1.266583 0.093554 
2010M05 -0.053877 -2.134767 1.194200 0.808935 0.238347 
2010M06 -0.025585 -0.941123 0.425646 1.224049 0.169816 
2010M07 0.017788 0.696426 -0.426101 1.477849 0.272383 
2010M08 -0.008432 -0.302056 0.120345 1.317723 0.136993 
2010M09 0.051521 1.867455 -0.642855 0.794760 0.105947 
2010M10 0.022792 0.789051 -0.211698 1.130493 0.067148 
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2010M11 -0.006694 -0.233583 0.073889 1.257559 0.090961 
2010M12 0.008283 0.304237 -0.142085 1.384979 0.179056 
2011M01 0.029792 1.056113 -0.357031 1.096405 0.102564 
2011M02 0.013928 0.490294 -0.166923 1.242343 0.103870 
2011M03 -0.021074 -0.779775 0.369759 1.294366 0.183575 
2011M04 0.028834 1.047438 -0.432489 1.154653 0.145655 
2011M05 -0.020647 -0.741937 0.293434 1.232038 0.135261 
2011M06 -0.034717 -1.203067 0.291324 0.994454 0.055389 
2011M07 -0.006481 -0.228705 0.080872 1.286524 0.111140 
2011M08 -0.030354 -1.088568 0.405808 1.109830 0.122016 
2011M09 -0.051078 -2.259715 1.782261 0.929776 0.383502 
2011M10 0.054997 2.032072 -0.786619 0.749806 0.130320 
2011M11 -0.009359 -0.340393 0.149906 1.352999 0.162440 
2011M12 0.007489 0.259226 -0.074299 1.234855 0.075915 
2012M01 0.037667 1.320972 -0.370486 0.972233 0.072924 
2012M02 0.010227 0.353841 -0.100121 1.222320 0.074129 
2012M03 -0.019043 -0.726998 0.401964 1.395416 0.234132 
2012M04 0.004604 0.161395 -0.053774 1.275256 0.099919 
2012M05 -0.022065 -0.794207 0.316246 1.220384 0.136856 
2012M06 -0.000422 -0.014565 0.004110 1.243821 0.073760 
2012M07 0.023849 0.827378 -0.227049 1.124121 0.070032 
2012M08 -0.005577 -0.196836 0.069821 1.289917 0.111761 
2012M09 0.020795 0.724679 -0.215001 1.163328 0.080901 
2012M10 -0.046229 -1.609564 0.351886 0.840710 0.045615 
2012M11 -0.016592 -0.586856 0.207062 1.233527 0.110708 
2012M12 -0.031800 -1.114101 0.326585 1.049855 0.079130 
2013M01 0.015330 0.525747 -0.127134 1.172379 0.055244 
2013M02 0.014211 0.499071 -0.165865 1.234743 0.099468 
2013M03 0.028002 0.959903 -0.204729 1.057092 0.043510 
2013M04 0.022211 0.772430 -0.221496 1.145490 0.075979 
2013M05 -0.049112 -1.831488 0.791184 0.858397 0.157267 
2013M06 -0.071412 -2.698943 1.020840 0.495110 0.125158 
2013M07 0.020122 0.740844 -0.342737 1.293710 0.176295 
2013M08 -0.038194 -1.364479 0.466817 0.990683 0.104783 
2013M09 0.027462 0.946918 -0.228619 1.073767 0.055080 
2013M10 0.049883 1.813493 -0.651278 0.823956 0.114240 
2013M11 0.009988 0.351004 -0.118725 1.261548 0.102663 
2013M12 -0.018994 -0.660046 0.190859 1.173395 0.077162 
2014M01 -0.029923 -1.051265 0.323409 1.078619 0.086459 
2014M02 0.045462 1.613954 -0.481833 0.872186 0.081834 
2014M03 -0.003404 -0.120105 0.042520 1.293843 0.111375 
2014M04 -0.005735 -0.193907 0.035309 1.183940 0.032094 
2014M05 0.016827 0.573983 -0.123290 1.150015 0.044103 
2014M06 -0.004247 -0.143729 0.027106 1.189572 0.034344 
2014M07 -0.011941 -0.413644 0.118321 1.216329 0.075634 
2014M08 0.031770 1.099828 -0.271364 1.030176 0.057384 
2014M09 -0.019573 -0.680256 0.196432 1.168651 0.076966 
2014M10 0.012850 0.445870 -0.129931 1.215011 0.078273 
2014M11 0.036859 1.353922 -0.576821 1.052018 0.153624 
2014M12 -0.009239 -0.335491 0.146237 1.349165 0.159663 
2015M01 -0.016199 -0.718165 0.626645 1.885784 0.432259 
2015M02 0.029282 1.160133 -0.721006 1.320745 0.278626 
2015M03 -0.004031 -0.152464 0.082558 1.484994 0.226735 
2015M04 -0.003829 -0.136616 0.053088 1.322552 0.131191 
2015M05 0.001406 0.050293 -0.019886 1.331766 0.135212 
2015M06 -0.045172 -1.636293 0.595594 0.897971 0.116989 
      
      
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
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Obs. 
INDUSTRIAL_P
RODUCTION INFLATION OIL_PRICE 
REAL_INTE
REST_RATE 
RISK_PREMI
UM 
TERM_STR
UCTURE FEARS C 
         
         2010M02 0.156826 0.009360 -0.005199 0.028457 -0.016628 -0.010458 -0.011266 -0.048135 
2010M03 0.087843 0.248848 0.183082 0.127163 -0.168737 -0.193486 -0.173974 0.015354 
2010M04 0.093554 0.006152 0.003857 0.002847 0.029984 0.030024 0.028345 -0.015160 
2010M05 0.238347 -0.963931 -0.106149 -0.437080 -0.304273 -0.330755 -0.305530 -0.310104 
2010M06 0.169816 0.007821 0.045227 -0.100014 0.251122 0.232047 0.244677 -0.216025 
2010M07 0.272383 0.090930 0.005780 0.083666 0.009156 0.023944 0.015504 -0.390578 
2010M08 0.136993 -0.002926 -0.008511 -0.045016 -0.064991 -0.077997 -0.067410 -0.028077 
2010M09 0.105947 0.050499 -0.018901 0.186248 -0.072805 -0.043781 -0.047689 -0.499616 
2010M10 0.067148 -0.119923 -0.033292 0.021662 0.136982 0.130492 0.134684 0.031267 
2010M11 0.090961 0.016566 0.021532 -0.011841 -0.042686 -0.040596 -0.044430 -0.038278 
2010M12 0.179056 0.087658 0.007774 2.53E-05 -0.038934 -0.056501 -0.043198 -0.020163 
2011M01 0.102564 -0.082672 0.105485 -0.006737 0.016028 0.001844 0.010195 0.286029 
2011M02 0.103870 -0.120596 0.041530 -0.034456 0.046195 0.052826 0.048735 -0.033577 
2011M03 0.183575 -0.195106 -0.289578 0.017566 0.073473 0.071772 0.075228 0.097529 
2011M04 0.145655 -0.243136 0.170005 -0.191026 -0.064586 -0.058936 -0.075096 0.106106 
2011M05 0.135261 0.004459 -0.094901 0.041943 0.034227 9.34E-05 0.019535 0.154700 
2011M06 0.055389 0.043557 0.180270 0.150981 -0.064937 -0.056534 -0.069675 -0.048139 
2011M07 0.111140 -0.006695 0.001811 0.034083 0.036655 0.035965 0.039331 -0.033526 
2011M08 0.122016 -0.090052 -0.106826 0.065799 -0.025077 -0.073326 -0.022575 0.065694 
2011M09 0.383502 0.274461 -0.057286 0.138170 1.153908 0.978172 1.065592 -0.043707 
2011M10 0.130320 0.303070 -0.313056 -0.254496 -0.317921 -0.394648 -0.330239 -0.151578 
2011M11 0.162440 0.064478 0.058009 0.041348 -0.118149 -0.120524 -0.118324 -0.005846 
2011M12 0.075915 0.014475 -0.034581 -0.027330 -0.039088 -0.036727 -0.039387 -0.003959 
2012M01 0.072924 0.201866 0.162259 -0.038292 0.102190 0.116663 0.101721 -0.098567 
2012M02 0.074129 -0.001323 0.020192 -0.036907 0.058627 0.051480 0.057034 -0.002096 
2012M03 0.234132 0.209982 -0.131389 0.161051 -0.044825 -0.018304 -0.029208 0.053694 
2012M04 0.099919 0.028116 0.016324 -0.015399 -0.015722 -0.012464 -0.016519 -0.003361 
2012M05 0.136856 0.087471 0.086691 0.083151 -0.055752 -0.080805 -0.052958 -0.159673 
2012M06 0.073760 0.001372 0.001879 0.000879 0.001533 0.001713 0.001532 0.001809 
2012M07 0.070032 -0.019266 -0.101440 -0.057591 0.102311 0.110358 0.096878 0.039550 
2012M08 0.111761 0.042819 -0.020283 0.015176 -0.006810 -0.009411 -0.009063 0.017812 
2012M09 0.080901 -0.036552 0.049349 -0.053132 0.024644 0.012316 0.021752 0.157434 
2012M10 0.045615 0.015114 0.174580 0.161888 -0.127999 -0.114373 -0.128863 0.100565 
2012M11 0.110708 -0.014591 0.151869 0.079069 -0.043432 -0.041371 -0.040619 0.065804 
2012M12 0.079130 0.025250 0.231176 0.130416 -0.007897 0.017013 -0.008409 0.064478 
2013M01 0.055244 -0.024025 -0.001475 -0.036846 0.029763 0.021202 0.032590 -0.003045 
2013M02 0.099468 0.031659 0.136811 -0.013622 -0.007864 0.001709 -0.007336 -0.006419 
2013M03 0.043510 -0.006359 0.038253 -0.072402 -0.071891 -0.081253 -0.080169 0.072607 
2013M04 0.075979 -0.095024 -0.084551 -0.035387 0.049265 0.073973 0.056931 -0.053619 
2013M05 0.157267 0.126681 0.126694 0.067262 -0.137344 -0.074560 -0.157004 0.296944 
2013M06 0.125158 -0.079198 -0.046035 0.217844 0.302532 0.446517 0.348029 0.123707 
2013M07 0.176295 -0.147428 -0.050442 -0.107674 -0.236498 -0.253225 -0.241804 0.049966 
2013M08 0.104783 -0.216456 0.069316 0.009589 -0.156525 -0.142327 -0.170067 -0.189579 
2013M09 0.055080 0.094699 0.009839 -0.068748 -0.120546 -0.121119 -0.126502 0.028521 
2013M10 0.114240 -0.226115 -0.393029 -0.126028 0.214719 0.240399 0.238723 0.210299 
2013M11 0.102663 -0.008105 -0.070563 -0.028698 0.076247 0.066529 0.074416 0.041012 
2013M12 0.077162 -0.011364 0.059115 0.074374 0.016230 0.041719 0.024507 0.016468 
2014M01 0.086459 0.156640 -0.106196 0.055488 0.048047 0.010259 0.045881 0.098203 
2014M02 0.081834 0.287465 0.148348 0.045206 -0.062923 -0.052367 -0.047940 0.144407 
2014M03 0.111375 -0.026377 -0.025908 -0.002727 -0.004460 -0.002489 -0.003216 -0.005020 
2014M04 0.032094 0.001574 -0.014856 0.008477 0.010497 0.010567 0.011629 0.005478 
2014M05 0.044103 0.022937 0.054708 -0.008263 -0.029764 -0.017240 -0.026715 -0.053694 
2014M06 0.034344 -0.009467 -0.000845 0.005243 -0.002576 -0.002554 -0.003070 0.014024 
2014M07 0.075634 -0.006334 0.041259 0.016972 -0.032158 -0.024080 -0.029205 -0.092317 
2014M08 0.057384 -0.089557 -0.114763 -0.062282 -0.129936 -0.118970 -0.132750 -0.045356 
2014M09 0.076966 -0.066379 0.032104 -0.048678 -0.042768 -0.037759 -0.049456 -0.093729 
2014M10 0.078273 -0.008048 -0.049598 0.011677 -0.082705 -0.082186 -0.084510 -0.019592 
2014M11 0.153624 0.267854 -0.319457 0.208191 0.200465 0.206095 0.203612 0.087420 
216 
 
2014M12 0.159663 0.007180 0.082868 -0.069834 0.000780 0.008308 0.003514 -0.039890 
2015M01 0.432259 0.125025 0.072470 -0.256610 0.135196 0.103897 0.151091 0.198331 
2015M02 0.278626 -0.034619 0.156954 0.491251 -0.049763 -0.070108 -0.024372 0.140191 
2015M03 0.226735 0.010722 -0.040218 -0.058850 -0.023118 -0.023723 -0.021590 -0.015473 
2015M04 0.131191 0.009461 -0.009515 -0.038433 0.006684 0.009386 0.007573 -0.012323 
2015M05 0.135212 -0.007658 0.008524 0.013621 0.003295 0.003402 0.003416 0.000953 
2015M06 0.116989 -0.009531 -0.197579 -0.461766 0.045405 0.079939 0.048224 -0.029550 
         
         
Note: Outliers are highlighted in red 
 
The influence statistics indicate the presence of outliers. 
1. RStudent: 4 outliers 
2. DFFITS: 6 outliers 
3. COVRATIO: 6 outliers 
4. Hat Matrix: 30 outliers 
5. DFBETAS 
 Intercept: 5 outliers 
 Inflation: 6 outliers 
 Industrial Production: 4 outliers 
 Real Interest Rate: 5 outliers 
 Risk Premium: 5 outliers 
 Term Structure: 5 outliers 
 Oil Price: 4 outliers 
 FEARS: 4 outliers 
The results from the leverage plots and influence statistics indicate that model (2) lacks some 
explanatory power as only two variables are statistically significant. Although this model has 
more outliers than seen in other countries it does not seem to be reason for the model as even 
those variables with fewer outliers were not declared to be statistically significant. 
 
 
